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Theoretical Philosophy » Why did the modern metaphysical picture of reality prevail? » Yesterday 6:06 pm

RomanJoe
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DanielCC wrote:

Because of the early modern confusion of the a priori, an epistemic notion, with the necessary, a logical/metaphysical notion. This is what lead to Hume's Fork (as he assumed the only prospective form of non narrowly logical necessity was causal necessity) ergo the absurdity of Logical Positivism and towards the idealism of Kant and his followers.

I wouldn't call the modern metaphysical picture nominalist though, as one of the greatest achievements of early 20th century philosophy (Russell, Moore, Frege, Husserl and others) was killing stone-dead the old arguments for nominalism employed by Mill and co.

As for 'Voluntarist' what do you mean? If anything the modern picture from the 17th century onwards has been marked by philosophers trying to smuggle determinism in as a free will under the label of 'compatibilism'. Until Kant there were only a few who protested about this e.g. Reid and Clarke.

With regards to voluntarism and nominalism I'm referring to the shift in late medieval thinking away from the Aristotelian mindset and more towards something approaching theistic personalism--where God's will is seen as something unfettered by essences, final causality, natural kinds. Instead, the divine will in conjunction with omnipotence is viewed as something that could break causal connections, override the constitution of things thus changing what was seemingly their essence or form.

Theoretical Philosophy » Why did the modern metaphysical picture of reality prevail? » 10/18/2018 7:57 pm

RomanJoe
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Why were nominalist, mechanistic, and voluntarist ideas taken seriously enough to eventually have influence? Given the theological and quasi-Aristotelian climate prior to modernity, I find it strange that ideas so contrary to the traditional worldview became so widely accepted. I'm especially thinking of Ockham and his influence.

I have a very rudimentary understanding of the origins of modern philosophical thought, so I would appreciate it if anyone could also direct me to some reputable sources that deal with this question.

Chit-Chat » How do you properly organize your thoughts? » 10/18/2018 1:57 am

RomanJoe
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Brian wrote:

Write in a philosophy journal.  Writing always helps me organize my thoughts.  And often Ill have some "new" thought that I later find in an old journal.  There's really no downside to writing except a time commitment.

I've been meaning to set up an online blog to help my thinking. Do you prefer pen and paper over a keyboard?

Chit-Chat » How do you properly organize your thoughts? » 10/17/2018 7:21 pm

RomanJoe
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At times I have several philosophical ideas bouncing around in my head. Often I feel like my indecision and hesitancy to cast some ideas to the flames and affirm others is due to a lack of mental organization. I have been revisiting the Stoics, and some of their techniques have been very useful in gaining a sort of inner tranquility with regards to anxiety and emotional stability. But my philosophical musings still remain... messy. Any advice?

Practical Philosophy » Why has consent become the ruling principle of ethics? » 10/12/2018 10:58 pm

RomanJoe
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I was having a conversation with a couple of friends. Somehow, after a few beers, we got talking about a notorious case where some guy consented to being cannibalized by another man. Both of them agreed that, since it was his choice and both parties gave full consent, there was nothing wrong with the cannibalization morally. One of them thought it was akin to cases of assisted suicide.

How has the principle of consent become to paramount in ethics? Why have we witnessed this shift towards a sort of tyrannical voluntarism where the will reigns supreme under the condition that it doesn't infringe upon the "freedom" of the will with regards to others? And, most importantly, how does someone argue or find common ground with people who assume that the will's willing is sacrosanct regardless of what it chooses or is directed towards?

Chit-Chat » What will be cast into the metaphysical waste bin in the near future? » 10/06/2018 2:11 pm

RomanJoe
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John West wrote:

I also like to think that a century from now philosophers will look at brute facts and nominalism and ask themselves "what the hell was going on there?"

I would be interested in learning why you think this. I'll have to, in spite of my natural aversion to it, write a blog article defending blob nominalism some time after November. But with brute facts, it helps to take a step back from the theist community and have a look: the PSR has been becoming less and less, not more and more, popular over the last two hundred years. I don't see any sign of a grand revival of belief in it.

I honestly couldn't give a solid reason which is why I prefaced it as something I would "like" to happen. I don't consider myself as philosophically well-rounded as most on this forum, especially with regards to certain philosophical trends in academia. That's partly why I started this thread.

Why do you think PSR has taken such a beating in the past two centuries?

Chit-Chat » What will be cast into the metaphysical waste bin in the near future? » 10/05/2018 3:44 pm

RomanJoe
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I think panpsychism and eleminative materialism won't withstand philosophical scrutiny. I also like to think that a century from now philosophers will look at brute facts and nominalism and ask themselves "what the hell was going on there?"

Theoretical Philosophy » The argument from motion and the Pure Act » 9/24/2018 10:58 pm

RomanJoe
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Calhoun wrote:

Noble_monkey wrote:

Calhoun wrote:

Well if such a being has potencies, its not a pure act then. Its actual action itself is one of its potency which has ended up being actualized. Since we've ruled out infinity of such beings , we get pure act with no potency.

Yes, that's precisely what I am asking. Why can't the actual action itself be not a potency and so does not need to be actualized but the same unmoved mover has other potencies that are "latent" so to speak and are not actualized or needed when he is acting as the unmoved mover. And then maybe those latent potencies are actualized later or even never actualized.

Well that us just what a potency means, if its just one of the action actualized at this particular time then it would require actualizer, If you reject this whole causal principle then that is completely different issue from the question you're asking right now.
 

Perhaps it would be helpful to speak of this in terms of composition where anything that  is a composite of act and potency needs something external to it to explain its specific composition. That is, why is it potentially x and actually y? But again, if you reject the POC or PSR then there's no reason for you to follow these arguments to their conclusions because you don't subscribe to the metaphysical principles they are built on.

Theoretical Philosophy » The argument from motion and the Pure Act » 9/24/2018 8:54 pm

RomanJoe
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Noble_monkey wrote:

RomanJoe wrote:

Noble_monkey wrote:

I do not think that it is enough to demonstrate that essentially-ordered series terminate in an unmoved mover for the argument to go through because an unmoved mover could have passive potencies that are actualized at a later time or never actualized. It seems that the proponent would have to prove that the unmoved mover also is purely actual without passive potencies. Feser would defend this by appealing to an essentially-ordered series where it is the entire existence of the object being actualized. I still do not see why the unmoved mover could not be something whose existence is not actualized but also has passive potencies. So what arguments are there to show that the unmoved mover has no passive potency?

If it is actual in some way and potential in another, you need to explain why it is specifically actual in that way instead of being actual in its potential way.

Why do I need to explain this? I don't accept the PSR.
 

Then you don't need a First Cause.

Theoretical Philosophy » The argument from motion and the Pure Act » 9/24/2018 1:08 am

RomanJoe
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Noble_monkey wrote:

I do not think that it is enough to demonstrate that essentially-ordered series terminate in an unmoved mover for the argument to go through because an unmoved mover could have passive potencies that are actualized at a later time or never actualized. It seems that the proponent would have to prove that the unmoved mover also is purely actual without passive potencies. Feser would defend this by appealing to an essentially-ordered series where it is the entire existence of the object being actualized. I still do not see why the unmoved mover could not be something whose existence is not actualized but also has passive potencies. So what arguments are there to show that the unmoved mover has no passive potency?

If it is actual in some way and potential in another, you need to explain why it is specifically actual in that way instead of being actual in its potential way.

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