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6/18/2017 4:02 am  #1


Scholastic metaphysics and PSR

Hi all, new to the forum

I'm having a difficult time understanding one of Dr. Feser's arguments in Scholastic Metaphysics, in particular on pgs 142-146 in my print copy. Dr. Feser seems to argue PSR is important for justifying the Scholastic PoC, for if PSR is true, PoC is true by modus tollens.

Dr. Feser spends only a few short paragraphs, though, defending PSR. He appeals to a couple of empirical arguments (top of pg 143), yet he seems to think these aren't especially strong because they are "mere empirical hypotheses." On pg 145 he gives another argument to the effect that, if PSR were false, every ostensibly explicable fact would ultimately be a brute fact, and so nothing would actually have an explanation, contrary to appearances.

I think those arguments both have some degree of plausibility, yet I'm not sure they're conclusive.

Yet the argument I'm most interested in is the bottom of pg 143 and pg 144, in particular Feser's attempt to show denying PSR results in absurdities w.r.t. our cognitive faculties.

I'm having a great difficulty seeing how this argument is supposed to work. The inference being made seems to be that if PSR is false, it's possible our cognitions / beliefs are happening for no reason whatsoever. And therefore, if that's possible, our rationality is undermined.

Yet I'm not sure this inference is legitimate. Even if PSR were true, it's still logically possible that we believe what we do for entirely the wrong reasons, for instance if we're deceived by a Cartesian demon. And those types of skeptical scenarios are generally designed so there is no way in principle of eliminating the possibility that we always go wrong. Yet that doesn't seem to commit us to skepticism, so why does PSR implying the possibility we always go wrong commit us to skepticism? I simply do not see how it does.

 

 

6/18/2017 10:27 am  #2


Re: Scholastic metaphysics and PSR

His argument is that the parts of the judgement are not even necessarily linked if the PSR is false, which is worse than the Cartesian Demon situation, and that one cannot form a syllogistic argument without the PSR. This is because to do so would be to believe that your premises and conclusion follow a sort of entailment relation, which if the PSR is false would not necessarily be the case. And yet one does rationally make an argument against the PSR, and to do so would perhaps lead to an infinite regress of these syllogisms (for she would also have to argue that her syllogism avoids the conclusion being an unrelated brute fact, and then that conclusion, and so forth). To even come to the conclusion of Agnosticism about the PSR would be to fall into the same error, for one would have to form a syllogism with regards to your reasons for not accepting it, which is again, self refentially incoherent.

At the very least, you are able to attack a weak sort of skepticism by a retorsion argument that a denial of the PSR is self referentially incoherent. However, I would argue that perhaps even the link between object and belief is compromised if the PSR is false, which makes it worse than the Cartesian Demon situation. So this would not merely be believing things for the wrong reasons, but the reasons themselves not being necessarily linked with the other parts of your mind. Plus how can one appeal to any objective tendency, since to deny that the PSR holds would make objective tendencies not of necessity true, and so one can't appeal to anything external maybe making a demon's thoughts and actions disconnected. This makes all of reality a big giant kablooey, not the sort of thing that one can rationally affirm or deny. Yet one can rationally access her reasons for denying the PSR. Hence, a denial leads to a retorsion argument. One can press another argument like the ones Feser gives, that since say knows his reasoning when denying the PSR to an interlocutor, that his mouth is moving at a connected manner with his speech, and that his thoughts are connected to his speech and that a link obviously exists between the group (at least within the mind), one is compelled to accept the PSR is true at least with regards to intellectual judgement. However, when one does this, you can press them, with two options A. Is their some fact assuring that the PSR only governs the mind, hence making this fact outside of mental judgement  or B. Is it merely a brute fact. Either options amounts to the conclusion that the PSR is not necessarily true with regards to mind (since how can one assure at that point the absurdities will not creep in yet again). One can do this with any layer of reality that is questioned to not be governed by the PSR.  

Another argument one can give is that since our experiences as a unified whole are key to our status as rational animals (and can be arrived at via introspection), Koon's argument for the PSR due to it's denial being self referentially incoherent is a good argument, and perhaps available just from this alone. Even the link between thinking and concluding that you are might implicitly assume a link. Obviously the basis for Descartes argument would still hold true, and yet in order to remotely rationally justify this conclusion, the PSR would have to be true.

Lastly, I would say that one doesn't have to assume  an infallibility to your epistemology, and that she can simply say this is as obvious a fact as say the external world. One concludes when lifting his arm that their is an obvious link between the will and the movement, and since a denial of the PSR would make this not necessarily so, why would one want to prefer an option that is in opposition to this? I am a lot more sure of these certain facts than I am of any skeptical situation. One could rest a whole lot of assurance on this. But a collolary of this is that the PoC is true. Therefore, one ought to prefer the PoC being an objective fact about reality.

Last edited by Camoden (6/18/2017 11:00 am)

 

6/18/2017 11:32 am  #3


Re: Scholastic metaphysics and PSR

His argument is that the parts of the judgement are not even necessarily linked if the PSR is false, which is worse than the Cartesian Demon situation, and that one cannot form a syllogistic argument without the PSR. This is because to do so would be to believe that your premises and conclusion follow a sort of entailment relation, which if the PSR is false would not necessarily be the case.

This is the case regardless of whether PSR is true or not though. Even if PSR is true, there remain skeptical scenarios that cannot in principle be eliminated (e.g. brain in vat, Cartesian demon, etc.). Yet we don't take that possibility to commit us to skepticism. But if that's the case, neither should we take PSR being false to commit us to skepticism, as it hinges on the mere potentiality that our beliefs are false, just as the usual skeptical scenarios do.

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6/18/2017 12:46 pm  #4


Re: Scholastic metaphysics and PSR

UGADawg wrote:

His argument is that the parts of the judgement are not even necessarily linked if the PSR is false, which is worse than the Cartesian Demon situation, and that one cannot form a syllogistic argument without the PSR. This is because to do so would be to believe that your premises and conclusion follow a sort of entailment relation, which if the PSR is false would not necessarily be the case.

This is the case regardless of whether PSR is true or not though. Even if PSR is true, there remain skeptical scenarios that cannot in principle be eliminated (e.g. brain in vat, Cartesian demon, etc.). Yet we don't take that possibility to commit us to skepticism. But if that's the case, neither should we take PSR being false to commit us to skepticism, as it hinges on the mere potentiality that our beliefs are false, just as the usual skeptical scenarios do.

I would argue that it is more than just that. I don't think the skeptical situations even commit us to something that absurd. It is once you grant this, you can't even access the probabilities for any situation, akin to Pruss's argument from inferences to the Best Explanation. But I would argue the weight of the argument isn't even in the mere skepticism of these arguments, but that they are self referentially incoherent. Remember Feser admits one could grant the skeptic situation, but any theory which denies explicitly what it affirms impliclty is absurd. Since the skeptic does this, his position is absurd. That is the weight of the argument. Still, I think even in the demon situation you can still affirm certain facts in a rational manner, which is not necessarily true under the no PSR world. The link between the reason and the affirmation, and the demons deception is a link that still allows for rational justification, one can still claim that he exists, even if the demon is deceiving him. While he can do the same thing in the other situations, it is of an entirely different sort. Still, the crux of the argument is that it is almost a sort of Moorean Fact, one that should easily be preferred, even if not infallibly so. Easily something one would trust a great deal more than any skeptical situation.

Last edited by Camoden (6/18/2017 1:37 pm)

 

6/18/2017 1:36 pm  #5


Re: Scholastic metaphysics and PSR

Also, welcome to the forum!

 

7/18/2017 7:15 pm  #6


Re: Scholastic metaphysics and PSR

Thanks for the welcome. Also sorry for the long delay in replies, I got busy and forgot about the topic.

Here's another way of thinking about it. Consider Michael Huemer's phenomenal conservatism, which says we're justified in believing something if it appears to us to be true and there are no defeaters for the appearance (i.e. no reasons to think it is false). He defines an appearance as a mental state in which something seems to be the case to us. There are different types of appearances, e.g. a sensory appearance would be an experience in which it seems to be the case that there is (say) a computer in front of me that I am typing this post on. That appearance would be sufficient to justify my belief that there actually is a computer in the absence of any reason to think there isn't one. Huemer further argues all rational beliefs are ultimately dependent on appearances, e.g. if my belief that P is rational, this is caused by and based on the fact that P appears to be true, or perhaps that Q appears to be true and it appears Q supports P, or perhaps that R appears to be true and R appears to support Q which appears to support P, etc.

So, what about the retorsion argument? It seems to me if Huemer is right the retorsion argument has no force. It definitely appears to be the case that our beliefs have explanations (Feser indeed grants this in his exposition in Scholastic Metaphysics). So that belief (i.e. our beliefs or cognitions have explanations) is justified if there are no defeaters for the appearance that our beliefs have explanations. So how would rejecting PSR be a defeater for that appearance? All rejecting PSR means is that it's possible our beliefs are without explanations. It does not by any means entail that they do not have explanations. Yet the possibility that an appearance is false is not sufficient to undermine the appearance. In the above example, the possibility that P is false isn't sufficient to defeat the justification based on the appearance that P is true. Or the possibility Q is false and the possibility Q doesn't support P isn't sufficient to show either of beliefs aren't justified in virtue of the fact they appear true (and that therefore the belief in P is unjustified). And so forth.
 

Last edited by UGADawg (7/18/2017 7:40 pm)

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7/18/2017 10:04 pm  #7


Re: Scholastic metaphysics and PSR

UGADawg wrote:

Thanks for the welcome. Also sorry for the long delay in replies, I got busy and forgot about the topic.

Here's another way of thinking about it. Consider Michael Huemer's phenomenal conservatism, which says we're justified in believing something if it appears to us to be true and there are no defeaters for the appearance (i.e. no reasons to think it is false). He defines an appearance as a mental state in which something seems to be the case to us. There are different types of appearances, e.g. a sensory appearance would be an experience in which it seems to be the case that there is (say) a computer in front of me that I am typing this post on. That appearance would be sufficient to justify my belief that there actually is a computer in the absence of any reason to think there isn't one. Huemer further argues all rational beliefs are ultimately dependent on appearances, e.g. if my belief that P is rational, this is caused by and based on the fact that P appears to be true, or perhaps that Q appears to be true and it appears Q supports P, or perhaps that R appears to be true and R appears to support Q which appears to support P, etc.

So, what about the retorsion argument? It seems to me if Huemer is right the retorsion argument has no force. It definitely appears to be the case that our beliefs have explanations (Feser indeed grants this in his exposition in Scholastic Metaphysics). So that belief (i.e. our beliefs or cognitions have explanations) is justified if there are no defeaters for the appearance that our beliefs have explanations. So how would rejecting PSR be a defeater for that appearance? All rejecting PSR means is that it's possible our beliefs are without explanations. It does not by any means entail that they do not have explanations. Yet the possibility that an appearance is false is not sufficient to undermine the appearance. In the above example, the possibility that P is false isn't sufficient to defeat the justification based on the appearance that P is true. Or the possibility Q is false and the possibility Q doesn't support P isn't sufficient to show either of beliefs aren't justified in virtue of the fact they appear true (and that therefore the belief in P is unjustified). And so forth.
 

Remember I allowed this sort of analysis, and said even on this the PSR would still fit in as a rational belief on this criterion. But I don't think this analysis even makes much sense on this scenario, because the sort of comparisons you appear to make about a belief being justified in relation to a possible apparence seems to be assumed in the criterion, that only the reason route assumes. The gap between judging the objective probability to say that one has no reasons to not believe it doesn't appear to make much sense. It would make this analysis ill founded. This was littered into Koons and Pruss's original argument. But yeah, I would at this point just consult you to Koons's work on the subject. I would say this is further than the Demon scenario because I don't think the gap between consulting and knowing would be threatened in the demon scenario as I have previously said. So I do think the denial of this certainly does lead to a high amount of skepticism that is certainly not to be preferred.

Have a nice day and God bless you,

Cameron

 

7/18/2017 10:20 pm  #8


Re: Scholastic metaphysics and PSR

PS I probably cannot reply for a few days.

 

7/20/2017 11:25 am  #9


Re: Scholastic metaphysics and PSR

I'm not sure this is going to work. In my last post I was trying to push the issue more directly toward the question of whether retorsion will work against different views in epistemology. I specifically picked phenomenal conservatism (PC) because PC is sort of uniquely resistant to a lot of skeptical threat arguments. If you're not familiar with PC, Huemer wrote the IEP article on it, which serves as an accessible and thorough introduction.

So the relevant questions are: (a) what exactly does PC claim?; and (b) is retorsion efficacious against PC?

Answering (a) is relatively easy. As Huemer says the central thesis of PC is: If it seems to S that P, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some justification for believing that P. Huemer goes over the general arguments for / against this central claim of PC in the IEP article if you'd like to take a look.

Now for (b), it becomes evident that if retorsion is to work, it must satisfy this latter requirement as a defeater for the fact that it seems to S that P. Feser is explicitly allowing that it seems or appears to be the case that our cognitions have explanations from our first person view, so the only question is whether or not we can adduce defeaters for that appearance.

Huemer says there are two types of defeaters, (c) First, there might be rebutting defeaters, that is, evidence that what appears to be the case is in fact false; and (d) Second, there might be undercutting defeaters, that is, evidence that one’s appearance (whether it be true or false) is unreliable or otherwise defective as a source of information.

So for retorsion to work on a PC epistemology, rejecting PSR would have to serve as a defeater as described in (c) and / or (d). Taking (c) first, it's not clear how PSR being false would serve as a rebutting defeater. That PSR is false implies it's possibly the case that our cognitions do not have explanations. But the fact that something is possibly the case (or possibly not the case) does not constitute sufficient evidence it actually is (or isn't) the case. So I don't think this will work as a rebutting defeater.

What about (d), then? Does PSR being false serve as an undercutting defeater for the belief that our cognitions have explanations, i.e. does it constitute good evidence to the effect that appearances regarding cognitive explanations are formed in virtue of unreliable / defective information?

Again, I don't see how it does. To do so, PSR being false would have to either logically entail our cognitions just pop up for no reason whatsoever or at least that it's significantly likely that they do so. Since no one is claiming it entails the former, the only question is whether it makes it significantly likely appearances w.r.t. cognitive explanations are formed in some unreliable way. Yet, at least as Feser has presented the argument, this has not been demonstrated. As he says, rejecting PSR implies "for all we know" our beliefs lack explanations, but this does not by any means make it likely that they are without explanation.

So I don't see how PSR being false is supposed to serve as a defeater for the belief that our cognitions have explanations on either (c) or (d). But if that's the case, and if PC is granted for the sake of argument, retorsion won't work against that epistemology. Or at least that's how it seems to me.

And no worries about slow replies, it too me a month to get back to you after all. Cheers.

Edit: You can see a similar rebuttal to Feser's retorsion argument from Keith Parsons here. IIRC Parsons is also an internalist (PC is an internalist epistemology too), though I don't know if he adheres to PC.

Last edited by UGADawg (7/20/2017 11:30 am)

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7/31/2017 3:51 pm  #10


Re: Scholastic metaphysics and PSR

Good discussion.

I know the OP is focusing on one of Feser's main arguments for the PSR as a self contained argument, but I wonder what Pruss' argument from objective probabilities would play? In order to provide a defeater to PC epistemology, the argument cannot appeal simply to the broad possibility, but what if, as Pruss argues, objective probabilities are undermined by denying the PSR? What that mean that the whole issue of justifying a defeater is itself defeated? For we do not have the foundation from which to demand significant probability of a defeater, given a rejection of PSR.

Also, and this isn't a specificly worked out thought, but Feser argues that metaphysics is more fundamental than epistemology, maybe any coherent epistemology would have to assume PSR? Afterall, isn't the point of the argument to ground rational enquiry, and it is based on rational argumentation that tye PC theory of epistemology must be justified. Would assuming that epistemology also be to assume the PSR? Im not sure. Mainly because of the entangled roles epistemology and ontology have in Feser's argument.

 

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