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Theoretical Philosophy » Can God creates a world where some evil is necessary yet... » 6/11/2018 7:55 am

Ouros
Replies: 3

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Honestly, I'm not too sure why you would even have differents intuitions in your two different readings. Notwithstanding, I was encompassing both of them in my mind.

I'm not sure that free will would be an instance of E4, because it's an essential part of a moral agent to have at some time the possibility to do evil, and also because there's inherent good to have freedom to have morally significant action. Netherless, I have some reservations about my last part, given that it seems deeply implausible to say that it was good for Hitler to have the possibility to implement the Final Solution, at least good enough to justify the Holocaust.

If I read you well, it seems that your last sentence imply the possibility of gratuitous evil. Would you say that it's possible for God to say to someone who was tortured "Well, there wasn't a particular reason for this, but the global situation is good enough isn't it?" ?

Theoretical Philosophy » Can God creates a world where some evil is necessary yet... » 6/11/2018 7:05 am

Ouros
Replies: 3

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not counterbalanced by a greater good?

Let's divide evil in four ways:

E1 := Evil that happens necessarily from a situation, and that isn't compensanted by a greater good.
E2 := Evil that happens necessarily from a situation, and that is compensanted by a greater good.
E3 := Evil that happens contingently from a situation, and that is compensanted by a greater good.
E4 := Evil that happens contingently from a situation, and that isn't compensanted by a greater good.

If theism is true, and I encompass both classical theism and theistic personalism, what of those type are possible?

Intuitively, I would say that E4 is impossible, and E2 and E3 possible. I'm not sure for E1, hence my first question

Practical Philosophy » Social sciences and supernatural » 6/11/2018 6:31 am

Ouros
Replies: 5

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I've already heared about this idea of bias for the prophecy of temple destruction, but do you have some source for it? It doesn't have to be an explicit attack on the mere idea of foreseeing events though.

And thank you for all those names, I will look them.

Do you have some books/papers/whatever readings for the "bulverism problem" in social sciences? Do some of them directly treat this?
Or, on the methodological assumptions of psychology, for example.

Practical Philosophy » Social sciences and supernatural » 6/04/2018 4:47 pm

Ouros
Replies: 5

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What psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists and historians are doing.

Practical Philosophy » Social sciences and supernatural » 6/04/2018 4:10 pm

Ouros
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That's more or less questions for people who have enough interest for the methodology of social sciences.

The social sciences are decidedly not my cup of tea. The more I try to read about them, the more I am skeptic about either their methodology, their ontological assumptions, or both. So, here some questions that I'd like to ask:

1) It seems to me that social scientist don't merely assume methodological naturalism, but clearly accept ontological naturalism. It's particulary problematic for sociology of religion/psychology of religion/ whatever humanities of religion, for how could you clearly study the reasons for someone's belief if you don't first show that his belief is true and if he had or not some perception or evidence for it?
Take for example the rural peoples' belief about the little people: personally, I'm agnostic about their existence. But is it the case for the sociologist/anthropologist? Wouldn't he basically explain with maybe a cultural pression, the sake of preserving their culture? Or a tendancy to see intelligence and finality when there is none?

Isn't there here a tendancy to bulverism?
At best, I think that we could only have conditionnal knowledge.

2) Doesn't social scientist assume mechanistic philosophy? It's like the intentionality and beliefs are not explanatory relevant, or that they can simply be reducted to structure that are causally determined by evolution in fine.

3) Does they undermine justification of belief in general? If you can explain by psycholocial means why someone belief X, does X is not to be believed anymore? Or does those methods can't exhaust justification?

Theoretical Philosophy » Criteria of demarcation » 5/23/2018 10:51 am

Ouros
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Is there some "aristotelian consensus" on what is the difference beetween science and not-science? If not, what do you all think about this "problem"?

Maybe something along the line of "the knowledge of empirical quantities and structures only"?

Also, ther's this tendancy to call "pseudo-science" pretty much everything a skeptic doesn't like. So, would you say, if you don't believe in it of course, that things like homeopathy are pseudo-science or just false on a scientific view?

Theoretical Philosophy » Verification critera and self-refutation » 5/23/2018 10:43 am

Ouros
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Well, I think your answers are pretty much correct.
After thinking about it a little much, I think that basically the three ways that he's using is basically the same way to redefine what metaphysicans call truth, and then doing a fallacy of equivocation, which is pretty much useless. And I also think that Greg's remark for the difference beetween verification and understanding is devastating.

Thank's everyone.

Theoretical Philosophy » Verification critera and self-refutation » 5/20/2018 11:23 am

Ouros
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Edward Feser, and a lot of other philosophers, argue that logical positivism is false because of the classical argument arguing that the verification principle is self-refuting.

Yet, I read an interesting blog post saying that it isn't the case, because the principle can be construed as either an analytic statement, or an empirical statement, or a meaningless yet useful statement.
Here it is: https://graspedinthought.org/blog/2017/12/4/why-verificationism-isnt-self-defeating

I was thinking about the "pragmatic" way: the verification principle as an heuristic principle. Now, could we still defend the idea of self-refutation, on the ground that it would mean that it's a ethic statement, with a "You should", and, as such, would still need a truth value.
What do you all think?

Theoretical Philosophy » Materialist's definition of matter » 5/15/2018 3:06 pm

Ouros
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Greg wrote:

If that's the case, then the ​denial of materialism also isn't even wrong. You can't take the negation of nonsense, unless you want some more nonsense.

Fair enough. But I l would say that what materialists call dualists and idealists can define coherently what is matter and what isn't, something not avaible to them.

Theoretical Philosophy » Is life meaningless without an afterlife? » 5/15/2018 6:08 am

Ouros
Replies: 14

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RomanJoe wrote:

Of course the reply might be that to even regard it as a tragedy is only to mirror my own cultural philosophical bias. 

Maybe. But obviously, some civilization had knowledge of that: a lot of them complained about the fatum, wich is an echo of it, I think.
 

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