The Second Way explains contingency (essence/existence) and the Third way reasons from substances (Hylemorphism). Both are untouched by change. Seeing as Ed has defended the First Way as an explanation of the existence of substances (and essence/existence, Form/matter are particular outworkings of act/potency) the first way is untouched.

Also, as this blog post touches on scholastic realism, Augustine's argument from universal truths is untouched.

Neither does A-T need to assume change to get act/potency and then the rest. If scholastic realism is true, things instantiate universals. That entails hylemorphism and essentialism. The existence of qualia and intentionality points toward Hylemorphism as well. That form depends on matter and matter on form points towards to essence/existence distinction. Much more can be said for these powerful arguments.

So to summarise;

Principle of finality is a neccessary part of any worldview

Realism about universals is a neccessary part of any worldview

Finality and realism entail hylemorphism (which has other powerful arguments)

Essentialism is also entailed.

Forget the Five Ways and Augustine's argument from universal truths for a second, the underlying metaphysics is not touched by B-Theory of time.

But the second and third way is untouched by B theory as well. As is Augustine's argument.

The Fifth way may need reformulating. I'm undecided. But i still think can be made successful. Swineburne's argument from temporal order is a version of the Fifth Way without A-T metaphysics but i think A-T is hard to resist.

Also, although no strictly A-T, in the broader family of Neo-platonism, Plotinus' argument for the One is untouched but im undecided on that argument.

(I won't address whether A or B theory is correct or how B can maintain change without needing something like Act/Potency. But i'm not completely against B theory, it's a ready made answer for how an immutable God can interact with the world).

Callum wrote:

The Second Way explains contingency (essence/existence) and the Third way reasons from substances (Hylemorphism). Both are untouched by change. Seeing as Ed has defended the First Way as an explanation of the existence of substances (and essence/existence, Form/matter are particular outworkings of act/potency) the first way is untouched.

Form/matter are particular outworkings of act/potency 
Well thats the problem, It seems when Act/potency collapses so does Essence/Existence ..just think about it, all moments of time are equally real, things won't be generated or corrupted  in the sense this argument would want them to..

Callum wrote:

Also, as this blog post touches on scholastic realism, Augustine's argument from universal truths is untouched.

Not sure why you bring this up, right now I am not familiar with it, and besides that I have never claimed that there are no arguments what so ever for theism.

Callum wrote:

Neither does A-T need to assume change to get act/potency and then the rest. If scholastic realism is true, things instantiate universals. That entails hylemorphism and essentialism. The existence of qualia and intentionality points toward Hylemorphism as well. That form depends on matter and matter on form points towards to essence/existence distinction. Much more can be said for these powerful arguments.

 

Well,this is confusing, isn't it the scholastic realism  which is entailed by those other consideration rather that vice versa ? those are already problematic on Eternalistic view of time ..

Under Eternalism, this Substantial Causation view held by A-T becomes mistaken ..Substances don't stand in causal relations ..Cause Doesn't Bring Effect into being..so it seems this whole view of Causality is false .only some Humean or Counter-factual theory of causation can go through ( of course this is my contention and I might be mistaken though it hasn't been shown how)

Callum wrote:

Also, Leibniz's cosmological argument is untouched by B theory. When the PSR is correctly formulated in scholastic terms that is.

well like I said some kind of Leibnizian CA could go through(though it seems absurd too) but it won't be on Aristotelian theory of causality ..So I might agree with the former claim in this statement but not with the second..

Callum wrote:

 Accepting something that can't be detected is not "rejecting the results of empirical experiments". Especially when rival hypotheses suffer from incoherent charges like empirical incoherence. Also, John Bell noted the independent reason for Lorentz's interpretation and the Aether because of the violation of the Bell inequalities. The Aether isn't some ad hoc idea postulated willy-nilly. Bell also noted Lorentz's interpretation is consistent with Relativity.

Well then how are we supposed to know that Aether actually exists? How is accepting it just not blatantly rejecting  results of Michelson–Morley experiment? and I Just never understood this charge of incoherence ..its just a red herring..

Callum wrote:

"it might be you are conceiving of change the wrong way". 

Maybe, or maybe not. Perhaps you could point out my mistake. 

"one interpretation clearly has more evidential support over other" Not with regards to Special Relativity. All physical interpretations start from the same, identical data. The main preferences are going to be based on philosophy.

Well your mistake is you are presupposing Change involves reduction of Act to Potency..No it doesn't under Eternalism..you are presupposing Eternalist can't describe change , they can it just doesn't involve things going out of being and coming into being.. Change for eternalist is just a matter of something's being one way at one time and another way at another time(better understood as space-time slices) its just mere replacement its not temporal becoming
I just want to emphasise  this point more and more ..there is no reduction of potency to act ..whatever exist,exists always nothing goes from Potentially being X to Actually being X its just not X at one time and X at another  .. nothing moves in the relevant sense Aristotelians use the term motion 

Well regarding your arguments from universals I am unaware of it I don't know what that argument is ..but (IIRC) in Aquinas Dr. Feser describes Hylemorphism as the view that things are composite of Prime matter and substantial form where this prime matter just is being in potency for some act.. but you can clearly see how this analysis is mistaken on eternalism ...
This is what I mean when I say substantial causation is ruled out 

Callum wrote:

 Needless to say Humean or Counter-factual theories are **severely** problematic. If eternalism entails counterfactuals then that's another reason to reject it, but I know you dont want to get into that.

Well maybe getting into that would be going down a big rabbit hole but let me ask if any of those **severe** problems don't actually just presuppose the specific view of change?  

Thats the Problem ..if Act/Potency goes A-T(or at least most of the five ways under specific interpretation) goes ..

Callum wrote:

. Some sense of Act/Potency will still come out from B theory as you accepted it still has to accept some change even if not in the original sense. For example, Laws of nature actualise states of affairs.

 
Yes, thats what I am interested in could you please develop that kind of reasoning? I haven't read Neo-Scholastic essays but I know Dr . Feser claims in it that Laws governing Minkowski's 4d Block universe are somehow contingent ..but I don't see how..can you elaborate on that? 

 

Calhoun wrote:

Callum wrote:

 Accepting something that can't be detected is not "rejecting the results of empirical experiments". Especially when rival hypotheses suffer from incoherent charges like empirical incoherence. Also, John Bell noted the independent reason for Lorentz's interpretation and the Aether because of the violation of the Bell inequalities. The Aether isn't some ad hoc idea postulated willy-nilly. Bell also noted Lorentz's interpretation is consistent with Relativity.

Well then how are we supposed to know that Aether actually exists? How is accepting it just not blatantly rejecting  results of Michelson–Morley experiment? and I Just never understood this charge of incoherence ..its just a red herring..

Callum wrote:

"it might be you are conceiving of change the wrong way". 

Maybe, or maybe not. Perhaps you could point out my mistake. 

"one interpretation clearly has more evidential support over other" Not with regards to Special Relativity. All physical interpretations start from the same, identical data. The main preferences are going to be based on philosophy.

Well your mistake is you are presupposing Change involves reduction of Act to Potency..No it doesn't under Eternalism..you are presupposing Eternalist can't describe change , they can it just doesn't involve things going out of being and coming into being.. Change for eternalist is just a matter of something's being one way at one time and another way at another time(better understood as space-time slices) its just mere replacement its not temporal becoming
I just want to emphasise  this point more and more ..there is no reduction of potency to act ..whatever exist,exists always nothing goes from Potentially being X to Actually being X its just not X at one time and X at another  .. nothing moves in the relevant sense Aristotelians use the term motion 

Well regarding your arguments from universals I am unaware of it I don't know what that argument is ..but (IIRC) in Aquinas Dr. Feser describes Hylemorphism as the view that things are composite of Prime matter and substantial form where this prime matter just is being in potency for some act.. but you can clearly see how this analysis is mistaken on eternalism ...
This is what I mean when I say substantial causation is ruled out 

Callum wrote:

 Needless to say Humean or Counter-factual theories are **severely** problematic. If eternalism entails counterfactuals then that's another reason to reject it, but I know you dont want to get into that.

Well maybe getting into that would be going down a big rabbit hole but let me ask if any of those **severe** problems don't actually just presuppose the specific view of change?  

Thats the Problem ..if Act/Potency goes A-T(or at least most of the five ways under specific interpretation) goes ..

Callum wrote:

. Some sense of Act/Potency will still come out from B theory as you accepted it still has to accept some change even if not in the original sense. For example, Laws of nature actualise states of affairs.

 
Yes, thats what I am interested in could you please develop that kind of reasoning? I haven't read Neo-Scholastic essays but I know Dr . Feser claims in it that Laws governing Minkowski's 4d Block universe are somehow contingent ..but I don't see how..can you elaborate on that? 

 

- First, as any philosopher of science will accept, the result of an experiement need not be accepted blindly. You can, for example, reject the assumptions made or the conditions of the experiment. Thing is, inherent to the Neo-Lorentzian interpretation is a reason to reject the assumption in Michelson–Morley experiment due to the nature of absolute motion and length. Obviously, that something isn't detectable doesn't mean we have no reason for thinking it exists. That's just scientism which is demonstrably false. Inevitably, the debate over Aether or four dimensionalism with depend on philosophy.

- Without meaning offence, it's not a red herring you just dont undertsand it, as you admitted. If physics attempts to show change is illusory, it essentially pushes change from the external world to an observer's consciousness in the same that physics has 'shown' that colour and sound doesnt exist as we experience them. However, what cannot be shown is that change occurs at least within the the observer's consciousness. It cannot be done. We experience change. Nor is this question begging. The objection is not "we experience change therefore there is a passage of time". The objection is "we experience change, so even if we accept for the sake of argument change is an illusion of consciouness that illusion still nevertheless involves change". So the first aspect is that change cannot be completely eradicated. The second part is that if someone tries to deny our conscious experience, =smallthis is implicitly to deny the very empirical evidential base on which physical theory is supposed to rest. Essentially Democritus' paradox all over again. This is similar to what Healey noted as "empirical incoherence'.

- "whatever exist,exists always=small". Then there is no change. Eternalism can call it change, but it isn't. It is using the term in a different sense. If something is always a certain way at a specfic time and always another way at another time, then it changeless has different parts. There is no change between a tree with leaves at one time and none at another because they are just different temporal parts. Temporal parts are supposed to be analogous to spatial parts. But there is no change from someone having black hair at one spatial part and a white hand at another. Odeberg explains well how temporal parts are supposed to be posited to save the analogy which undermines the entire argument from analogy. Also, if IIRC, humean counterfactuals are problematic simply because they are hopeless at actually explaining causation. But i'll leave change on eternalism, its problem with identity and the relationship of temporal becoming and Humean counter-factual theories until later. You wanted to know if the Five Ways are compatible with B theory.

- Feser understandibly uses Act and potency to explain Hylemorphism in Aquinas because Act and Potency was how he structured the book. The idea of matter being different than the atomist view does not depend on Act/potency. Any neutral monist and pansychist will tell you that and as Bertand Russell's and Pucknam show is plausibly pointed at from the mathematized method of physics. Hylemorphism simple follows from Aristotelian Realism, it is also entailed by the Principle of Finality independently. Neither AR or PF depend on Act/Potency but each have powerful independent arguements.

- You can't see how the laws of the Minkowski universe are contingent? You think they are neccessary?!

- Act/Potency doesnt depend on coming into being. At any moment, say time T3, a person existence has multiple potentialities being actualised. Taking Atomism for sake of argument: the potential for your molecules to be arranged cell wise is being actualised etc etc. This is why the potential for specific laws of nature to be actualised in a Minkowski universe will go back to Pure Actuality in Feser's view. Remember, A-T has a very rich sense of causation.


 

Callum wrote:

That's just scientism which is demonstrably false

well I do agree with you on that ..but the problem is it just can not be shown in the first place that Eternalist has unbearable burden of proof ..that they just can't account for our experience of passage of time or that their claim that the passage is an illusion just "Can not" be made coherent ..

Callum wrote:

- Without meaning offence, it's not a red herring you just dont undertsand it, as you admitted. If physics attempts to show change is illusory, it essentially pushes change from the external world to an observer's consciousness in the same that physics has 'shown' that colour and sound doesnt exist as we experience them. However, what cannot be shown is that change occurs at least within the the observer's consciousness. It cannot be done. We experience change. Nor is this question begging. The objection is not "we experience change therefore there is a passage of time". The objection is "we experience change, so even if we accept for the sake of argument change is an illusion of consciouness that illusion still nevertheless involves change". So the first aspect is that change cannot be completely eradicated. The second part is that if someone tries to deny our conscious experience, =smallthis is implicitly to deny the very empirical evidential base on which physical theory is supposed to rest. Essentially Democritus' paradox all over again. This is similar to what Healey noted as "empirical incoherence'.

- "whatever exist,exists always=small". Then there is no change. Eternalism can call it change, but it isn't. It is using the term in a different sense. If something is always a certain way at a specfic time and always another way at another time, then it changeless has different parts. There is no change between a tree with leaves at one time and none at another because they are just different temporal parts. Temporal parts are supposed to be analogous to spatial parts. But there is no change from someone having black hair at one spatial part and a white hand at another.

here again this is just reiteration of the same old red herring ..this is the problem with Presentists ,they just can't wrap their head around it and they just can't settle for anything less than what their intuition demands, they just always demand this something more .(give this one read tho, its very relevant)
Compare how the compatibilist's account of freedom just doesn't seem to be a description of freedom to the libertarian...

THIS^ ....this is the problem just because it seems to libertarians that its not really freewill doesn't mean there is no imaginable way the compatiblist can account for it..

You basically never move past this argument ..
[list=circle]
[*]We have experiences as of the passage of time.
[*]If we have experiences as of the passage of time, then any reasonable explanation for this relies on the passage of time being an objective feature of reality.
[*]therefore, The passage of time is an objective feature of reality.
[/list]

Thats the problem ..there actually are ways in which Philosophers can reject both of these premises( some deny that we can actually even experience the passage, let that sink in but most and indeed in your opinion the sane ones just deny the second premise that experience gives any credence to it being objective) and still maintain coherency ..there are many ways from Philosophy of Cognitive science and Phenomenology of temporal experience which they might adopt..of course non of it is conclusive so one might still maintain his justified belief in above argument..but it doesn't mean its impossible to reject the above argument..I can link you to various papers on the topic if you are interested...there is nothing incoherent though maybe incomplete about it..

You if you are just so sure that this argument that Passage of time just can't be coherently denied and can't be explained in any other way  then by all means you might accept any interpretation of SR you like (even though that one is clearly evidently inferior) but still when one crucial premise of crucial argument for important thesis are concerned then you can't just rely on these intuitions to do the work for you...

So this comment of mine was dedicated to your claims about some Dynamic theory of time being just so obviously true ..
you give some nice arguments for other claims ...I would assess them in the next comment..but i would only able to do that later..please wait for it..
just the bottom line is, One has just no reason to buy into that whole incoherent charge thing...