John West wrote:

What, for you, constitutes a sufficient explanans?

I don't see that there is such a thing. Rather, explanans are culled one by one until you're left with only one. In which case you either hold it to be the actual explanans, accept that there is an explanans you haven't thought of, or you throw out the explanandum.

John West wrote:

You see, historically, wielders of principles like Ockham's razor often had corresponding anti-razors (i.e. principles of plurality).

Right. One can specify conditions under which we are committed to a given explananda/entity. Which concerns not merely explicit ontological commitments (e.g. I believe x exists), but also our implicit ones (e.g. I believe x exists).

John West wrote:

But I don't know what rules you're playing by, surroundx. I know you like principles of parsimony, but you don't seem to think there is any very forceful way to support them (cf. #124).

Parsimony helps prevent ad hocness. I take that to be as forceful a reason to accept parsimony as there is to accept any other explanatory tool.

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

So, if I really get you right, a particular is "just" a "bit of matter", but lack anything else except being matter? How can particles like quarks be these simples, as they have a position, but you specifically said that your simples lack position?

Right. If a quark can be in two places at once then it doesn't have an unequivocal position. Even if when not in two places at once it does have an unequivocal position. So either quarks are not simples, or simples vacillate between position and non-position. I take the former to be the case, however, that is predicated upon a very basic understanding of physics. So I consider it probable enough to justify it tentatively (>c.55%), but insufficient to justify it with belief. So I'm agnostically leaning towards sub-quarks. But I state it as my position since, as not everybody knows as little as me, it is better to potentially take advantage of other people's knowledge and subject the notion of sub-quark particles/particulars to other people's arguments rather than simply let them gather dust.

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

Well, about that comparison, the big difference between your view and mine, for example, is that God has properties (though, they're not distinct as He's perfectly simple), while in your view, there are no properties whatsoever. None. Zilch. You stated it multiple times. And you've been clear about that.
Another difference is the fact that God is one. One. So, divine simplicity works, but how can you have more than one simple with the same being... without them being the same?

I take it that you're a Trinitarian? If so, how can that be squared with Divine Simplicity?

Well I reject numerical identity, so perhaps that is a big difference between us. Which is why the quark that is in two places is neither the same individual, nor a different individual. I don't think there is a good analogy that I ca

If you feel that your time is being wasted, then please end the discussion.

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

Please answer my points before bringing more into the discussion. Otherwise, especially now that you're speaking about locomotion and doing this, it sounds like you're someone I honestly don't want to talk to again.

As I've already said, I don't think properties exist. So there's nothing for me to answer regards location as a property. I've already explained my personal position. If you're unclear on what that is, then perhaps the rest of my reply will clarify.

On your view it seems to me that location is extrinsic. But then again you seem to have only granted it for the sake of the argument, so perhaps not.

I discussed locomotion with someone earlier in this thread, so I haven't suddenly raised the notion out of nowhere.

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

I'll also add : extension appears to be a property in your view. If not, what is it? It appears to be something shared between things.

A particular's extension simply is the thing itself.
 

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

You're going too fast. I said "property", not "extrinsic property". Second, the fact that "you don't see [it] making any sense" and that "it's less parsimonious" are reasons that I'd qualify as weak - but perhaps it's your wording.

Though, for the sake of the argument, I'll bite.

"Location isn't a property because it's less parsimonious if we postulate it as a property?" Is that what you're saying? If so, what is "location", if it's not a property?

Do you accept the intrinsic/extrinsic property distinction? If so, surely you'd agree that location is extrinsic since a particular's location can change without any substantial/formal change?

We'll just have to disagree about the strength of parsimony I suppose. I don't see a way of adjudicating on it. Although I'm obviously open to suggestions.

If for the sake of the argument we allow the possibility of infinite extension, then an infinitely extended particular's location just is it's existence (i.e. it is not localized). It is only for finitely extended particulars that a change of location (local motion) is even possible. So that location is simply the proportional inverse of extension.