Classical Theism, Philosophy, and Religion Forum / Prime matter,substantial form

**Posted by Mikael** 3/20/2016 2:05 pm

I quote from Feser's 'Aquinas':"even if there could be some composite of form and matter which exists
everlastingly, since in purely material substances form depends on matter just as matter
depends on form, we would have (as Martin has pointed out) an explanatory vicious circle
unless we appealed to something outside the form/matter composite on which it depends
for its existence".My question is:why do we have to appeal to something outside the composite of matter and form to explain the composite?

**Posted by Shade Tree Philosopher** 3/24/2016 6:12 pm

Mikael wrote:
I quote from Feser's 'Aquinas':"even if there could be some composite of form and matter which exists
everlastingly, since in purely material substances form depends on matter just as matter
depends on form, we would have (as Martin has pointed out) an explanatory vicious circle
unless we appealed to something outside the form/matter composite on which it depends
for its existence".My question is:why do we have to appeal to something outside the composite of matter and form to explain the composite?

I'll bite, but just a bit.
To answer the short question, Feser allows the definition of being a form-matter composite to stand in for a distinct proof. He's only pointing out that an everlasting composite is still a composite. On one account of Aristotle's notion of necessity, the Universe as everlasting means it is even necessary: nevertheless, it requires a God (as an unmoved mover, etc.) to explain why even an eternal Universe is before us.

Chris Kirk

**Posted by Mikael** 3/25/2016 11:00 am

Well,thanks a lot Chris for your response.I think I got it.So basically,if something is discernible from other thing it is in potency to that something,which is actual,so there must be a Pure Act.Where do you think that pantheists are mistaken?Do they treat the whole Universe as a single substance?It seems to me that even if you take this approach to be right,given the fact that the Universe is a changinga structure,you have to appeal to something outside this "Universe-as-a-substance",something that is unchanging and Purely Actual.But of course pantheists do not believe in a Pure Act.Or am I mistaken and they take a different approach?

**Posted by Shade Tree Philosopher** 3/28/2016 11:47 am

Mikael,

I'd say that none of your questions have simple answers, because labels like 'pantheist' almost always cover distinct varieties.

I don't happen to think pantheism in the ordinary sense - everything is (part of) God - really is relevant to discussion about hylomorphism. If I had a pantheist to convince, I might try the same path the scholastics took to refute al-Ghazali's claim that there is no secondary causation, just God directly causing everything. It seems to me it's one step more to claim that everything *is* God in a way, and might fall by the same kind of objections as al-Ghazali's claims do.

Is there a particular argument you have in mind?

Chris-Kirk

**Posted by Mikael** 3/28/2016 1:08 pm

It's not like it's relevant to the discussion about hylemorphism.I just didn't want to start a new topic.So,how exactly would a Thomist refute al-Ghazali's claim that there is no secondary causation?

**Posted by Shade Tree Philosopher** 3/28/2016 3:01 pm

Hah! You should start another thread on that!

I admit I do not know exactly, but I promise to look it up - if you look it up also and tell us what it says. Just look up 'secondary causation' or 'al-Ghazali', and try the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, which is online and has lots of well-written articles.

My Stove-like anti-philosophy argument is that it's blinking obvious that fire burns cotton (to use the old medieval example), and you're a pretty unhealthy sceptic to try to convince people otherwise.

Chris-Kirk