Classical Theism, Philosophy, and Religion Forum / Justified Beliefs and Epistemology

**Posted by Dennis** 6/24/2017 1:19 am

Some epistemologists hold that there can be beliefs that can be justified non-inferentially. I suppose Plato's regress of reasons has done a good amount of damage to epistemology (while also advancing the field).

Consider the following argument:

1. If P is a justified true belief, then P must be justified by some proposition Q.
2. If Q is a justified true belief, then Q must be justified by some proposition S.
. . .ad infinitum.

Since not every proposition can be justified true belief (JTB), I think it's safe to say that we should abandon JTB's altogether. However, does this refutation work against the notion that there could be reasons for accepting non inferential true beliefs that we have some to adopt? I'm not so certain. It seems that some epistemologists would accept things like fact infinitism, which is the thesis that (1) there are no self-justifying beliefs, and that (2) there are no foundational reasons. Which is to say that there is no doxastic justification, which proclaims the chain of reasoning or inference can lead to a belief that isn't itself justified.

All of this brings me to the point of circular justification in epistemology, while I don't have much hope for Western Epistemology, I don't say this out of contempt, but it seems to be the end-game for the field. Where should we go from here? And, what kind of validity do circular sources of justification/epistemic circularity (P justifies itself) have?

**Posted by UGADawg** 6/26/2017 5:54 am

I doubt it's possible to deny we can have justified true beliefs that are, at some level, non-inferential. I'm thinking of something like Michael Huemer's "self defeat argument" for phenomenal conservatism.

**Posted by Dennis** 6/26/2017 8:04 am

Foundational beliefs as such would be unjustified, but not false. But there are at least two problems with it, (1) how do we decide which beliefs are foundational? And if we employ a certain method of arbitration, (2) on what basis do we know that is true? I don't think foundationalism with regard to beliefs is acceptable, since I think that these problems are insurmountable, and lead us to some form of circular justification.

**Posted by UGADawg** 6/26/2017 9:06 am

No, they would be justified. That just is Huemer's argument, i.e. appearances are sufficient to justify belief in the absence of defeaters. He then argues denying this is self defeating. I would recommend reading his argument, e.g. see his article Phenomenal Conservatism and Self Defeat (2011).

**Posted by Dennis** 6/26/2017 10:04 am

Yes, but it isn't justified by another proposition, the answer is no. So it's not justification in the relevant sense. Seeing itself justifies that thing. I'm familiar with this, the point assailed is that which appearances justify, and why? Appearances are not always a source of justification, re: hallucinations. How does any arbitrartion here not seem to lead to the problem of criterion? Plus, it doesn't seem to be the case that any argument here would be self defeating, since I don't hold JTB's to be an analysandum of knowledge.

**Posted by Dennis** 6/26/2017 10:15 am

Suppose for the sake of argument that Huemer succeeds. All this shows is that the contrary position is incoherent, that shouldn't be a reason to accept doxastic beliefs, since the notion of "well-foundedness" of belief does seem to run into the problem of criterion and unless that is somehow cogently solved, I have no idea why I should accept them.

**Posted by UGADawg** 6/26/2017 11:09 am

Yes, it's not justified by another proposition, but why is that a problem?

And Huemer has answered your reply regarding things like hallucinations, i.e. appearances serve to justify so long as there are no good defeaters.

Last edited by UGADawg (6/26/2017 11:10 am)

**Posted by Dennis** 6/26/2017 11:22 am

That still doesn't give me any reason to think that we can have doxastic beliefs without solving the deeper problem.

UGADawg wrote:
Yes, it's not justified by another proposition, but why is that a problem?

Even if it is not justified by another proposition, criteria 'x' serves to justify that thing. That experiences prima fascie justify is a doxastic belief. How do we come to know that such a criteria is valid source of justification? I'm only conceding that we have justification for "x" if we examine that there are no defeaters. However, you would necessarily need a method to arbitrate the sources of justification. If you have a method, you at least need something to be true, but the issue with knowing that truth, plausibly demands that you have some method by which we can say it is well-founded/true. This is the problem of criterion.