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7/16/2015 4:21 am  #1


Empirical objections, Counter-Factuals and Divine Actuality

In this post want to look at a scenario in which an 'a posteriori' theistic argument is defeated by an 'a posteriori' difficulty. For simplicity's sake we will consider only one theistic argument*, the Aristotelian proof from motion which forms the basis of the First Way. Now imagine a person, let's call him McX. McX considers the reasoning behind the proof, and the conclusions it reaches - indeed he considers it correct were it not for a sole 'empirical' defeating objection, the Law of Inertia or the existence of self-moved animals.

With that in mind he should not object to us putting his reasoning in a counter-factual manner: were it not the case that such and such then the proof from motion would go through. However I would argue that this is all we need for a successful (though maybe weaker) proof of God.

Consider: McX is using exactly the same arguments as a Thomist does to understand God and he admits these arguments and their conclusions are logically coherent - they would have worked had the world been another way. This implies the possibility of a necessary, simple being: a necessary being, a being in which Essence and Existence are one, cannot be merely contingently non-existent though: if it's possible it must be actual.

Objection: depending on what account of the Laws of Nature one holds this argument forms a species of per impossible reasoning. This is true and would weaken it somewhat but I don't think it constitutes a fatal objection. An impossible antecedent need not have an impossible consequent. If I could travel faster than the speed of light (taking this to be metaphysically impossible) I could stand at the magnetic pole of a planet in the Andromeda galaxy tomorrow - the latter is not a logical impossibility even though it comes about as a consequence of one. Here we fall back on modal intuitions and I say they're in our favour.

(The animals as self-movers objection is free from this difficulty as we all admit it’s possible for there not have been any contingent living beings)

Even if the above provides the atheist with a bolt-hole the reasoning here just highlights the price atheists must pay if they want to take the Laws of Nature to be contingent i.e. only Nomologically necessary. If taken so then laws of physics e.g. Inertia could be otherwise - if that's the case there's a possible world in which the First Way goes through, and a divine simple being exists. We all know what follows from that. To conclude: if a theistic proof fails then its failure cannot be a merely contingent one.

 

7/17/2015 8:32 am  #2


Re: Empirical objections, Counter-Factuals and Divine Actuality

Thanks for the response, I meant to reply yesterday

My granting an empirical defeater is more from an epistemic standpoint (I don't think there is a possible world in which it is the case). What I was trying to emphasise is that McX knows and understands all that the Thomist knows about a Simple Being and admits that part of the argument is coherent - but coherent simple being = possible simple being = actual simple being.
 
Some Thomists, very foolishly in my opinion, claim that we cannot know anything about the Divine Attributes and their coherency until after we’ve carried out a Five Ways type proof (this is a most strange considering Augustine, not to mention other Church Fathers carried out sophisticated analysis and defences of said attributes, without ever having given proofs of that type – in fact the first great analysis of Simplicity comes from Augustine). This is also a bit of a reducto against that since McX knows all about the Divine Attributes for the same reasons as the Thomist.

Alexander wrote:

If the premise "everything changed is changed by another" is only contingently true, then we must seemingly reject act and potency (because the theory of act and potency necessarily entails the principle of motion), so it seems you cannot argue for necessity on the grounds of "pure act"

I would agree that the bracketed conclusion i.e. the principle of motion does follow, but I don’t think per impossible its denial is enough to force us to deny act and potency altogether – after all there were many scholastics who rejected it in the case of willed beings but still held to a slightly different understanding of the Act/Potency distinction.

Alexander wrote:

However, if you can get to necessity, you can run a Thomistic ontological argument based on S5 (which I take to be your ultimate goal).

That was only after-though actually (better to call it a Modal Cosmological Argument). I had initially planned to use the alleged Quantifier Shift in the Third Way (that each thing can go out of existence at a time does not entail there will be a time in which all things go out of existence) but decided against it since Maydole and Leftow had in fact based Modal type arguments on it.
 
I don’t think such an argument, at least as discussed here, would go very far; it’s virtue would be more to highlight the price the atheist pays by taking the laws on which they base their objections to be only contingently true.

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