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1/06/2018 6:18 pm  #11


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

Timocrates wrote:

DanielCC wrote:

That two material entities possess incompatible properties occupy the same space doesn’t mean that there is one entity possessing both incompatible properties. The latter is metaphysically impossible whilst the former is not (the only question it what empirical and theoretical reasons do we have for thinking it to be the case).

Thank you. I granted the existence of two material entities; however, what I have issue with is the simultaneous presence of incompatible properties, particularly in the empirical domain. I mean could the self-same temperature sample be both hot and cold, detecting a presence of high and low (or virtually no) thermal energy? If it could, and we admit this, then physics is certainly in trouble or at least at a virtual dead end, I think.

If such co-presence did occur (as I said I think co-presence is more likely to be the province of sub-atomic particles) then its unlikely we could detect it in the kind of examples you discuss as the influence of both factors on our instruments would cancel one another out. Whether such things actually exist is an epistemic rather than metaphysical question though - as yet we have no reason to think they do so can assume they do not in virtue of parsimony.
 

 

1/06/2018 10:18 pm  #12


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

Timocrates wrote:

​But you are not a negative reality: the different parts of you are in different places relative to each other, do you agree? A spinning ball could occupy the same place overall but each of its parts or sections would be moving from place to place.

I never suggested that I am a negative reality. Rather, space is a negative reality.

The spinning ball can move from "place" to "place" in virtue of the fact that space is unlimited. There is therefore either no place to exist at, or infinite places to exist at.

Timocrates wrote:

​And I think it's rather bizarre to imagine that there is negative place: a negative place would be no place; a "negative reality" is just the negation of reality itself: to transition from the real to the unreal is no different than transitioning from the existent to the non-existent. But surely there was something real and actual you were moving into when you sat down at your chair.

Refer to my second sentence above.

Timocrates wrote:

​Now nothing - a place included - can be said to exist while it is in potentiality but only in actuality.

I never suggested such a thing. Space has no actualities or potentialities. One might consider it the opposite of God.

Timocrates wrote:

​​Further, an immediate paradox follows upon your theory. Let us say we were at the end of the universe and space.

If space is a negative reality, as I have claimed, then there can be no "end" to space. You're strawmanning my position.

Timocrates wrote:

​​According to your idea, we could launch a projectile beyond the limits of the edge of existent space because there is nothing impossible about something moving into a non-existent place;

I've said that space is a negative reality. How then can there be a real distinction between "existent space" and "non-existent place"? Limitations are material consequences. Only material objects are limited.
 

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1/06/2018 11:29 pm  #13


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

DanielCC wrote:

Omnipresence means to exist at all spatial locations. Immaterial objects cannot be said to be omnipresent because they lack spatial properties or properties relating to space (this means that, like 'Infinite', 'Omnipresent' is a nonsensical theological honorific).

Omnipresence means to exist in a spatially unqualified manner. That is perfectly compatible with what I've said. I lack Omnipresence in virtue of having a material body, in virtue of which certain kinds of motion are possible for me that are not possible for immaterial objects. Namely, the ability to change the relative parts of my body, and to the relative distance between myself and other objects.

You need to given an explanation of why such types of motion are possible for me and you but not God. Invoking space as a positive reality is overkill. The simplest and most obvious explanation is that the limitation lies wholly within us. We are no co-extensive with the field of existence, a field which is cut up into ontic loci.

DanielCC wrote:

Could you clarify the second sentence? I am not sure what you mean by appealing to the identity of indiscernibles. Are you claiming that if two entities occupied the same spatial location they would be identical?

No, I was merely emphasizing the uniqueness of space. For whatever can only be spoken of, even in principle, in negative terms cannot be distinguished from another such.

DanielCC wrote:

Likewise what do you with the claim that space is the negation of existence? Surely not the claim that for any x that exists x has a spatial location? What reason could one give a prior to accept a criterion of existence that rules out abstract objects, epiphenomnal property and sense date amonst other things?

Space can't exist (as a material object) as it would require space within which to exist, which is a contradiction. So therefore, either space is immaterial or space isn't a positive reality. The latter is explanatorily sufficient, thus the former is ad hoc.

DanielCC wrote:

Another point: the claim that two material objects cannot be co-present at the same spatial location seems like a question to be solved by physics rather than appeal to metaphysical concerns, at least unless we have some strong reason to think that this metaphysical account is the only coherent one.

Physics supposedly tells us that they can occupy the same spatial location. The density at that spatial location would just increase. Moreover physics, it is argued by some, shows that there are material objects that do not occupy definite spatial locations (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wk-UO81HmO4). Which is why I define material objects the way I do. A more natural definition any way.

DanielCC wrote:

Most philosophers take the laws of nature to be contingent (Thomists do not) and there are various theories in theoretical physics which suggest the universe could have had a different spatial structure were its origin conditions different (likewise that if multiverse cosmology be true then there will exist other universes with different spatial structures).

There are no such things as the laws of nature. Two qualitatively identical material objects have the same powers and liabilities, otherwise any behavioural differences in absentia outside efficient causation would be inexplicable.

DanielCC wrote:

How do you define material?

Either the definition given above, or any object capable of motion that God is not capable of.

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1/07/2018 4:20 pm  #14


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

surroundx wrote:

Timocrates wrote:

​But you are not a negative reality: the different parts of you are in different places relative to each other, do you agree? A spinning ball could occupy the same place overall but each of its parts or sections would be moving from place to place.

I never suggested that I am a negative reality. Rather, space is a negative reality.

The spinning ball can move from "place" to "place" in virtue of the fact that space is unlimited. There is therefore either no place to exist at, or infinite places to exist at.

Timocrates wrote:

​And I think it's rather bizarre to imagine that there is negative place: a negative place would be no place; a "negative reality" is just the negation of reality itself: to transition from the real to the unreal is no different than transitioning from the existent to the non-existent. But surely there was something real and actual you were moving into when you sat down at your chair.

Refer to my second sentence above.

Timocrates wrote:

​Now nothing - a place included - can be said to exist while it is in potentiality but only in actuality.

I never suggested such a thing. Space has no actualities or potentialities. One might consider it the opposite of God.

Timocrates wrote:

​​Further, an immediate paradox follows upon your theory. Let us say we were at the end of the universe and space.

If space is a negative reality, as I have claimed, then there can be no "end" to space. You're strawmanning my position.

Timocrates wrote:

​​According to your idea, we could launch a projectile beyond the limits of the edge of existent space because there is nothing impossible about something moving into a non-existent place;

I've said that space is a negative reality. How then can there be a real distinction between "existent space" and "non-existent place"? Limitations are material consequences. Only material objects are limited.
 

You claim I am straw manning you then double down on your claim that space is "negative reality" when the implications of that is exactly what I drew out: I provided an argument if not a proof that space is not and cannot be "negative reality." You deny space has either actualities or potentialities: but that is ridiculous. Space can be potentially large or small, obviously and (according to you) it can be apparently "unlimited," (it can't but we'll leave that aside). Space cannot be a "negative reality" for the reasons I gave: if it were, then nothing could be said of it: there could be no distance between spaces if it were a "negative reality." Nothing you said alters the argument I gave against that idea.

Last edited by Timocrates (1/07/2018 4:21 pm)


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1/08/2018 8:53 am  #15


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

Timocrates wrote:

You claim I am straw manning you then double down on your claim that space is "negative reality" when the implications of that is exactly what I drew out: I provided an argument if not a proof that space is not and cannot be "negative reality." You deny space has either actualities or potentialities: but that is ridiculous. Space can be potentially large or small, obviously and (according to you) it can be apparently "unlimited," (it can't but we'll leave that aside).

Space does not exist. It is not a positive reality. However, given that people predicate of it, it is linguistically a reality. If you don't like the label "negative reality" then feel free to suggest another.

Correct, space has neither actualities nor potentialities. So when you suggest that on my theory space is limited ("Let us say we were at the end of the universe and space"), since limitations are either actualities or potentialities, you were strawmanning my theory. Space is unlimited in the sense that you could travel forever in one direction. Due to a lack of anything preventing you from doing so.

You state that "Space can be potentially large or small". What is that claim based upon?

Timocrates wrote:

Space cannot be a "negative reality" for the reasons I gave: if it were, then nothing could be said of it: there could be no distance between spaces if it were a "negative reality." Nothing you said alters the argument I gave against that idea.

Distance is really a predicate of objects, not space itself.

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1/08/2018 10:10 pm  #16


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

@surroundx,

It's nice to see someone who has done homework before asking questions.  And the questions are thoughtful.

Have you have read Aquinas's commentary on Aristotle's Physics Book IV.  It discusses the concept of place. http://www.dhspriory.org/thomas/Physics4.htm

You'll find agreement (place isn't a material object) and disagreement (place exists).

 

1/09/2018 8:14 am  #17


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

@bmiller thanks for the suggested reading. I have an abridged collection of Aquinas' writings, hopefully it is in there as I prefer to read physical copies than a computer screen. Thanks again.

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1/09/2018 8:37 am  #18


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

surroundx wrote:

@bmiller thanks for the suggested reading. I have an abridged collection of Aquinas' writings, hopefully it is in there as I prefer to read physical copies than a computer screen. Thanks again.

If you have access to a library or used book dealer, you may find the Blackwell - Spath - Thirkel translation (New Haven, Yale UP, 1963). 

bmiller and I mentioned the work of Helen S. Lang over on another thread. Lang argues that "place" in Aristotle has a certain causal power. Many of the academic reviews disagreed with her conclusions, but she sets them out most fully in The Order of Nature in Aristotle’s Physics: Place and the Elements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. On p. 28 she writes, "place acts as a cause of motion though it is not one of the four causes," while Aristotle rejects void as an incoherent concept that can’t serve as a cause of motion. “Place is the first limit of the surrounding body and thereby causes motion by rendering the cosmos determinate in respect to ‘where’, e.g. up or down…" 

Another commentator who had thought along the line taken by Lang was Alfred E. Taylor in his commentary on Plato's Timaeus. About Physics IV 208b, Taylor wrote: "Aristotle, in fact, attributes to the different regions of ‘absolute’ space a sort of power of ‘attracting’ different kinds of body" (665). This is part of a whole appendix on Aristotle's Doctrine of Space. I don't think Taylor's book is very accessible, so if you are interested in a fuller summary and quotations, I'll paste in more of my notes from it.
 

Last edited by ficino (1/09/2018 8:54 am)

 

1/10/2018 5:44 am  #19


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

ficino wrote:

I don't think Taylor's book is very accessible, so if you are interested in a fuller summary and quotations, I'll paste in more of my notes from it.

That would be very much appreciated, thank you

     Thread Starter
 

1/10/2018 9:31 am  #20


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

surroundx wrote:

Timocrates wrote:

You claim I am straw manning you then double down on your claim that space is "negative reality" when the implications of that is exactly what I drew out: I provided an argument if not a proof that space is not and cannot be "negative reality." You deny space has either actualities or potentialities: but that is ridiculous. Space can be potentially large or small, obviously and (according to you) it can be apparently "unlimited," (it can't but we'll leave that aside).

Space does not exist. It is not a positive reality. However, given that people predicate of it, it is linguistically a reality. If you don't like the label "negative reality" then feel free to suggest another.

Correct, space has neither actualities nor potentialities. So when you suggest that on my theory space is limited ("Let us say we were at the end of the universe and space"), since limitations are either actualities or potentialities, you were strawmanning my theory. Space is unlimited in the sense that you could travel forever in one direction. Due to a lack of anything preventing you from doing so.

You state that "Space can be potentially large or small". What is that claim based upon?

Timocrates wrote:

Space cannot be a "negative reality" for the reasons I gave: if it were, then nothing could be said of it: there could be no distance between spaces if it were a "negative reality." Nothing you said alters the argument I gave against that idea.

Distance is really a predicate of objects, not space itself.

​Space has no distance? But if no distance, then it is not extended either; therefore, it is not and cannot be either limited or unlimited. So why assert this at all? Are you confusing space with a geometric point? I think you have to be if you have anything in mind at all. Space has neither actuality nor potentiality? So you are asserting that space is just literally nothing and that nothing not only can be but actually is unlimited? It's actually unlimited  even though it has no actuality? Or maybe you mean it is potentially unlimited but it has no potentiality?

​But regardless, my proof still stands because as you say space is nothing and if two objects are separated from each other but space is as you say nothing they cannot actually be separate from each other because there is nothing in between the objects since space is not distance. According to you only other actual objects can make for actual distances. So even if you are correct that distance is attributed to objects rather than space, space is a meaningless concept because it cannot even be thought of as that which is in between two locally separated objects. So why do you even speak of space when you deny it exists at all? What is the point of speaking of space when for you space is just actually body? And how can actual bodies be "negative realities"?

Last edited by Timocrates (1/10/2018 9:42 am)


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- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 16 (3).

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