Classical Theism, Philosophy, and Religion Forum / Hey!

**Posted by 119** 11/05/2017 1:50 pm

This forum is a class act!

I wonder if I'm the only one who does this. The harder I try to disprove theism the more theistic I become. Hume's "treatment" of the cosmo argument, Nietzsche's presupposition of atheism, Russel's stupid teapot, whatever the heck Dennett & Dawkins & Rosenberg are doing -- all of these convince me something is intrinsically goofy about their philosophy. I'm currently reading Richard Gales book On the Nature and Existence of G-d, which is a whole different order of magnitude (Everett's The Non-Existence of G-d, too). What are your recommendations of Top-Tier cases for atheism & skepticism?

I'm the fish who chomps down on the hook and the harder he tries to free himself the more embedded it becomes.

**Posted by FrenchySkepticalCatholic** 11/05/2017 8:27 pm

Hi there !

119 wrote:
I wonder if I'm the only one who does this.

Given my username, no, you're not.

119 wrote:
What are your recommendations of Top-Tier cases for atheism & skepticism?

As far as I understand, the only way to "argue" against God is to reject reason. Really. As long as you can infer and make conclusions, reason works. And thus, you can bootstrap a cosmological argument on it.

I don't think you can read an argument against God. I've never seen one, to be honest; because arguing "against" God presupposes a specific version of a God, which is thus countered by a "bigger" version of a God... which is still submitted to a view of Classical Theism.

I'd be wary of skepticism books, they can really mess up your reasoning and your thoughts. Trust me on that one. :/ And it's hard to save reason in these cases.

**Posted by 119** 11/11/2017 1:51 am

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:
[A]rguing "against" God presupposes a specific version of a God, which is thus countered by a "bigger" version of a God... which is still submitted to a view of Classical Theism.

This has been my experience, though the bigger version is one more modest in the attributes it ascribes, one less confident in its ability to define 'G-d.'