- TomD
- Member
Offline - Registered: 7/06/2015
- Posts: 38
Re: Causality and the Universe
Scott wrote:
TomD:
Temporal becoming isn't necessarily what's at issue in discussions of causation, though. I happen to think that some version of eternalism must be true even in order for temporal relations genuinely to obtain between things/events at different times. However, that leaves the question of ontological dependence untouched. And causes in esse are certainly not temporally prior to their effects on the standard Scholastic understanding.
I agree with this. I would argue however that one of the bigger problems in contemporary thinking about God is that people tend to think of creation as God causing the first moment of the universe to come into existence and that's it. If this understanding were all there were to creation, I could see how Morriston's or any number of objections may be taken more seriously. However, on a more complete understanding in which ontological dependence is really what is at issue, then such objections aren't even relevant.
- John West
- Administrator
Offline
- Registered: 6/25/2015
- Posts: 1,254
Re: Causality and the Universe
Hi Paulo,
1. Our grasp of causation cannot extend beyond the order of nature, as expressed by the laws of nature.
2. A cause of the universe would, ipso facto, exist beyond the order of nature.
3. So, nothing can be a cause of the universe.
4. So, the universe exists uncaused.
This interpretation is invalid. It doesn't follow from the truth of “Our grasp of causation cannot extend beyond the order of nature” (my emphasis) and “[a] cause of the universe would, ipso facto, exist beyond the order of nature” that “nothing can be a cause of the universe”. At most, it follows that we can't grasp whether something can be a cause of the universe.
If we carry the “epistemic operator”, the second conclusion no longer follows from the first:
1. Our grasp of causation cannot extend beyond the order of nature, as expressed by the laws of nature.
2. A cause of the universe would, ipso facto, exist beyond the order of nature.
3*. So, [we can't grasp whether something] can be a cause of the universe.
4. So, the universe exists uncaused.
So, the argument becomes:
1. Our grasp of causation cannot extend beyond the order of nature, as expressed by the laws of nature.
2. A cause of the universe would, ipso facto, exist beyond the order of nature.
3*. So, [we can't grasp whether something] can be a cause of the universe.
This is an interpretation Daniel and Poe addressed, but it's worth making it explicit. The exception is if Morriston is a phenomenalist (about at least causation), in which case add “Nothing beyond our grasp exists” (or, "There is no causation beyond our grasp") to your original interpretation.