John West wrote:

You might find these articles (I, II, III, IV, V) and this round-up helpful.

 
John, I want you to know that I appreciate you digging up the links to Dr. Feser's blog articles - particularly The Mind-Body Problem Roundup.   There's gold in them thar hills!

Last edited by joewaked (2/06/2017 11:35 pm)

joewaked wrote:

My apologies Jeremy, I just jumped right to an objection... If you don't mind, indulge me a bit and let me continue with the objection.

Is it even possible to imagine an abstract concept without allowing the entry of any particulars into the imagination? For ex, can triangularity be "seen" with the mind without particular lines, angles, space around/in it? I would say the answer is no.

​I think you are confusing conceiving with imagining.

I don't think it is possible to imagine an abstract concept at all. All mental images are particular. As you note, they have particular lines, angles, etc. But we can certainly know abstract concepts - we know what triangularity is. We just conceive it, rather than imagining it. Conceiving and imagining are two different processes/faculties.

Last edited by Jeremy Taylor (2/07/2017 1:49 am)

Mysterious Brony wrote:

I was talking about this: "Is it even possible to imagine an abstract concept without allowing the entry of any particulars into the imagination?"

Maybe this article by Dr. Feser may help you: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2014/12/progressive-dematerialization.html

Cheers!

I'll be heading to that article next.  Thanks Mysterious.

Proclus wrote:

Here's a pretty straight-forward argument, found somewhere in C. S. Lewis (although you can find a version in Kant too):

1. If the mind were purely physical, rational inference would be impossible.
2. Rational inference is possible
3. So therefore the mind is not purely physical

Why should we think (1) is true?

4. If the mind were purely physical, then all its operations would be governed by purely efficient causation.
5. Rational inference cannot be a type of efficient causation.
6. So therefore (1)

Why should we think (2)? Because any argument to the contrary would be self-undermining.

Can we say it this way and have the same result:

4. If the mind were purely physical, then all its operations would be governed by purely nonrational causes.

Or is that somewhat circular?

Ah, the argument from reason. In my opinion it is one of the best arguments for the immateriality of the mind. C. S. Lewis is underestimated as a thinker.

There are certainly objections to it that have been raised, though I don't find them convincing. We can go through some of them though, in the Scholastic manner. Victor Reppert has an excellent work on the topic. Annoyingly, I don't have it at my new place at the moment, and won't be able to get access to it for a week or two.