Classical Theism, Philosophy, and Religion Forum / Causation, relations, and fundamentality

**Posted by Dennis** 11/15/2016 8:23 am

It seems to me that for the most part, contemporary metaphysicians seem to take relations to be fundamental. It is the thing with which they talk of everything else, this is a very important point for me as I don't think what that what we call relations are any relations at all. Here are a few questions;

(1) What do contemporary metaphysicians mean when they say 'x' is fundamental?
(1a) As far as I understand it, they seem to say that it cannot be reduced to something else.
(2) From what I've read, I don't think metaphysicians would argue that causation is fundamental, since it can be reduced to talks of relations, so,
(2a) What did the Scholastics usually take to be fundamental, and why?
(2b) What do contemporary metaphysicians take to be fundamental, and why?

**Posted by John West** 11/15/2016 12:58 pm

You're probably going to need to give us some context for your claim and questions.

**Posted by Dennis** 11/15/2016 4:13 pm

The plant dies due to a lack of oxygen. For the sake of argument, if you take this as a form of causation and then you somehow believe that the absence caused something, this seems to show that causation is not fundamental, there is something more going on which is more basic than causation that leads to the death of the plant. My questions are questions of grounding, "What grounds what?"

http://www.jonathanschaffer.org/grounds.pdf

I reject that absences can be converted to causes, but maintain that this is a case of causation as there are certain powers that always dispose towards the death of the plant.

**Posted by John West** 11/15/2016 4:44 pm

The paper you linked answers your first question. What do you need me for?

(2a) What did the Scholastics usually take to be fundamental, and why?

God.

(2b) What do contemporary metaphysicians take to be fundamental, and why?

It depends on the contemporary metaphysician.