​Isn't it Richard Swinburne who thinks that God exists but is not metaphysically necessary?

Sleety Dribble wrote:

But I was going back over one of Ed's older blog posts[1] about the whole somthing-from-nothing debate, and noticed his ending:

"The classical theist's claim is...'There could not have been nothing, and the reason is theism' "

That sounds like a stronger position; namely that God's existence is necessary, period. He's "there", and must be there, regardless of whether anything else exists.
[1] "Steng Operation", April 23 2012 (As a forum newbie I can't post links yet)

I would start by saying, that God's existence is known to be metaphysically necessary if and only if, there's something which is metaphysically contingent. I thought the classical theist's position was that, because there is something metaphysically contingent, there's something metaphysically necessary, and that's the only way to ground the existence of something that is contingent. Something that which is metaphysically necessary, cannot fail to exist. However, if we're going to assume that nothing was or is, then how do we get to God? 

Avicenna's Argument from Contingency Part I & II.

St. Thomas Aquinas's Third Way as presented by Christopher Martin.

Edward Feser's Aquinas counts as well.

EDIT: I wanted to give an Amazon link to Dr. Feser's Aquinas, and now, that's done.

Last edited by Dennis (9/30/2015 2:24 pm)

Dennis wrote:

​Isn't it Richard Swinburne who thinks that God exists but is not metaphysically necessary?

Yes, Swinburne has what can only be called moronic views on necessity and indeed the nature of the logic in general. John Hick was another one (there’s a good article where Harteshorne rips him apart on this).  This used to be a common problem with Anglophone theists in mid-20th century due to toxic overtly contradictory Tractatarian tenants about necessity.

 

Scott wrote:

First: as others have noted with varying degrees of explicitness, the argument of the Third Way shows only that if even one contingent being exists, then a necessary being exists. That doesn't mean that if the antecedent is false (i.e., if no contingent beings exist), then no necessary being exists. At most, it would mean that the argument is silent on that point.

Yep. Thats what I meant when I said: "those arguments say nothing about the necessity...of God's existence if nothing else existed".

But second, and more fundamentally: as others have also at least alluded to, you're confusing two senses of "necessary." The arguments of the First, Second, and Third Ways show that if certain facts obtain, it necessarily follows that God exists. That is not what is meant by God's necessarily existing.

Absolutely. And I don't believe I'm confusing that at all. That use of "it necessarily follows" is simply another way of saying "it is logically implied" and that's not at all what I mean by the necessity of God's existence.

To say that God exists necessarily, in Thomistic thought, is to say that God, in and of Himself, can't not exist -- that He's a necessary being, not that His existence is the conclusion necessitated by the premises of an argument. The latter is a sort of epistemological necessity, not the metaphysical sort that Thomists and other classical theists ascribe to God.

Again, I get the difference. But my point is that in practice -- e.g. in the Summa Theo. -- the notion of God's ontological necessity *is* typically argued (i.e. taken to be epistemically necessary) from some premises (e.g. "There is change" or "There is contingency"), and I'm interested in finding out if there is another way of justifying that (ontological) necessity -- one that does not arise from inference from premisses.

Put another way: you note that in Thomist thought, "To say  that God exists necessarily ... is to say that God...can't exist". Now suppose I was to challenge the Thomist to justify that assertion, but I was to challenge them to do it without recourse to premises such as "There is change" or "There is contingency". How would they do that? (In fact, to make it a worthy challenge, I'd like it to be done also without recourse to Anselm, or Plantinga, or anyone else offering a form of the ontological argument).

Bottom line, as I said in the title, I want to know how it can be justified that God's (ontological) necessity is (ontologically) neccesary, or if it is merely contingent; i.e. (epistemically) necessitated by premises such as "There is change"
 

Sleety Dribble wrote:

Put another way: you note that in Thomist thought, "To say  that God exists necessarily ... is to say that God...can't exist". Now suppose I was to challenge the Thomist to justify that assertion, but I was to challenge them to do it without recourse to premises such as "There is change" or "There is contingency". How would they do that? (In fact, to make it a worthy challenge, I'd like it to be done also without recourse to Anselm, or Plantinga, or anyone else offering a form of the ontological argument).

Bottom line, as I said in the title, I want to know how it can be justified that God's (ontological) necessity is (ontologically) neccesary, or if it is merely contingent; i.e. (epistemically) necessitated by premises such as "There is change"
 

What I take you to be asking doesn't seem to make much sense, so feel free to correct me at any point. You seem to be suggesting that, because we need to make use of contingently true premises to argue for God's necessity, then God's necessity is somehow dependent on the truth of the premises (and therefore cannot itself be necessary). Doesn't this just confuse questions of what is true and what is known to be true?
EDIT: To put it another way: the idea that any necessary truth must be known from necessary premises to be true, is one I reject. On the other hand, Duns Scotus did seem to think along your lines, and presented an argument that, not only is God's existence truly necessary, but so is our knowledge of it.

Last edited by Alexander (10/02/2015 12:56 pm)