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Chit-Chat » Elements in the Philosophy of Religion » 8/29/2018 4:54 pm

Ouros
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DanielCC wrote:

Calhoun wrote:

Always interesting to read the blog posts.And also there is a new paper by Matthew James Collier on Modal realism and Classical theism, says their combination is either incompatible or lead to Modal collapse , among other things..

Ultimately I think any form of modal realism faces modal collapse because every being, or at least every worldbound being, is essentially the way it is. The indexical takes of existence and actual are just semantic ways of sugaring the pill.

Interestingly Almeida comes close to admitting this in his chapter on the cosmological argument and modal realism:  'Of course it is also true that the actual world and everything in it necessarily exists, since the actual world is one region of a necessarily existing pluriverse' (p79)

Something which seems very strange to me is to reconcile omnipotence and modal collapse: if God couldn't have done otherwise, in what sense can we say he's omnipotent?

Theoretical Philosophy » Imagination as a perfect guide to possibility » 8/29/2018 4:22 pm

Ouros
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Hello everyone. http://cdn.boardhost.com/emoticons/happy.png


I was thinking about modal knowledge after reading a bunch of things about Husserl and his eidetic reduction,
It seems to me that "if we can imagine X, then X is possible" is clearly true. I fail to see how to form qualia in our mind could make us see an impossible word, even by mixing any of them.

So I tried to think about some counter-example, and I could found only one; a Penrose triangle:

https://www.illusionsindex.org/images/illusions/penrose-triangle/PenroseTriangle.jpg


But I'm not so sure, even if he's one of the so-called "impossible objects". Maybe some non-euclidean space could accodomate it?

What then is wrong: 1) the infaillibility of imagination as modal guide or 2) the impossibility of this figure?

I would bet on 2, but I'm curious about your views.

Practical Philosophy » The naturalist narrative » 7/24/2018 7:39 am

Ouros
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Isn't this idea of teleological bias ultimately a petitio principii? Obviously, for every theists, every events comes from a personal source in the end.

I was also thinking about materialist accounts of mental life. Is there some clear account where even non-materialists, in general, agree that some parts of it is now explainable in a purely material way? (And where non-materialists were thinking that it wasn't possible.)

Practical Philosophy » The naturalist narrative » 7/24/2018 6:49 am

Ouros
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Hello everyone.

You all certainly heard about the naturalist meta-narrative of history:

Our ancestors were a bunch of superstitious people who put supernatural being and substance beyond every natural phenomen. But with the progress of science/philosophy/whatever fields, we now know that it's false.
So, by extending this idea, we can be sure that everything that can't be explained in natural ways now, will be in some future.


What about that?
Is there some truth in that, or is it more like a distorted view of history?

It would be interesting to know everyone's opinion, and if you have some book on that subject, either from a naturalist or non-naturalist point of view.

Chit-Chat » ​Who are your three biggest philosophical influences? » 7/05/2018 8:52 am

Ouros
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John West wrote:

And where is our glorious Frenchman? I've studied under French professors, so I have an idea of the kind of rubbish you probably have to deal with whenever philosophy comes up. (Anglos have to contend with lots of naturalists, but at least they're still objectively-minded. The French have to contend with rampant postmodernism.) How does someone surrounded by all that get to Thomism?

It's a bit out of place, and maybe too much personal, but I'm curious: on what circumstances did you study under French professors?
Apart from that, even if I'm not sctricto sensu from France, only a francophone, I wouldn't say that they got a big problem with postmodernism: maybe the academics aren't very much "analytics", but on public matters, I would say that the USA are ahead on this level.

Theoretical Philosophy » What are the best responses to Kant's transcendental idealism? » 7/01/2018 10:51 am

Ouros
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Hello everyone.

A big problem I've got with Edward Feser, and modern philosophy of religion in general, is that there isn't direct response to kantian affirmations about the nature of metaphysical claims. Now, you're going to say me that someone doesn't have to address every philosophical systems that existed to get a point, but that answer have two problems:
1) It's question begging, exactly as when Feser is saying that to doesn't adress what thomists actually say is question begging.
2) Many arguments for substantial thesis misses the point for a transcendental idealist. Take thoses argument for the truth of the PSR: induction from experience, retorsion argument, no-probability argument and Della Roca's. Kant could, and does, accept each of them in a sense: yet, he could still argue that it isn't a proof for a metaphysical use of the principle.

It seems clear to me that an empiricist position isn't tenable: the examples I gave are good for showing that. But that's not the end of it.

Therefore, let me end on my original question: what are the best responses to Kant's transcendental idealist?

Theoretical Philosophy » Dissolving the Interaction Problem » 6/26/2018 10:34 am

Ouros
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Even if I agree with you, I think that's probably because of the billard balls model of actions which is pretty intuitive. If we take immaterial substance as some  ghostly balls, then immaterial-material interactions are surely unintelligibles.

Theoretical Philosophy » "Objections to St Thomas Aquinas' First Way (The Unmoved Mover)" » 6/25/2018 7:18 am

Ouros
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Noble_monkey wrote:

Hey, I wrote a comprehensive and detailed refutation of this video here while defending the argument here.

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1riQw5-9G4Ac8zYt38ei-ZnsC5in0bJeO6ceQf_RXhvg/edit?usp=sharing

If somebody can post it to youtube, that would be great and appreciated.

Well, you certainly were motivated. That made me think that it would be great to have an argument map for every major, and even minor, theistic argument.
It seems to me that, with it, it would be clear that the so-called "definite objections" were, in fact, already answered.

Theoretical Philosophy » Can God creates a world where some evil is necessary yet... » 6/11/2018 7:55 am

Ouros
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Honestly, I'm not too sure why you would even have differents intuitions in your two different readings. Notwithstanding, I was encompassing both of them in my mind.

I'm not sure that free will would be an instance of E4, because it's an essential part of a moral agent to have at some time the possibility to do evil, and also because there's inherent good to have freedom to have morally significant action. Netherless, I have some reservations about my last part, given that it seems deeply implausible to say that it was good for Hitler to have the possibility to implement the Final Solution, at least good enough to justify the Holocaust.

If I read you well, it seems that your last sentence imply the possibility of gratuitous evil. Would you say that it's possible for God to say to someone who was tortured "Well, there wasn't a particular reason for this, but the global situation is good enough isn't it?" ?

Theoretical Philosophy » Can God creates a world where some evil is necessary yet... » 6/11/2018 7:05 am

Ouros
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not counterbalanced by a greater good?

Let's divide evil in four ways:

E1 := Evil that happens necessarily from a situation, and that isn't compensanted by a greater good.
E2 := Evil that happens necessarily from a situation, and that is compensanted by a greater good.
E3 := Evil that happens contingently from a situation, and that is compensanted by a greater good.
E4 := Evil that happens contingently from a situation, and that isn't compensanted by a greater good.

If theism is true, and I encompass both classical theism and theistic personalism, what of those type are possible?

Intuitively, I would say that E4 is impossible, and E2 and E3 possible. I'm not sure for E1, hence my first question

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