1- I agree a view close to Spinoza's would be better than a brute fact. But this suffers from some of the same problems I pointed out, and which have been pointed out before by numerous people (e.g. Samuel Clarke, Leibniz, etc). A) necessitarianism heavily conflicts with all our intuitions and we can conceive of different universes, different particles, different rearrangements, no trees, etc; B) again one may bring teleology into the picture, as does Samuel Clarke, and point out the order in dependent beings. Sure, in principle the spinozist could say it is a necessary fact, but it doesn't actually remove the mystery surrounding such order if it is the product of an impersonal being; C) on its face, Spinoza's defense of things as different modes of God just makes no sense. I don't see how one could sustain necessitarianism given that these "different modes" clearly seem to change and experience corruption, arguments from essence/existence apply here too, etc; D) proportional causality considering the presence of intellect and rationality

(Like you, I think the soul is a very useful way in bridging the "gap problem")

There will be further difficulties: libertarian free will is incompatible with it. Of course, hard determinists won't care, but if someone is convinced of libertarian fw on independent grounds (I personally think it's the only position that seems true, for instance), then the necessary universe option won't be acceptable. There is also the problem with objective morality. I think that once we grant Spinoza's basic contentions about necessary nature, it becomes hard to avoid his other theses, including his ethics. But if you're familiar with Spinoza's ethics, you'll know that it's a mess and he equates rights with power. He tries to give it a humanistic appearance, but it has some notorious issues.

I also think that 9 and 10 would come to bear here. You may find religious experience to be a weak argument (I actually think it's quite stronger than it has been presented before) but taken in a cumulative case they become stronger. If anything, theistic religious experiences (and most religious experiences in general, which feature subjectivity) and miracles give an edge for theism against necessary universe.

Then there's the problem of why one would accept necessary universe by assuming Van Inwagen's argument works. We actually have reasons for thinking an explanans need not entail its explanandum, and may have reasons for accepting contingent self-explanatory facts in terms of free actions. And finally, Spinozism is *not* atheism; it is pantheism. Even if somehow all the previous issues were to be solved, I don't see how one can accept necessitarianism without committing oneself to Spinoza's main views, and Spinozism is not atheism, it is pantheism.

As far as infinite regresses go, I don't think it's an open option at all. If one takes Maitzen's view, I don't think it would work for a regress in an essentially ordered series of causes, but I don't even think it would work for leibnizian/clarkian questions, and not just for Valicella's point but also because I don't see contingent beings as irrelevant dummy sortals at all, and on its face the suggestion of an HEC answer just violates PSR.

For consciousness, I've really been wondering about whether there's a way for atheists to avoid the "argument from consciousness" without opening themselves for classical arguments for God by accepting aristotelian solutions.

I don't have a link to Clarke's article, but it's in his "the creative retrieval of st. Thomas Aquinas". But it's pretty straightforward; if the atheist accepts that we have immaterial souls, it becomes really hard to avoid the conclusion that they've been created by God. It would require a denial of PPC. John Haldane has given similar arguments before; I personally think arguments from the soul for God can be as strong as classical cosmological arguments are. They deserve more attention.

Written too much already

Last edited by Miguel (3/03/2018 12:28 pm)

I think you're far too cavalier in your dismissal of the modal collapse problem. The only real way to avoid it is through an appeal to libertarian free will, but to be frank that's a dubious position that most philosophers not only find to be flat out false but additionally borderline incoherent. I mean, you see this to some extent in the various modern accounts of Aquinas's odd mixture of libertarianism / compatibilism, where it ultimately bottoms out in them admitting that the only way to preserve the true "possible alternatives" notion of choice in his position is by leaving in a certain degree of arbitrariness w.r.t. the manner in which we choose to consider the finite goodness of limited being, which is, of course, inconsistent with the PSR.

UGADawg wrote:

I think you're far too cavalier in your dismissal of the modal collapse problem. The only real way to avoid it is through an appeal to libertarian free will, but to be frank that's a dubious position that most philosophers not only find to be flat out false but additionally borderline incoherent. I mean, you see this to some extent in the various modern accounts of Aquinas's odd mixture of libertarianism / compatibilism, where it ultimately bottoms out in them admitting that the only way to preserve the true "possible alternatives" notion of choice in his position is by leaving in a certain degree of arbitrariness w.r.t. the manner in which we choose to consider the finite goodness of limited being, which is, of course, inconsistent with the PSR.

 
1- Normally, the modal collapse problem shouldn't even show up unless one accepts a PSR in which explanans entail explananda. Why should one accept that?

2- Necessitarianism faces serious problems from conceivability. Perhaps one can defuse them, but it's still a problem.

3- Again, how are we to make sense of necessitarianism given that different "modes" seem to undergo change and corruption? Humans haven't always existed. I have yet to see how one can square this with real necessitarianism.

4- How is necessitarianism able to account for rationality and PPC? (Perhaps some kind of panentheism, but then our souls are also contingent. there would be problems with identity too; also panentheism can have problems over how God would be determined to create the world)

5- I didn't mention it, but necessitarianism severely limits potential cosmological models of the universe, and that could be a problem.

6- I have never seen Aquinas's view as a "mixture" between libertarianism and compatibilism; I've said this before in these forums but for the life of me I cannot see how a rational will could be determined to act by a finite good, or how this would violate PSR. There is determination with regards to infite good, yes, but there also is libertarian free will for all its reasons and purposes. The idea that there is some kind of violation of PSR by such a scenario begs the question by presupposing either that an explanans must entail its explanandum, or that there can't be contingent and self-explanatory facts. If I'm mistaken, do tell.

And yeah many philosophers take libertarian free will to be either false or incoherent, but I have yet to see any decent reason for it that doesn't beg the question with regards to free actions (which is what randomness objections do). Most philosophers are also atheists and materialists but as I've been saying here, I can't even take atheism seriously (materialism even less), so an appeal to philosophers (even of action) doesn't mean much these days.

Last edited by Miguel (3/03/2018 1:39 pm)

UGADawg wrote:

In fact, I'd probably say if finite goods couldn't determine our choices, I'd be very worried about whether I have free will: if I prefer a given choice to all others in a given context, and that choice is indeed within my capabilities to bring about, yet it's still possible I don't take the action, something seems to have gone amiss. 

A libertarian can presumably say that something would have to go amiss in someone who self-consciously and all-things-considered prefers A over B but chooses B. But what if there is no such preference? Does compatibilism imply that there cannot be choices between incommensurable options, or that there are no incommensurable options, or that any such choices would not be free?

It is not plausible that, if I can freely choose A when it is my preference, I cannot freely choose it when I also have the option to choose B, which is incommensurable with A.

UGADawg wrote:

I mean, I don't think the notion that someone could prefer A to B, yet pick B, is even coherent, unless the relevant budget constraint allows for B and not A.

We are in agreement on that point, unless I misunderstand you.

UGADawg wrote:

And to your latter question, insofar as something isn't subsumed into the preference function, it just isn't relevant to the choice.

What is the 'something' here which you are thinking isn't subsumed into the preference function?