Posted by Rick  4/08/2018 10:08 pm | #1 |
Many Thomists seem to insert prime matter into their metaphysics in order to account for substantial change. I am completely confused by this. There is the claim that prime matter and physical matter are not in competition with each other, and that prime matter is not acting as a substitute or an antiquated pre-cursor to the physical conception of matter. From my understanding the Thomist uses prime matter to avoid the pitfalls of generation and annihilation with regards to substantial change. Something must persist, must connect, two different substances which are seemingly linked through the process of change. A log that turns to ashes must have some type of metaphysical principle that can account for its transformation into a completely different substance. This principle would be prime matter. But the materialist has no need of prime matter. The transformation from log to ashes is (from substance 1 to substance 2), on the materialist worldview, the result of some material structure taking on a different structure through the motions of an atomic basis. Isn't prime matter in complete competition to this?
I find it hard to believe that level-headed Thomists would deny current atomic theory, let alone the very existence of atomic particles. I find it hard to believe that they would deny that there are motions of atomic particles into different structures when there is substantial change. So perhaps there's an error in my understanding of the Thomist's metaphysics. I know there is the idea that these particles exist virtually within a substance and that the form determines their proper behavior, harnessing the atomic powers through the immanence of the form. But this still does not seem to render the physical conception of matter obsolete. If anything it admits its relevance in metaphysics and seems more like an attempt to merge the antiquated ideas of prime matter (and perhaps form?) with the current scientific understanding of matter and its properties.
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Posted by Miguel 4/08/2018 10:48 pm | #2 |
I see no competition whatsoever. We just found out that material things are more composite than we once thiught they were, but the medievals were obviously already aware that bodies were composed by many different things which themselves were material (like organs, even though organs wouldn't properly be considered substances). Particles are just further parts; if they exist (many scientists, especially in QM don't actually believe fundamental particles exist btw, sounds a little weird but that's the way it goes) they are also composites of form and matter. So where's the competition?
I would say that the chief insight of hylemorphism is really the distinction between formal and material causes as explanations, and how the idea of "matter" not structured into any form would be a mere abstraction. Atoms aren't just "little blobs of matter", they only are what they are (atoms) because of how they are structured; they're matter informed by the form of atom. This would go all the way down to the most fundamental particles: at the bottom, they are all matter structured in a certain common form. How would they not be? What else would they be? Little building blocks of "matter"? No, they are -- like other material beings -- material matter informed by a specific nature which unifies their attributes and structures them into the kind of thing we call quarks, or whatever.
And so hylomorphism makes good sense of how there can be no simple "matter" that isn't structured into a certain form; how we may explain essences/sharing of essential features among material beings; how we can explain change and identity; how we can explain the fact that we come to objectively know things (by having the same form of material being X actually present in our intellect as an abstraction); how we can have a neat account of soul-body dualism; a way to give some explanation of consciousness; etc.
I don't see how atoms could do the work prime matter does; if anything it just pushes the the problems to another step.
Last edited by Miguel (4/08/2018 10:50 pm)
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Posted by Rick 4/09/2018 3:18 am | #3 |
Miguel wrote:
I see no competition whatsoever. We just found out that material things are more composite than we once thiught they were, but the medievals were obviously already aware that bodies were composed by many different things which themselves were material (like organs, even though organs wouldn't properly be considered substances). Particles are just further parts; if they exist (many scientists, especially in QM don't actually believe fundamental particles exist btw, sounds a little weird but that's the way it goes) they are also composites of form and matter. So where's the competition?
No doubt this is true. But the thrust of my objection is that we have seemed to have uncovered the basic underlying structure of all material beings, that is, the atomic and subatomic levels. Where prime matter was posited once to account for the possibility of change in all beings, now physical atomic matter is posited as the substrate by which substantial change takes place,with aubstantial change being the reorganization of atoms into different structures. Notice I'm not advocating an all out reductionism. I am open to the idea that structures of atoms can yield emergentist or epiphenomenal qualities that the individual atoms themselves don't have (e.g. sensation, thought, unity).
I would say that the chief insight of hylemorphism is really the distinction between formal and material causes as explanations, and how the idea of "matter" not structured into any form would be a mere abstraction. Atoms aren't just "little blobs of matter", they only are what they are (atoms) because of how they are structured; they're matter informed by the form of atom. This would go all the way down to the most fundamental particles: at the bottom, they are all matter structured in a certain common form. How would they not be? What else would they be? Little building blocks of "matter"? No, they are -- like other material beings -- material matter informed by a specific nature which unifies their attributes and structures them into the kind of thing we call quarks, or whatever.
But why should we accept that atoms and other material particles are composite of prime matter and form? It seems to me that prime matter is used by the Thomist to explain substantial change. But if one can explain substantial change through the motion of atoms, rather than some unseen purely potential substratum, then it would be unnecessary to seek an alternative metaphysical substitute.
And so hylomorphism makes good sense of how there can be no simple "matter" that isn't structured into a certain form; how we may explain essences/sharing of essential features among material beings; how we can explain change and identity; how we can explain the fact that we come to objectively know things (by having the same form of material being X actually present in our intellect as an abstraction); how we can have a neat account of soul-body dualism; a way to give some explanation of consciousness; etc.
I don't see how atoms could do the work prime matter does; if anything it just pushes the the problems to another step.
Well if prime matter is seen as superfluous then I don't think we need to hold onto the Aristotelian idea of matter. You pointed out earlier that finding the atomic structure of beings just made us more aware of how composite beings really are. But the atomic basis is unifying, all physical beings are made up of it. If we need a persisting subject through substantial change we can readily admit that the organs of a corpse don't survive cremation or that the fibers of wood don't survive being burned into charcoal. But in all cases of material change the atomic and subatomic levels do persist. In other words, they are the persistent subject of change Aristotle was looking for.
I'm not sure what you mean by pushes the problem to another step.
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Posted by FrenchySkepticalCatholic 4/09/2018 8:58 am | #4 |
I'm not sure what you mean by pushes the problem to another step.
Perhaps I can help, with one question.
In what ways are two different atoms similar?
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Posted by Rick 4/09/2018 11:44 am | #5 |
I'm not sure what you mean by pushes the problem to another step.
Perhaps I can help, with one question.
In what ways are two different atoms similar?
They share the same form. They are the same kind of thing
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Posted by FrenchySkepticalCatholic 4/09/2018 12:00 pm | #6 |
I'm not sure what you mean by pushes the problem to another step.
Perhaps I can help, with one question.
In what ways are two different atoms similar?They share the same form. They are the same kind of thing
Thus, they're not simples, are they? They wouldn't be sharing something. Form and matter are both present at the atomic level.
Don't forget that you can apply the form/matter distinction to any material thing. 
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Posted by Miguel 4/09/2018 12:19 pm | #7 |
"But why should we accept that atoms and other material particles are composite of prime matter and form?"
Because of whar I just said? Do you think atoms are pure forms, or are they embodied forms? You yourself answered that atoms "share the same form", because "they are the same kind of thing"; right, and in what way are they *different* from one another? Because of prime matter, which allows us to talk of them as embodied beings with respective differences of matter, spatiotemporal location, etc. Since they both share the same form, the form obviously cannot be the principle of individuation for atoms, or they wouldn't actually share the same one form, but would each be different from one another!
As I said, the chief insight of hylomorphism is the distinction between formal and material causes, which is present also in atoms. Atoms are prime matter structured into a specific form -- the atomic form.
"It seems to me that prime matter is used by the Thomist to explain substantial change. "
That is partially incorrect. As I mentioned, hylomorphism (including the concept of prime matter) does explain substantial change, but it explains more than that. It also, for example, explains individuation among beings that share the same form; it allows us to make sense of the basic difference between material and formal causes in our questions, etc.
Prime matter is *not* superfluous. My whole point was that I see no way to make sense of atoms as anything but hylomorphic composites of form and prime matter. And also that hylomorphism (with prime matter) has more explanatory power for many issues.
Last edited by Miguel (4/09/2018 12:19 pm)
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Posted by Rick 4/10/2018 2:33 am | #8 |
Thus, they're not simples, are they? They wouldn't be sharing something. Form and matter are both present at the atomic level.
Don't forget that you can apply the form/matter distinction to any material thing.
True, if we affirm the existence of forms then we would need to posit something to individuate those forms (or else we couldn't even entertain the idea of beings sharing a nature), otherwise we would have monism. But would prime matter be necessary to explain this individuation? From what I understand, prime matter is supposed to explain why forms are cut up into distinct beings, instantiated in the physical world as things with potentialities. Thus prime matter explains why substance 1 is potentially on the table and substance 2 is potentially on the ground. If individuation needs explanation, however, why appeal to prime matter? Why not just appeal to space. That is, substance 1 is spatially one way while substance 2 is spatially another way. They both occupy different realms of space.
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Posted by Rick 4/10/2018 2:48 am | #9 |
"But why should we accept that atoms and other material particles are composite of prime matter and form?"
Because of whar I just said? Do you think atoms are pure forms, or are they embodied forms? You yourself answered that atoms "share the same form", because "they are the same kind of thing"; right, and in what way are they *different* from one another? Because of prime matter, which allows us to talk of them as embodied beings with respective differences of matter, spatiotemporal location, etc. Since they both share the same form, the form obviously cannot be the principle of individuation for atoms, or they wouldn't actually share the same one form, but would each be different from one another!
As I said, the chief insight of hylomorphism is the distinction between formal and material causes, which is present also in atoms. Atoms are prime matter structured into a specific form -- the atomic form.
I'm still a bit hesitant to insert prime matter into my metaphysics. You mention that prime matter must act as a principle of individuation in order for us to explain why distinct beings can share the same form. As I said to FrenchySkepticalCatholic, why do we need prime matter to explain the many of the singular atomic form? I can just appeal to space. Each atomic particle occupies a distinct amount of space. If two atomic particles occupied the same space (the same exact space) then we would just have one particle, not two. Therefore, spatiotemporal location and physical motion (the means by which a physical being can occupy new locations) seems sufficient to explain why atomic particles are distinct and yet the same with regards to their shared nature.
Prime matter is *not* superfluous. My whole point was that I see no way to make sense of atoms as anything but hylomorphic composites of form and prime matter. And also that hylomorphism (with prime matter) has more explanatory power for many issues.
Prime matter does seem more attractive when one considers the mind's ability to abstract a universal nature from a concrete substance. However, I am inclined to think that substances, a la the scholastic understanding, being concrete beings that individuate universals, is a bit suspect. How do we explain the idea that we can supposedly create our own universals and abstract from their concrete substances? For instance, a car, a house, a chair. Each is man-made, but can the finite and concrete individual really generate something like a universal? This is just to show that perhaps the scholastic idea of universals existing in concrete beings (only to be abstracted as universals by the intellect) is not as straightforward or commonsensical as it might seem.
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Posted by RomanJoe 4/10/2018 3:14 am | #10 |
A suppositum's ability to occupy new spatiotemporal locations presumes that it has a potentiality to do so. To have a potentiality for a new state of existence--i.e. existing at location x and potentially existing at location y--requires a metaphysical explanation. There must be some determinable yet undetermined metaphysical part of the suppositum which allows it to take on new existences. This is what the scholastic calls prime matter. Any attempt to replace it with physical laws or space just misses the point because such a replacement presumes that beings have a potential to take on new existences in spacetime.
