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1/13/2018 2:34 am  #31


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

bmiller wrote:

Please give more details for this:
"It is not that things which do not exist have size, it is that the negation of things can vary in size."

What do you consider the difference between "things which do not exist" and "the negation of things"?

I'm interested in your reasoning.

In the former case "things" is an individual subject (viz. qualitatively static). In the latter case, "things" is a much broader subject (viz. not qualitatively static).

 

1/13/2018 12:56 pm  #32


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

What would you call the absence of any qualities whatsoever?

 

1/13/2018 11:24 pm  #33


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

bmiller wrote:

What would you call the absence of any qualities whatsoever?

Nothingness.

     Thread Starter
 

1/14/2018 1:33 pm  #34


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

OK.  Can you fit a cube into nothingness?

 

1/15/2018 10:51 am  #35


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

bmiller wrote:

OK.  Can you fit a cube into nothingness?

No. There is no real into, just as with creatio ex nihilo there is no real out of, nothing(ness).

If a cube exists, it's not that it fits (anywhere), rather it simply is.

     Thread Starter
 

1/15/2018 11:55 am  #36


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

surroundx wrote:

bmiller wrote:

OK.  Can you fit a cube into nothingness?

No. There is no real into, just as with creatio ex nihilo there is no real out of, nothing(ness).

Right.  So if there is nothing between 2 existing cubes, then one cannot insert a third existing cube between them.  If there is enough space between the 2 existing cubes, then one can insert a third existing cube between them.

surroundx wrote:

If a cube exists, it's not that it fits (anywhere), rather it simply is.

But it can either fit between the other 2 cubes or it not.  If it is too big it won't.  So size does matter.

 

1/16/2018 10:14 am  #37


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

bmiller wrote:

Right.  So if there is nothing between 2 existing cubes, then one cannot insert a third existing cube between them.

If there are no things and no space between them, then one cannot insert a third existing cube between them. However, space is not a thing, but rather the negation of things, and so there being nothing between two cubes does not entail that they are conjoined.

bmiller wrote:

But it can either fit between the other 2 cubes or it not.  If it is too big it won't.  So size does matter.

Absolutely size matters. However, the size of the gap is determined through negation. Imagine that space is singularly horizontal and totals 10, and each of two cubes take up 1 space each. Then 8 spaces are unoccupied, either in virtue of the unactualised potential for a further 8 cubes to exist, or in virtue of the actualised potential for 2 cubes to exist (10-8=2 is the same as 10-2=8). The potential distance between the two cubes ranges from a maximum of 8 to a minimum of 0. The actual distance is determined by locomotion.

     Thread Starter
 

1/16/2018 2:25 pm  #38


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

surroundx wrote:

If there are no things and no space between them, then one cannot insert a third existing cube between them. However, space is not a thing, but rather the negation of things, and so there being nothing between two cubes does not entail that they are conjoined.

I think we are in agreement that space is different than a materially existing object and is also different than nothing.  But I disagree that if there is nothing between 2 objects that they not are conjoined.  Because what determines that there is a single material object is a boundary.  If there is nothing between 2 objects, there is no boundary between them, and so they must be considered a single object. 

surroundx wrote:

Absolutely size matters. However, the size of the gap is determined through negation. Imagine that space is singularly horizontal and totals 10, and each of two cubes take up 1 space each. Then 8 spaces are unoccupied, either in virtue of the unactualised potential for a further 8 cubes to exist, or in virtue of the actualised potential for 2 cubes to exist (10-8=2 is the same as 10-2=8). The potential distance between the two cubes ranges from a maximum of 8 to a minimum of 0. The actual distance is determined by locomotion.

But I think you are using the act/potency distinction ambiguously.
For you mention in one place there actually are 10 units of which 2 are actually occupied, implying that the sense of what is actual is 10 possible spaces.  So both spaces and things occupying them exist independently of each other.

But then it seems you shift focus exclusively to objects alone.
Almost like that you consider material objects as a default condition and the lack of objects as a privation of material objects but not quite, because this particular "privation" has at least some positive qualities.  Is this correct?

Last edited by bmiller (1/17/2018 10:39 pm)

 

Yesterday 7:33 am  #39


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

bmiller wrote:

I think we are in agreement that space is different than a materially existing object and is also different than nothing.  But I disagree that if there is nothing between 2 objects that they not are conjoined.  Because what determines that there is a single material object is a boundary.  If there is nothing between 2 objects, there is no boundary between them, and so they must be considered a single object.

In regards to boundaries between objects, are you talking only about qualitatively identical objects here? For example, prima facie it might seem like two water droplets couldn't be individuated from each other if they merged. But if you divide the total volume of the water by the volume of a single H2O molecule, do you not get the number of individual water molecules that constitute the pool of water?

Skipping ahead to qualitatively non-identical objects, in the case of oil and water the boundary is nothing more than the very nature of the two (or more) objects. While in cases like black and white paint, the resulting conjunction is a new object with roughly intermediate properties (depending upon the proportion of the two paints). 

To be honest, I'm not sure what your criticism is meant to establish. It would feel a little strange perhaps, but importantly not problematic, to accept that the universe is a single object. After all that doesn't nullify the reality of parts to that object, which have certain relations to each other.

bmiller wrote:

But I think you are using the act/potency distinction ambiguously.
For you mention in one place there actually are 10 units of which 2 are actually occupied, implying that the sense of what is actual is 10 possible spaces.  So both spaces and things occupying them exist independently of each other.

But then it seems you shift focus exclusively to objects alone.
Almost like that you consider material objects as a default condition and the lack of objects as a privation of material objects but not quite, because this particular "privation" has at least some positive qualities.  Is this correct?

Sorry, I tried to simplify things in order to skip over the possibly problematic notion of infinite. I fixed the maximal potential for extension at 10 rather than infinite. Also I wasn't sure if, like Timocrates, you think space is potentially larger and potentially smaller. Do you think that space extends forever?

     Thread Starter
 

Yesterday 3:06 pm  #40


Re: Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

surroundx wrote:

In regards to boundaries between objects, are you talking only about qualitatively identical objects here?

Yes, I was considering the 2 cubes we were discussing.

surroundx wrote:

To be honest, I'm not sure what your criticism is meant to establish. It would feel a little strange perhaps, but importantly not problematic, to accept that the universe is a single object. After all that doesn't nullify the reality of parts to that object, which have certain relations to each other.
 

It meant to establish that if it is said that "nothing" separates A from B, then A and B are at least touching with no space between them.  If space separates A from B then there is more than just their own boudaries that separate them.  That's all.  That *nothing* is different from empty space which is different from material objects.

You were right that just because there is nothing between 2 separate things, it does not necessarily mean they are joined.
  

surroundx wrote:

Sorry, I tried to simplify things in order to skip over the possibly problematic notion of infinite. I fixed the maximal potential for extension at 10 rather than infinite. Also I wasn't sure if, like Timocrates, you think space is potentially larger and potentially smaller. Do you think that space extends forever?

Timocrates agrees with the present scientific concensus of the Big Bang and expanding universe (I assume).  If the universe is expanding, it means at this moment it is larger than it was before and smaller than it will be in the next moment.  If space was infinite, it could not have been smaller nor can it grow.

Please tell me why you think the extent of space is infinite.

Last edited by bmiller (Yesterday 9:34 pm)

 

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