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Theoretical Philosophy » Basic question on teleological argument from Aquinas » 2/14/2018 7:17 am

Ouros
Replies: 3

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And given only the subject of teleology, what are the advantage that divine conceptualism as over platonism?
For me, a succesful argument of natural theology is when you can argue your way without too much advanced metaphysics foundations. I know that's the opposite of Edward Feser method, but I think it's a better path if you want to convince someone.

Theoretical Philosophy » Basic question on teleological argument from Aquinas » 2/13/2018 4:05 pm

Ouros
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Hello everyone!

I'm a novice on the fifth way, but here's a worry of mine:

If someone is a platonist, doesn't the teleological argument became the cosmological argument for him?
Let me explain; if you need to explain why there is regularity in nature, he could simply say that this regularity is grounded in the platonic realm by certains laws. And it seems that at this point, the only thing that we could ask, is "Why this regularity rather than another?" But then we're talking about contingency, not the "telos" anymore.

Maybe it's a question that was too many answered, or maybe it's ill-formulated and it doesn't have any sense. Anyway, answers would be great! :-)

Theoretical Philosophy » 'What Caused God' and the Ontological Argument - Sins of Thomism » 2/13/2018 3:46 pm

Ouros
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Miguel wrote:

Personally, my problem with the OA as a standalone argument is how we can successfully argue for the possibility of God without using additional arguments. Contrary to the universe, contingent things etc which we come to know and interact with through our senses in our ordinary (and philosophical) lives, it is harder to discuss the modal possibility of a transcendent being such as God. If we can argue for the first premiss in the ontological argument, then we probably can also give a more direct, clearer argument for God's existence (e.g. Leibnizian cosmological arguments). I think the OA can be useful to perform a modal weakening of premisses in cosmological arguments (or other arguments for God's existence), e.g. Scotus's, Gale-Pruss, etc. If it's at least possible that the universe/contingent things could have an explanation, and that seems undeniable even to those who wrongly reject PSR, and that explanation is a necessary being, then that necessary being exists.

As a standalone argument, however -- which is how OAs have typically been discussed -- it is not very good, in my opinion.

I don't know about that.

In fact, every argument of natural theology need, at least, good developpment of metaphysic thesis which are front door of metaphysics systems, sometimes only one, sometimes more.
In the case of the ontological argument, you need to defend basics of a modal ontology and, also, what is the link beetween epistemic possibility and ontological possibility. If you can succesfuly defend that we posses a good guide to ontological possibility, then the ontological argument will work, and it's as hard as any other theological argument.
For example, I think that the cosmological argument is maybe harder on this point, especially the rationalist version: you need to defend a version of the principle of sufficient which is easy to accept, but enough to make the case that the necessary being that you've proved is God. That's clearly not an easy ta

Theoretical Philosophy » Paper from cosmologist Sean Caroll on "Why is there something?" » 2/10/2018 6:53 am

Ouros
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Right here: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.02231.pdf

It's a prime example for why the scientist are not always good philosopher. But there's something that disturbs me even more: how can he decently wrote on a subject when he doesn't interact AT ALL with the litterature? I mean, all he said can be resumed in one phrase: "The PSR is false, because its defense is antiquated and we don't need it."
Not only the latter doesn't imply the former, but it's also completly false.

Thoughts?
Maybe philosophy should be mandatory to every scientific education.

Theoretical Philosophy » Intelligibility of the universe » 1/22/2018 9:11 am

Ouros
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Isn't your response to 1) a self-defeating, even self-refuting, proposition? It's equivalent to "This phrase haven't any sense.", which is a variant of the liar paradox.

For 2): well, a unintelligible universe would be the same as a universe where you are always disoriented, like if you were always drunk, or under hard drugs, because you wouldn't understand anything. Obviously, this is not the case.
But then, you will probably get to your skeptic scenario that you've written above; so, I can only advice you to use my first answer

Theoretical Philosophy » PSR and the Destruction of Probability » 1/22/2018 9:02 am

Ouros
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aftermathemat wrote:

Actually, it's even worse then that.  We actually KNOW that brute facts by their very definition do not have ANY probability whatsoever. It's not that we can't give brute facts some sort of subjective probability, it is that we positively know that brute facts do not have any objective probability. So it's not merely that brute facts subjectively lack a probability, they lack any actual objective probability as well.
 

I'm OK with that, I follow you on 100%. For me, it's just that subjective evaluation was "larger" than objective one. I will think about this.

Now, I think that you didn't prove that "possibility implies probability". You have shown that probability implies possibility, but not the opposite.
Also, maybe it's a little problematic for libertarian free will; if you can't attribute a free action a certain probability, that would also mean that it's illogic, and if you can, then is it a free act?

Theoretical Philosophy » PSR and the Destruction of Probability » 1/22/2018 8:03 am

Ouros
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Except that an event with a probability of 0 may happen in theory; if you randomly choose a number beetween 0 and 1, the chance that you pick any of them equals zero, but you're sure to pick one of them.
It's a subject for probability theory, with the events that are almost surely, wich mean that they have a 1.0 probability, for example.

That said, I think that there is something to say about your idea that something wich can't even attribute a subjective probability seems like simply impossible.
Also, other consequences with the destruction of probabilities by authorize brute facts is that you can't use induction, abduction, and skeptic scenarios aren't escapables anymore.
 

Theoretical Philosophy » Intelligibility of the universe » 1/22/2018 7:52 am

Ouros
Replies: 6

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Maybe those two points:

1) Talking about a subject presuppose that it is at least barely intelligible, because if it wasn't the case, you could not even talk about it.
2) You could also use some retorsion argument; if the universe wasn't epistemically intelligible, your friend couldn't live in it because he would be paralized by the idea.

That being said, I'm not so sure about this. Maybe it just proves that the universe is only a little bit intelligible, but wouldn't it be enough for your use? Or, other possibility, if the universe is only a litttle bit intelligible, then it's completly intelligible.

Introductions » Bonjour, Hello! » 12/16/2017 3:51 am

Ouros
Replies: 5

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Thank you very much, it will be helpful!

(That's not bad. It's not an easy language.)

Introductions » Bonjour, Hello! » 12/15/2017 4:43 pm

Ouros
Replies: 5

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Hey!
Thank you.

(Oui, j'avais remarqué. Mais bon, Toulouse c'est bien loin de chez moi. Je serais intéressé qu'on discute un des ces quatre sur la situation du débat sur l'existence de Dieu et l'influence de la religion dans nos pays francophones. )

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