Classical Theism, Philosophy, and Religion Forum / Aristotelian realism vs Platonic realism

**Posted by RomanJoe** 7/04/2018 8:59 pm

A common critique of the Platonic idea of a bifurcated reality where particulars exist in the physical realm and uninstantiated universals or forms exist in a non-physical realm, is that it's hard to understand or even fathom how a concrete spatially limited being could bear any relation to the radically transcendent, non-particular, non-physical form. But doesn't the Aristotelian have the same issue? On the Aristotelian view all forms are instantiated and are only universal when abstracted via an intellect--but how does a concrete particular bear such a relation to universal abstraction?

**Posted by John West** 7/23/2018 5:51 pm

I don't have time for a lot of (or, probably, any) follow-up questions, but it's more or less accepted in contemporary ontology that every solution to the problem of universals has a prima facie problem with a fundamental relation (e.g. universals and tropes and the instantiation relation, concepts and the falling under relation, etc.). It's also more or less accepted that there are ways of reducing these relations so that they become unproblematic (e.g. Armstrong's reductive principle for internal relations, intentionality, etc.).

The stuff on the "nature considered absolutely" (which as far as I know is unique to Thomism) is also relevant.