Posted by seigneur  5/08/2018 1:21 am | #41 |
John West wrote:
I've literally given you a standard definition of intuition in English philosophical discourse. I pulled it from Ewing's commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, where he contrasts it with a sense more common on the continent (Anschauung). Having stipulated what I mean in the paragraph, I'm not going to wrangle with you over definitions.
So, Ewing contrasts his intuition with Anschauung and this should make his intuition more acceptable? Has Ewing read Jung to inform himself what psychological function intuition performs?
If intuition means to you merely a guess that you can reject without proper argument, simply by saying that "people differ", then such concept of intuition must be rejected (or simply use "guess" that you actually mean). People differ on many things, but this does not make those things rejectable out of hand. The same applies to intuition.
To get back to the topic: The divine is so hidden that people differ about it, radically. Does this mean there is no divine, that there can be no study of it, no explanations that appeal to it?
Last edited by seigneur (5/08/2018 1:27 am)
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Posted by John West 5/08/2018 1:26 am | #42 |
So, Ewing contrasts his intuition with Anschauung and this should make his intuition more acceptable?
Haha. This obviously isn't what I said, seigneur.
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Posted by seigneur 5/08/2018 1:32 am | #43 |
So, Ewing contrasts his intuition with Anschauung and this should make his intuition more acceptable?
Haha. This obviously isn't what I said, seigneur.
Well, to quote your own words back to you, you said that you literally gave a standard definition of intuition in English philosophical discourse, as exemplified by Ewing. I say that if it indeed is standard, then so much worse for English philosophical discourse, given the problems that I have pointed out. Let this be a bit more international forum.
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Posted by John West 5/08/2018 1:44 am | #44 |
Well, to quote your own words back to you, you said that you literally gave a standard definition of intuition in English philosophical discourse, as exemplified by Ewing.
No, if you look back at my comment, this isn't what I said.
I say that if it indeed is standard, then so much worse for English philosophical discourse, given the problems that I have pointed out. Let this be a bit more international forum.
I'm fine with that, but when one is speaking English it's regular to assume the standard English use of words or, at least, on a philosophy forum, the standard use of those words in English philosophy. I can run the exact same argument using Anschauung.
(When I switched to philosophy full time, I also switched to a continental faculty. I ended up deciding to continue on in the continental tradition. I'm more of a continental philosopher at this point than an Anglo one. (I've been defending Nietzsche of all people.) I write the way I write on here because I generally think that the analytic style is better for the forum format and, also, more suited for a lot of the topics people interested in scholastic philosophy discuss.)
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Posted by John West 5/08/2018 1:47 am | #45 |
I accidentally hit the edit button instead of the quote button the first time I went to reply. Fortunately, I had another window open and was able to replace it, but I thought I should note what happened here.
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Posted by John West 5/09/2018 4:29 am | #46 |
Looking back at this, I misread the last part of your comment as suggesting that I was somehow citing Ewing in favor of using the English definition of intuition:
Well, to quote your own words back to you, you said that you literally gave a standard definition of intuition in English philosophical discourse, as exemplified by Ewing.
Now I see that you only meant that the form of the definition itself is the one Ewing gives. That is true. But my point was that I obviously wasn't using his contrasting the common English sense of intuition with Anschauung as a reason for preferring it over yours either as a definition or (if we pay attention to the separate meanings and use them for a second) as a "philosophical starting point" or "source of data" over a source indicated by what intuition means in some other sense. I was simply citing where I got the definition.
The original context of this discussion was a conversation with Miguel who I assumed was basing the obviousness of his view on either (i) Moorean intuitive plausibility (he has made Moorean moves on here before), or (ii) Anschauung (he has mentioned that he has been studying some of the phenomenologists before), and proceeded accordingly. I seriously doubt that he had intuitions in Jung's sense in mind.
Rather, what you're doing (and, I think, expressing quite poorly, sorry), is trying to sort out the conflicts I pointed out by appealing to a piece of theory. That is a fine move. I could keep going, if I didn't have limited time and other obligations I need to spend it on, but I'm happy to leave this where it is for now. We can start a separate thread on it in the future when I have more time, if you like.
(I think, by the way, that you would do better to avoid comments like your second paragraph here in the future. I doubt that anyone who read my earlier comments thinks I wasn't giving a "proper argument" (whether or not it's sound is in dispute, but proper? A bit of charity, please).)
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