1 of 1- RomanJoe
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How do you handle this objection to God / supernaturalism?
All material things seem to have an essence distinct from their existence--their essence being merely potential relative to their existence. In a chain of causes in esse, we must eventually arrive at something that has non-derivative existence, whose existence is independent of any prior members. My question is, how do we know that--say--some underlying sea of fluctuating energy, or some primordial material substrate, doesn't have non-derivative existence? Perhaps it's the case that this fundamental material level of reality has a necessary isness about it. Why do we have to appeal to a transcendent ultimate cause? Could we not also ask the question, how do we know that God or some other immaterial reality has non-derivative existence? In short, couldn't the skeptic object that all we need is a fundamental material level of reality which just has existence in a non-derivative and essential way. Its existence, one may say, is just part of its essence (its that it is is just part of its what it is).
Last edited by RomanJoe (7/09/2017 12:39 pm)
- Camoden
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Re: How do you handle this objection to God / supernaturalism?
Well one could press the issues Feser and Oderberg talked about with regards to sub atomic elements, by virtue of being fruther corruptable and divisible (which science shows us), would be still based on prime matter. Anything material is composite and hence not essentially necessary and Ase, not something that is Being Itself. Secondly, unless they wanted to suppose Monism to be the case (which admittedly looking back at your post might be an option), you could say that since these items are distinguished from each other, these fundamental elements, there has to be some accidental difference, which is repugnant to a necessary being. Either there is one that is essentially absolute, or they are all identical, which doesn't match up with our experience, and plausibly could have Leibniz's law placed against it (not endorsing it's validity or not, but this route is open). Thirdly and most powerfully, the fact that they undergo change and gain new perfections by virtue of rearrangement, it follows they cannot be essentially immutable, which is requisite for a necessary being. These beings move themselves to a perfection, and are either ordered like Monads (which I would argue involves God), or they have final Causality, which I think inarguably involves God. They at they very least undergo spatial change, which is enough to get this point across. Now maybe this energy is indivisible, but then you could press how such an energy, was it not directed, could bring about reality that was distinct from it, assuming that this reality functions in some way like a material cause. If it does then all the issues are back open to it. If not, then how would a simple (which this argument I think shows, as how could anything not composed of essence and existence be composed of posterior parts like matter and form), timeless, immutable, spaceless, reality which was Being itself be really an energy. It doesn't even function as a material cause, so I think this makes such a position absurd. You could then do an exercise in Perfect Being Theology (as something that is Pure Goodness being a transcendental with being, is also Pure Perfection), and place attributes like an intellect and will as perfections befitting such a being. How could a perfect Being, which we proved a posteriori, be lacking such attributes, ones that could do nothing but fulfill a Perfect Being, ones that involve no intrinsic principle of limit, nor any signs of imperfection. If one wants to remove these distinctions mentioned entirely, sure, but they would have lots of costs in doing so, as many of these distinctions follow from indubitible first principles.
Last edited by Camoden (7/09/2017 2:42 pm)
- Camoden
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Re: How do you handle this objection to God / supernaturalism?
Looking back I sort of assumed you would be discussing things like Quarks and the like, but that was not a great target. I apologize for that. Still, I think either the reality is indivisible or it isn't, and if it is indivisible, something unique to immaterial reality, it isn't really a sea of energy (this is again controversial I know). If it is divisible however, you then press them on there being potency within the agent (which is a principle of limit repugnant to something Being itself), and that the individuation issues arise again, as there are units within it.
Last edited by Camoden (7/09/2017 2:32 pm)
- RomanJoe
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Re: How do you handle this objection to God / supernaturalism?
Camoden wrote:
Looking back I sort of assumed you would be discussing things like Quarks and the like, but that was not a great target. I apologize for that. Still, I think either the reality is indivisible or it isn't, and if it is indivisible, something unique to immaterial reality, it isn't really a sea of energy (this is again controversial I know). If it is divisible however, you then press them on there being potency within the agent (which is a principle of limit repugnant to something Being itself), and that the individuation issues arise again, as there are units within it.
You make some great points. I definitely think composition has a role to play in all of this. However, couldn't one say that the sea of energy has as part of its essence a sort of self-unifying composition? Couldn't one just argue that we don't truly know the essence of primordial matter and that perhaps its essence explains why it's the fundamental bedrock of reality?
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Thread Starter- Camoden
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Re: How do you handle this objection to God / supernaturalism?
Looking back I sort of assumed you would be discussing things like Quarks and the like, but that was not a great target. I apologize for that. Still, I think either the reality is indivisible or it isn't, and if it is indivisible, something unique to immaterial reality, it isn't really a sea of energy (this is again controversial I know). If it is divisible however, you then press them on there being potency within the agent (which is a principle of limit repugnant to something Being itself), and that the individuation issues arise again, as there are units within it.
You make some great points. I definitely think composition has a role to play in all of this. However, couldn't one say that the sea of energy has as part of its essence a sort of self-unifying composition? Couldn't one just argue that we don't truly know the essence of primordial matter and that perhaps its essence explains why it's the fundamental bedrock of reality?
Thank you. I would have to see what you mean by self unifying composition. If they are contrary to each other, I am not sure this is possible, which in the case of Essence and existence (assuming you admit the real distinction, which you seem to). I certainly think whatever the case, any composition at all is less repugnant to something that is Being Itself, for the reason that if something isn't composed of metaphysically fundamental elements, it seems like it cannot be composed of posterior elements. But yeah, I suppose the question has to do with self unification, which is a touchy subject. I tend to think that if one adopts a strong version of the PSR like I do (which I think is defensible), composition of any sort would be ruled out because nothing about a particular element (say a form), explains its unification with matter. Of course, this notion might be defensible without the PSR, but it appears stronger with it. You might be apprehensive about the PSR, which is understandable, but I think it is extremely defensible and once you allow it to govern the mental world, to avoid retorsion arguments you have to allow it to flow towards all of reality, for the reason that the PSR would either be a contingent or brute fact without this assumption. Now if it is a brute fact, there goes Koons skeptical scenario and Feser's logic argument. If it is contingent to that reality (say the conceptual order as Kant might even allow), it needs to be explained if the PSR is true, and a collolary of this is that the explanation for the principle is something outside of that particular reality (it has to be outside of the conceptual order). This will proceed as infinitum to any piece of reality, under the assumption that we can make valid and rational mental judgements (which is far more obvious than the negation and the negation would be self referentially incoherent). Now since we do have confidence in the construction of a syllogism (which wouldn't necessarily be the case without the PSR), we can further the retorsion argument to protect against all layers of reality. Hence, we can protect against that scenario. Once you admit the truth of essences and existence, you would have to arrive at God. Then since this is the First Being posterior to none, do a exercise in perfect Being theology (or if you wish, just derive the features of an intellect from that fact that this being caused intellectual and willing agents). I think you can prove divine simplicity out of an exercise in this, by showing that any agent that is dependent on parts is posterior to them, and hence it is unbecoming of a Perfect Being, since being supreme and posterior to none is clearly not an imperfection and manifestly a something that would fulfill the First Being. I think it isn't truly about knowing the agent doesn't, but simply knowing that this is a universal principle covering all of reality, and that a sea of energy couldn't bin principle be analogous to this Agent.
Last edited by Camoden (7/10/2017 7:30 pm)
- RomanJoe
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Re: How do you handle this objection to God / supernaturalism?
Looking back I sort of assumed you would be discussing things like Quarks and the like, but that was not a great target. I apologize for that. Still, I think either the reality is indivisible or it isn't, and if it is indivisible, something unique to immaterial reality, it isn't really a sea of energy (this is again controversial I know). If it is divisible however, you then press them on there being potency within the agent (which is a principle of limit repugnant to something Being itself), and that the individuation issues arise again, as there are units within it.
You make some great points. I definitely think composition has a role to play in all of this. However, couldn't one say that the sea of energy has as part of its essence a sort of self-unifying composition? Couldn't one just argue that we don't truly know the essence of primordial matter and that perhaps its essence explains why it's the fundamental bedrock of reality?
Thank you. I would have to see what you mean by self unifying composition. If they are contrary to each other, I am not sure this is possible, which in the case of Essence and existence (assuming you admit the real distinction, which you seem to). I certainly think whatever the case, any composition at all is less repugnant to something that is Being Itself, for the reason that if something isn't composed of metaphysically fundamental elements, it seems like it cannot be composed of posterior elements. But yeah, I suppose the question has to do with self unification, which is a touchy subject. I tend to think that if one adopts a strong version of the PSR like I do (which I think is defensible), composition of any sort would be ruled out because nothing about a particular element (say a form), explains its unification with matter. Of course, this notion might be defensible without the PSR, but it appears stronger with it. You might be apprehensive about the PSR, which is understandable, but I think it is extremely defensible and once you allow it to govern the mental world, to avoid retorsion arguments you have to allow it to flow towards all of reality, for the reason that the PSR would either be a contingent or brute fact without this assumption. Now if it is a brute fact, there goes Koons skeptical scenario and Feser's logic argument. If it is contingent to that reality (say the conceptual order as Kant might even allow), it needs to be explained if the PSR is true, and a collolary of this is that the explanation for the principle is something outside of that particular reality (it has to be outside of the conceptual order). This will proceed as infinitum to any piece of reality, under the assumption that we can make valid and rational mental judgements (which is far more obvious than the negation and the negation would be self referentially incoherent). Now since we do have confidence in the construction of a syllogism (which wouldn't necessarily be the case without the PSR), we can further the retorsion argument to protect against all layers of reality. Hence, we can protect against that scenario. Once you admit the truth of essences and existence, you would have to arrive at God. Then since this is the First Being posterior to none, do a exercise in perfect Being theology (or if you wish, just derive the features of an intellect from that fact that this being caused intellectual and willing agents). I think you can prove divine simplicity out of an exercise in this, by showing that any agent that is dependent on parts is posterior to them, and hence it is unbecoming of a Perfect Being, since being supreme and posterior to none is clearly not an imperfection and manifestly a something that would fulfill the First Being. I think it isn't truly about knowing the agent doesn't, but simply knowing that this is a universal principle covering all of reality, and that a sea of energy couldn't bin principle be analogous to this Agent.
I actually do think Feser's PSR logical retorsion argument is brilliant--it reveals that our confidence in rational inquiry is completely undercut without PSR. Even a general intuition in our own abilities to reason would be unintelligible without PSR.
With regard to essence and existence, however, couldn't a skeptic posit a self existing and self explanatory material agent to undergird all of reality? For instance, say we have M (fundamental material reality). M is some type of energy, let's say, that acts as an undercurrent for all of reality. M is self existing and self explanatory. Even though M is composed of matter and form, its essence is that which self unifies matter and form. Additionally, M's essence has existence as a part of it rather than as identified with it. M, then, is necessary but not in the classical theistic way of being pure Being. Rather, it still retains the crudeness of being a material being. Now one may argue that this would be admitting that M is not a simple being but rather is composed of parts. If existence is just part of its essence then we would need an explanation for why its parts are united. But remember M's essence is also that which includes self unity, and therefore explains its own composition.
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Thread Starter- Camoden
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Re: How do you handle this objection to God / supernaturalism?
You make some great points. I definitely think composition has a role to play in all of this. However, couldn't one say that the sea of energy has as part of its essence a sort of self-unifying composition? Couldn't one just argue that we don't truly know the essence of primordial matter and that perhaps its essence explains why it's the fundamental bedrock of reality?Thank you. I would have to see what you mean by self unifying composition. If they are contrary to each other, I am not sure this is possible, which in the case of Essence and existence (assuming you admit the real distinction, which you seem to). I certainly think whatever the case, any composition at all is less repugnant to something that is Being Itself, for the reason that if something isn't composed of metaphysically fundamental elements, it seems like it cannot be composed of posterior elements. But yeah, I suppose the question has to do with self unification, which is a touchy subject. I tend to think that if one adopts a strong version of the PSR like I do (which I think is defensible), composition of any sort would be ruled out because nothing about a particular element (say a form), explains its unification with matter. Of course, this notion might be defensible without the PSR, but it appears stronger with it. You might be apprehensive about the PSR, which is understandable, but I think it is extremely defensible and once you allow it to govern the mental world, to avoid retorsion arguments you have to allow it to flow towards all of reality, for the reason that the PSR would either be a contingent or brute fact without this assumption. Now if it is a brute fact, there goes Koons skeptical scenario and Feser's logic argument. If it is contingent to that reality (say the conceptual order as Kant might even allow), it needs to be explained if the PSR is true, and a collolary of this is that the explanation for the principle is something outside of that particular reality (it has to be outside of the conceptual order). This will proceed as infinitum to any piece of reality, under the assumption that we can make valid and rational mental judgements (which is far more obvious than the negation and the negation would be self referentially incoherent). Now since we do have confidence in the construction of a syllogism (which wouldn't necessarily be the case without the PSR), we can further the retorsion argument to protect against all layers of reality. Hence, we can protect against that scenario. Once you admit the truth of essences and existence, you would have to arrive at God. Then since this is the First Being posterior to none, do a exercise in perfect Being theology (or if you wish, just derive the features of an intellect from that fact that this being caused intellectual and willing agents). I think you can prove divine simplicity out of an exercise in this, by showing that any agent that is dependent on parts is posterior to them, and hence it is unbecoming of a Perfect Being, since being supreme and posterior to none is clearly not an imperfection and manifestly a something that would fulfill the First Being. I think it isn't truly about knowing the agent doesn't, but simply knowing that this is a universal principle covering all of reality, and that a sea of energy couldn't bin principle be analogous to this Agent.
I actually do think Feser's PSR logical retorsion argument is brilliant--it reveals that our confidence in rational inquiry is completely undercut without PSR. Even a general intuition in our own abilities to reason would be unintelligible without PSR.
With regard to essence and existence, however, couldn't a skeptic posit a self existing and self explanatory material agent to undergird all of reality? For instance, say we have M (fundamental material reality). M is some type of energy, let's say, that acts as an undercurrent for all of reality. M is self existing and self explanatory. Even though M is composed of matter and form, its essence is that which self unifies matter and form. Additionally, M's essence has existence as a part of it rather than as identified with it. M, then, is necessary but not in the classical theistic way of being pure Being. Rather, it still retains the crudeness of being a material being. Now one may argue that this would be admitting that M is not a simple being but rather is composed of parts. If existence is just part of its essence then we would need an explanation for why its parts are united. But remember M's essence is also that which includes self unity, and therefore explains its own composition.
Sorry for the late reply, but yeah, I just do not think that possible if they are complete contraries. The reason why essence cannot be a part of existence, it if you define that as the fundamental feature of an essence, then you would of course exclude many of the other features as when one would define the essence of a man using animality as it's main feature. Also something to stress is the fact that we can reason from the fact that these are analogous to many things we know not to exist, and the fact that these things come into being, we can rationally conclude that existence is not something that flows into the essential definition. It is not something that could in principle belong to an essence of many contingent things of our existence. This seems perfectly obvious to me at least. Feser has a new lecture on this here if you wish to look into it. He covers these issues extensively. Even still I do not think something that unites two diverse elements could be another diverse element, especially if the essence is posterior to the matter and form like Aquinas states in "On Being and Essence", at least with regards to material creatures. I will save the response to your concerns about the epistemological feature for the next thread.
Have a great day and may God be with you,
Cameron