Posted by Karl3125  3/10/2017 7:14 pm | #1 |
The Craig-White presentations present the categories of God's knowledge as such:
1. God's knowledge of himself
2. God's knowledge of potentials
3. God's knowledge of created things
My questions -
(1) Isn't the Molinist distinction between created things and potential "worlds" simply the application of the act-potency distinction to God's knowledge of creatures?
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(2) Are the Reformed objectors to Molinism creating a problem for themselves when they reject the idea of middle knowledge? Is there any way to account for God's knowledge of potentials without accepting Molinism?
Cheers
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Posted by Proclus 3/16/2017 6:02 pm | #2 |
(1) Not quite. According the Molinists God's middle knowledge is logically prior to the creative act whereby creatures come into being and receive their natures. As I understand it, God's knowledge of a creature's act and potency would be logically posterior to his creative act (i.e. type 3 above).
(2) I think this is really two questions in one. I'm not sure which reformed objectors you have in mind. Many of the proponents of Molinism (e.g. Plantinga) consider themselves reformed. To the second question: Yes, there are other proposals. Do you have in mind God's knowledge of counterfactuals generally (e.g. "This oak tree could have been 50 feet tall, even though it's actually 40 feet tall") or do you have in mind specifically God's knowledge of CCFs (counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, e.g. "John could have refrained from murdering Tom, even though he did, in fact, murder him")?
Last edited by Proclus (3/16/2017 6:03 pm)
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Posted by Karl3125 3/17/2017 5:26 pm | #3 |
(1) Guess I need to make a little more time to read Molina, then.
(2) True, Plantinga does hold to the Reformed confessions, but he's not well accepted among Reformed theologians (especially presuppositionalists like J White and K S Oliphint).
I believe the objections I have in mind are those concerning God's general knowledge of counterfacutals. The arguments I come across most often is that the Molinist distinction between God's knowledge of contingent things and counterfactuals are really the same kind of knowledge. James White has put the charge this way: If God is the creator, wouldn't he already know what his creatures would do in any sort of circumstance? (This leads to the basic distinction of essentials and contingencies.)
Here's Paul Helm on the Reformed/Calvinistic perspective (http://www.ligonier.org/blog/molinism-101/):
Since the Reformed held that all that occurs is unconditionally decreed by God and that men and women are responsible for their actions, they saw no need for a third kind of divine knowledge, a middle knowledge, which depended upon God foreseeing what possible people would freely do in certain circumstances. The Reformed interpreted the Keilah incident differently. God did not simply see what Saul would do; He ordained that Saul would come down if David remained. He ordained that David would depart from Keilah upon hearing what Saul would do. And He ordained that Saul would change his mind.Not only is middle knowledge unnecessary to an all-knowing, all-decreeing God, but the Molinists’ conception of free will makes it impossible for God to exercise providential control over his creation. Why? Because men and women would be free to resist His decree. God can only bring to pass the actions of free agents via his middle knowledge of what they would freely do if…Further, given the Molinist view of freedom, it is impossible for God to bring about the conversion of any person by the exercise of His effective call, for in the view of the Molinists it is always possible for an individual to resist God’s grace. Men and women must freely cooperate with what God says and does if they are to become Christians. God’s grace is always resistible. Reformed Christians have no good reason to accept the speculative concept of middle knowledge and strong reasons to reject it.
Last edited by Karl3125 (3/17/2017 5:31 pm)
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Posted by Proclus 3/19/2017 3:04 pm | #4 |
I think it is true that Molinists must hold that there are some logically possible states of affairs that God cannot bring about (because such states of affairs would entail that one or more true CCFs are false). In general, I think most Molinists would also extend this to the issue of salvation, but I think it is worth noticing that they are not logically forced to accept this further conclusion. They might think of God's call as a special case that cannot be resisted and does not involve creaturely freedom. Molinism only requires that some of our actions are the result of creaturely freedom (which they gloss as: we do them because the antecedent of a true CCF was satisfied).
If you ask me, the real problem with Molinism is the truthmaker objection: What makes the true CCFs true, and the false ones false? It can't be creatures because they don't even exist yet (and would collapse middle knowledge with your (3) above). It can't be God because that would collapse middle knowledge to your (1) above (and would make God the author of evil). In my view when we think about God's providence and creative act we need to face head on the difference between views that say God is the absolute cause of every aspect of the way things are (including evil) and those that deny this (usually because of evil). It seems to me that Molinism attempts to avoid this fork by pushing the question off to the realm of the CCFs, but I don't see how this helps things.
