Classical Theism, Philosophy, and Religion Forum / Substantial Form

**Posted by AKG** 8/16/2015 2:10 pm

Everyone, with regards to substantial form do you know a way to deal with the claim that the idea has been refuted by modern science as some such as this article says: It claims that DNA and atoms or the lowest sub atomic particle explain what a thing is and the idea of substantial forms is not needed in this explanation. I'm asking because I did some searching and found out that substantial form is key to some of the Five Ways such as the Third Way.www.anselm.edu/Documents/.../Abstracts/4.5.3.2c_51Hill.pdf

by B Hill - ‎2007 - ‎Related articles.

**Posted by Scott** 8/16/2015 5:10 pm

Are "DNA and atoms or the lowest sub atomic particle[s]" (or is any other purely reductionist account) sufficient to "explain" e.g. what a human being is?

(By the way, for convenience, here's a live link directly to the article.)

Last edited by Scott (8/17/2015 3:08 pm)

**Posted by AKG** 8/17/2015 10:33 am

Scott, how long did it take you to fully understand the metaphysics behind classical theism?
(are you the Batman of classical theism?)

**Posted by Scott** 8/17/2015 3:07 pm

AKG wrote:
Scott, how long did it take you to fully understand the metaphysics behind classical theism?

I wouldn't claim to have fully understood it yet. Why?

Anyway, though, I think the first question to ask in reply to the post you're asking about is the one I asked. The basic criticism of any form of reductionism is that it can't account for "higher-level features" of the thing for which the alleged reductive explanation is offered. If that criticism is sound, then substantial forms aren't rendered irrelevant by "explanations" in terms only of subatomic particles and such. (Perhaps some things can be explained that way, but if such explanation fails for just one thing, it's not sufficient for all things.)

And the most obvious place for this sort of explanation to fail is in the case of rational animals, i.e., us. The arguments (particularly Ed's) for the immateriality and irreducibility of the intellect are pretty well known on this forum, since so many of us came here from that forum.

Last edited by Scott (8/17/2015 6:47 pm)

**Posted by seigneur** 8/18/2015 4:15 am

The article is interesting and takes us nicely through the distinctions that seem relevant to the author. However, the critique of substantial forms itself stems from confusion about the distinctions involved.

The main thrust of the critique is stated up front.

Benjamin Hill wrote:
The most obvious and natural way for Aristotelians to respond to these [counter-]arguments is by increasingly physicalizing substantial forms. But then the physicalized notion of form are no longer able to function as formal causes. Thus there is no basis for retaining such entities in one’s ontology.

In the critique, the author indeed takes us through the "physicalizing", but I don't see how such physicalizing is necessary. For example,

Benjamin Hill wrote:
Heap and continuum unity are characterized by in principle physical divisibility. A part of a heap may be removed from any other part. Ditto for a continuum, even if that division could only be performed by God’s omnipotence.

As far as I know, the point of continuum unity (contrasted with atomistic heap unity) is precisely that physical divisibility is not possible. Space is the paradigmatic example example of continuum unity, both logically and physically indivisible. Space is a good analogy to understand the nature of form-matter relationship, where the primary difference between the analogy and that which is denoted by the analogy is that that which is denoted by the analogy is non-physical. There's no reason I see why the person who holds to substantial forms should physicalize the form-matter relationship.

**Posted by seigneur** 8/18/2015 6:23 am

Still, is there an Aristotelian answer to a point raised in the article, namely, how to attribute formal functions?

Benjamin Hill wrote:
Think of the problem as like describing a key opening a lock: is the event caused by the shape of the key or the setting of the lock’s tumblers? Ideally they’d be isomorphic so that each key opened one and only one lock and each lock had one and only one key that could open it, but in actuality that is rarely the case. A key with three bittings partially inserted into a lock with only two pins (corresponding exactly to the key’s first two bittings of course) would be opened by that key—is what’s responsible for the key’s opening the lock the formal aitia of the key’s shape or the material aitia of the pins’ setting? It does not seem possible to non-vacuously decide this...

So, on Aristotelianism, is the functionality of the lock attributable to the substantial form of the lock or of the key? Or is it attributable in some other way?

Last edited by seigneur (8/18/2015 6:24 am)

**Posted by AKG** 8/18/2015 1:46 pm

Are there any sources which explain why substantial form has not been refuted by modern science discoveries such as DNA, and the fundamental particles, while alslo showing instead is in fact superior to reductionism?

**Posted by AKG** 8/19/2015 8:14 am

Something else to add. I've been looking at Dr. Feser's blog and he say's that he rejects the idea of elementary particles. What does he mean by this term as scientist believe that they exist in some forms such as quarks. Is Dr. Feser using this term in the same way that they do? Why does he reject this?
@seigneur
Here is a link to an article responding to the claims made in the other one:
http://www.anselm.edu/Documents/Institute%20for%20Saint%20Anselm%20Studies/Abstracts/4.5.3.2c_51Baldner.pdf

**Posted by iwpoe** 8/19/2015 8:23 am

AKG, where does Ed say that? I can't find it. I have a vauge idea in my mind where you might reject a certain interpretation of "elementary particles" that implies an atomist interpretation of nature, but this wouldn't mean, necessarily, that he would reject quarks in any sense.

**Posted by AKG** 8/19/2015 8:47 am

@iwpoe, I don't mean that he rejects quarks, but that he rejects atomism or modern interpretations lf it as he said in this post: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/04/welcome-to-machine.html
My question is why even though science shows there is a good chance fundamental particles exist.