Posted by RomanJoe  7/11/2017 10:55 pm | #1 |
Correct me if I'm wrong with a few things--I'm a rookie when it comes to scholasticism:
From what I understand every material being is a hylemorphic composite of a determinable substratum (prime matter) and a determining pattern (form). Form actualizes the purely potential prime matter, instantiating said prime matter in a specific time and place (e.g. five minutes ago the matter underlying the form of wood gave way to the present form of ash). Now a substantial form (as opposed to an accidental form which modifies a presupposed substantial form without changing the substantial form itself) encompasses the intrinsic (as opposed to extrinsically imposed) characteristics of a being. So, the hylemorphist would say, rubber's tendency to be flexible, to stretch, to melt, to be rubber-like, is a result of its substantial form, its intrinsic finality. Now rubber's possible imposed ends issued by it being a dog toy, an elastic band, or a bouncy ball are all accidental forms which presuppose the fact that it is rubber, that it has the substantial form of being rubber.
Now, if the atomist is right, insofar as material reality can be reducible to certain fundamental particles (be it quarks or some type of subatomic particles), then would that not entail that what really has substantial form are the fundamental particles, and that the aggregate collections of particles such as dogs, humans, rubber, rocks, are all just accidental forms? That is, what truly has intrinsic properties are the particles (e.g. their tendency for motion, formation, composition) and all the odd collections of particles are merely accidental forms of an underlying fundamental material form. Feser mentions in Scholastic Metaphysics, that one way we could object to this reductionist view is by realizing that the fundamental substratum of particles is only present virtually rather than actually in the beings of our experience. So, for instance, in a snowball we don't have the substantial form of odorless and colorless particles, even though at a fundamental level such particles constitute the snowball. Rather, these particles exist virtually in the snowball, while the snowball's substantial snowballness exists actually.
My issue, however, is that the snowball is still reducible to these particles--if, for instance, I had some insanely high powered microscope perhaps I could analyze the deepest levels of the the snowball and observe these particles. At a very basic level, then, the particles are really doing all the work by providing the material substratum for the snowball. Also where does the snowball's substantial form come from if, at the fundamental level of its material composition, the snowball is constituted by the substantial form of odorless and colorless particles?
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Posted by Jason 7/12/2017 5:47 pm | #2 |
I think that Thomist's take substantial form to be for the entire substance down to its very particles even. Like if you were to observe the particles of a snowball they would be a substantial form of a snowball. Let's say if you were able to take the one particle out of the snowball it would then not have the substantial form of the snowball anymore but will take on another substantial form altogether. So no matter how many parts are inside a substance their substantial form would be the same as the whole. The snowball's substantial form comes from snowballness.
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Posted by RomanJoe 7/12/2017 8:24 pm | #3 |
Jason wrote:
I think that Thomist's take substantial form to be for the entire substance down to its very particles even. Like if you were to observe the particles of a snowball they would be a substantial form of a snowball. Let's say if you were able to take the one particle out of the snowball it would then not have the substantial form of the snowball anymore but will take on another substantial form altogether. So no matter how many parts are inside a substance their substantial form would be the same as the whole. The snowball's substantial form comes from snowballness.
Are you saying that the particles are all subservient to the substantial form of the snowball? I have trouble with this because one could fall into a type of monist understanding of reality where there is just one substantial form, the universe, and the snowball (and all material things) are merely constituent parts subservient to the one cosmic substantial form.
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Posted by Jason 7/13/2017 11:26 am | #4 |
I think the difference is that you are seeing this from a scientific angle where all particles are just the same in everything in the universe but talking from a Thomistic perspective that is not the case. When we bring in substantial form a Thomist would say that a substance would have it's substantial form down to its very particles. Lets borrow an example from Scholastic Metaphysics where Dr. Feser talks about water. Now we know hydrogen has it's own substantial form and oxygen it's own substantial form but when they combine they take on the substantial form of water and lose their substantial form of hydrogen and oxygen respectively. Now water takes on some properties of hydrogen and some properties of oxygen but not all to become water, which is why they are virtually present in water but not actually. Yes you can take hydrogen and oxygen out of water but then when you do so the substantial form is transferred back to hydrogen and oxygen and it loses its substantial form of water. So this does not fall into a monist understanding of reality as a matter of fact just does the opposite in the sense that each substance has its' own substantial form distinct from another, hope this helps.
Last edited by Jason (7/13/2017 11:29 am)
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Posted by RomanJoe 7/13/2017 7:23 pm | #5 |
I think the difference is that you are seeing this from a scientific angle where all particles are just the same in everything in the universe but talking from a Thomistic perspective that is not the case. When we bring in substantial form a Thomist would say that a substance would have it's substantial form down to its very particles. Lets borrow an example from Scholastic Metaphysics where Dr. Feser talks about water. Now we know hydrogen has it's own substantial form and oxygen it's own substantial form but when they combine they take on the substantial form of water and lose their substantial form of hydrogen and oxygen respectively. Now water takes on some properties of hydrogen and some properties of oxygen but not all to become water, which is why they are virtually present in water but not actually. Yes you can take hydrogen and oxygen out of water but then when you do so the substantial form is transferred back to hydrogen and oxygen and it loses its substantial form of water. So this does not fall into a monist understanding of reality as a matter of fact just does the opposite in the sense that each substance has its' own substantial form distinct from another, hope this helps.
I understand what you're saying, the constituent parts of a substantial form are subservient to the whole. That is, hydrogen no longer operates as hydrogen and oxygen no longer operates as oxygen. But my point is that this seems open to absurdity. Because then every material thing in the universe would be subservient to the whole of the cosmos and the cosmos would really have the substantial form. I'm talking about the entire collection of material reality we call the cosmos would have a substantial form--and if the basic parts of a substantial form lose their substantial form (as you just mentioned with oxygen and hydrogen losing their form to serve the whole) in service to the whole, then that would mean all material things don't have a substantial form and that only the cosmos (the collection of all material things) does.
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Posted by Jason 7/13/2017 7:47 pm | #6 |
The point here is that hydrogen and oxygen are an intrinsic part of water that means if we take out hydrogen from water it would no longer be water but cosmos would still be the cosmos even if an entire galaxy never existed. The parts are not really intrinsic to it. They have their own substance and hence their own substantial forms.
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Posted by RomanJoe 7/14/2017 11:52 am | #7 |
The point here is that hydrogen and oxygen are an intrinsic part of water that means if we take out hydrogen from water it would no longer be water but cosmos would still be the cosmos even if an entire galaxy never existed. The parts are not really intrinsic to it. They have their own substance and hence their own substantial forms.
So a part only loses its substantial form when it is an intrinsic part to the whole?
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Posted by Jason 7/18/2017 11:31 am | #8 |
The point here is that hydrogen and oxygen are an intrinsic part of water that means if we take out hydrogen from water it would no longer be water but cosmos would still be the cosmos even if an entire galaxy never existed. The parts are not really intrinsic to it. They have their own substance and hence their own substantial forms.
So a part only loses its substantial form when it is an intrinsic part to the whole?
Yes and the part gains the substantial form of the whole which would be the same down to the particles and hence only be present virtually.
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Posted by RomanJoe 7/18/2017 2:18 pm | #9 |
The point here is that hydrogen and oxygen are an intrinsic part of water that means if we take out hydrogen from water it would no longer be water but cosmos would still be the cosmos even if an entire galaxy never existed. The parts are not really intrinsic to it. They have their own substance and hence their own substantial forms.
So a part only loses its substantial form when it is an intrinsic part to the whole?
Yes and the part gains the substantial form of the whole which would be the same down to the particles and hence only be present virtually.
Ok thanks for the clarification. Any recommended reading that would assist me in understanding hylemorphism, substantial form, and such?
