nojoum wrote:

For a sharp contrast, consider the fact that I as university student do not have to worry about whether scientific books are correct or not. I can easily trust the books and their conclusions. (I agree that philosophy is on whole another level of investigation but this is only to show the difference in levels of the trust I can put into these areas)
 

Again, I think you should consider the simple difference in teaching method between these two disciplines.  Most science classes at the university level will simply assert scientific dogmas and teach the students to work through the various equations.  The latter part is the focus of the undergraduate level.  It is not until graduate school (usually) that students are taught mutually incompatible theoretic models and how to evaluate which has the better empirical evidential basis.  By contrast, from the very beginning of the PHI 100 class I taught this past semester students are taught the major competing theories about different topics and the logical tools necessary for evaluating which theory has the better claim to being right.  Importantly, I teach them about theories that have no adherents that I know of, e.g. universal skepticism, simply because laying out the views and assessing the arguments is how one does philosophy.

Last edited by Proclus (5/02/2017 7:40 pm)

John West wrote:

I'm reminded of Wittgenstein's caution about one-sided diets of examples. For instance, many forms of blob nominalism lay in waste after the last seventy years of arguments (and most that don't stand or fall with extreme modal realism). There are conclusive reasons to reject those theories.

There are also conclusive empirical reasons for affirming that there are property-instances. (It's a more interesting question whether there are anything but property-instances.)

I know so little about philosophy so I don't understand your examples. But I guess you are meaning to say I should not just look at the issue of God and assume that every other area of philosophy is riddled with the same problem.

John West wrote:

(I happen to agree about God and dialectics yielding a stalemate (though not with the inferences from disagreement). A theist, however, might point out how much more existentially important God's existence or non-existence is than properties', and suggest that is part of why there is so much less consensus about it. They might also point out that (since “existential importance” has nothing to do with objective truth) this is another example why we shouldn't decide the truth of philosophical theses based on stuff like polls and surveys.)

I am sorry but I am not familiar with existentialism. I just get the feeling that you mean subjective perceptions of God is more important than objective reasoning done by philosophers.

John West wrote:

There is also E. J. Lowe's point that it's impossible for anyone to actually live without taking positions on substantive philosophical issues (e.g. without having beliefs, making ethical claims, assuming certain beings exist, etc), and so it's probably a good idea for us to examine those positions and make sure they're coherent even if we could never have conclusive answers about them.

(I'm hoping to write more about the paragraph you tacked on at the end later.)

It sounds true to me and I also agree with your point. We should strive as much as we can.

John West wrote:

I was going to reply to this quote:

nojoum wrote:

For a sharp contrast, consider the fact that I as university student do not have to worry about whether scientific books are correct or not. I can easily trust the books and their conclusions. (I agree that philosophy is on whole another level of investigation but this is only to show the difference in levels of the trust I can put into these areas)

But I decided I had better find out what conclusion it's aiming at first. (Thus, without looking at individual arguments we tend to assign scientific results a higher epistemic credit rating than philosophical ones? I think that's probably right.)

I'm not sure we can draw any of the skeptical conclusions we've been looking at from it, though.

You are correct at realizing my aim. I am not going to draw skeptical conclusions from it. It is just an example to provide a measure to compare the success of science and philosophy at their own endeavors.

John West wrote:

Fair enough.

So, what is the thesis that we're discussing now? that there is at least one substantive philosophical question that we're unable to conclusively answer (e.g. whether God exists)? that many scientific results are more certain than that God exists?

(I'm open to the first, and think the second probably right.)

I agree with with you said above. My knowledge of philosophy is so limited that I cannot maintain the discussion. I am not aware of the problems in other areas of philosophy.

But I have one question, do you know what are most accepted foundations for morality? Is there a consensus in philosophy in this regards?
 

Last edited by nojoum (5/04/2017 4:40 pm)

nojoum wrote:

I am sorry but I am not familiar with existentialism. I just get the feeling that you mean subjective perceptions of God is more important than objective reasoning done by philosophers.

I was just making the point that it's easier to remain detached and objective about something like (say) the existence of properties than about something like the existence of God (especially where religion is somehow involved)*, and that this is probably going to affect how much consensus there is about God's existence.

But I have one question, do you know what are most accepted foundations for morality? Is there a consensus in philosophy in this regards?

I'm not familiar enough with the relevant literature to answer (responsibly, anyway). Maybe someone else can chime in.

*The reason, in part, I think, being that whether God exists has more (and more obvious) implications for how we live than whether irreducible properties exist does.

nojoum wrote:

But I have one question, do you know what are most accepted foundations for morality? Is there a consensus in philosophy in this regards? 

There isn't consensus. Among professional philosophers who took a somewhat recent PhilPapers survey:

Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?

Other    301 / 931 (32.3%)
Accept or lean toward: deontology    241 / 931 (25.9%)
Accept or lean toward: consequentialism    220 / 931 (23.6%)
Accept or lean toward: virtue ethics    169 / 931 (18.2%)

Most are cognitivists though.

I think the PhilPapers survey does tell us some things as long as we keep its limitations in mind.  I think it does show, for instance, that amongst contemporary anglophone philosophers there is not a consensus about which metaethical theory is correct.  I'm just not sure this tells us much of anything about which metaethical theory is correct (or even whether or not truth can be had in this area).

Last edited by Proclus (5/22/2017 12:57 pm)