Classical Theism, Philosophy, and Religion Forum / Why should we accept the matter-form distinction as foundational?

**Posted by Incessable** 3/12/2016 9:29 pm

Hylemorphists claim that the distinction between "matter" (hyle) and "form" (morphe) is fundamental, foundational to reality, as opposed to merely conventional or superficial. What evidence do they adduce in favour of the claim that distinction is fundamental/foundational as opposed to non-fundamental/non-foundational?

**Posted by John West** 12/08/2016 10:09 pm

The argument is going to have three parts: (1) objects have ontological structure (i.e. to borrow some of Armstrong's scholarly terminology, they're “layer cakes” instead of “blobs”); (2) that structure involves both substances and attributes; (3) those substances are composed of matter and natural kind-universals or natural kind-modes. Each is a huge subject.

If you're still interested, we can take them up over the holidays.

(Sorry about the delayed reply. I've been catching up on old—especially missed—threads in my spare time.)

**Posted by iwpoe** 12/09/2016 3:33 am

I'd be willing to concede it's at least subordinate to being as such (form and matter are), non-being, to oneness/plurality (form and matter are in some way and they are not each other), and that it's constitutive of the particularity of things with perhaps some other co-principles which one might work out, which would entail that it's contingent at some high metaphysical level (since they're dependent), but it's foundational to reality because it's necessary to even articulate the structure of the world as such as we have it. It could only be conventional or superficial to reality on the condition of some rather odd divine supervenience, but even then we might still be able to say it's *regionally* foundational (i.e. insofar as God creates things *in this manner* then they are of such-and-such a character of themselves).