I added this to my last post, but will post it separately, as it goes someway to answering your question:

What is important so far as this thread goes is whether the scientific explanation alone can replace an account like Aristotle's as a metaphysical explanation of change that answers Parmenides' challenge. Certainly, no one doubt change exists, but that doesn't mean we don't need an account that explains its possibility. Besides, the scientific account is not a full philosophical account of causation anyway. It would have to be turned into such an account, and therefore no longer be purely science.

​​The scientist doesn't give an account of causation and its possibility that would underlie the melting of ice. He simply gives an account of what happens physically when ice melts - he assumes a common sense idea of causation. The two accounts are doing different things. This is why causation is an important topic in metaphysics, even for non-A-T philosophers.

 

ficino wrote:

Cool. But where does this leave all of us with ForumUser's questions? 

I really want to sink my teeth into the problem, what work do notions like "actuality" and "potentiality" and "form" actually do? When the scientist has given an exhaustive account of what happens when ice melts, and then the metaphysician triumphantly intones, "the heat in the candle actualized the ice's potentiality to be liquid," I'm left with a "Well, duh" reaction. What work do "act, potentiality, essence, prime matter" do that isn't being done by scientists using other systems of symbols? The A-T chap says, "the shape of Hermes is in the block of marble potentially but is not in the song of the bird potentially, because extension is not in the being of the song," and I reply again, well, duh. We knew that already, but thanks for the vocabulary.

As I'm reading it this sounds like a general criticism of metaphysics, not just A-T stuff. Actuality, Potentiality, form, matter etc. are part of particular responses to general metaphysical questions or issues like what is change?, what is a cause?, what are objects?, what is possible? etc. In the natural sciences, a lot of this stuff can be just taken for granted in a search for more specific or detailed answers to the questions we might have or explanations we might seek. But, just because they are more general kinds of questions, I don't think they are necessarily less meaningful than the more specific and focused kinds. (Or, in fact, some kinds of scientific explanation may be no more than what the A-T chap is doing or providing, so, equally, why choose some kind of 'scientific' language to describe it over an A-T one?)

Hello ForumUser,

First , I am not myself completely convinced by these principles you object to and it might turn out that some of that has to do with physics or some other things you've mentioned. but I think there can be good responses to particular objections you make here. The reason I think you haven't got a detailed response is that the objections are fairly loaded, I think the best task would be, if you're really interested in this kind of metaphysics is to read more books about it.

Here I'll try to address some of your points, It will hopefully clarify few things or at least give you something more to think about.

2. Objection (p 10): Why believe this metaphysical model [about actualization and potentiality, and change being the actualization of potential rather than the breaking of atomic bonds; rather than leftover pizza absorbing radiation from the microwave, "the microwave actualizes the pizza's warmth"?] instead of our modern physical models? In other words, "How can change occur?" seems like a meaningless question, and to give it meaning, one must invent or presuppose this system of "metaphysics". Instead of saying "Change occurs when potency is reduced to act," one can instead be satisfied with, "Change occurs when atoms interact": Why do we need this metaphysics at all?

Not sure If I follow, I think you need further elaboration to show the real force of the objection, Particularly Your use of "rather than" is confusing, All the state of affairs you note (Breaking of atomic bonds,Pizza absorbing radiation,interaction of atoms) themselves include instances changes and hence of actualization of Potentiality because all of them involve obtaining of some metaphysically possible state of affairs, here at least it is most obvious because we can actually pick out a time where they hadn't obtained. Clearly we need a general principle to formulate what such causality involves, so again , not sure what your "rather than" amounts too. So apparently, There really isn't much replacement of such principle with your example available it seems. You would need more work to show that such is the case. 
And you would certainly need to say more about what you consider meaningful and meaningless questions? , What do you think is criteria of such things?  I can not extract a lot from your post  that shows that such is the case, like again it isn't clear how "Change occurs when atoms interact" is an alternative principle so that we can meaningfully asses how satisfactory it is compared to other principle. examples like this are available in all of philosophy not just this type of metaphysics, like How is knowledge possible? , What is knowledge? , When does composition occur?  or consider that it is hardly a satisfactory answer to What is time? question in philosophy of time to just tell us to look at clocks. So again you would need to say more.

Perhaps you hint at such a criteria in your objection 8 when you say,

What do you mean? Why would it not be able to change?" You seem to be assuming some problem that needs answering, as if the default state of affairs is for objects to not change, whereas the opposite is apparently true -- we should be puzzled only if we see something incapable of change.

But such a criteria doesn't seem coherent , A changeless world doesn't seem impossible and anyway,  How does asking Why would it not be able to change? supposed to show that such a question about change is meaningless, And what sense of "default" are you using? If it denotes the actual world's state of affairs then again how does meaninglessness is proved through that?, as If asking why do objects fall down from heights is only meaningful if falling down is not the default state for objects at some height. 

3. Objection: You say potentiality is "rooted in a thing's nature" (11), but is it not rather rooted in our own minds? Does aluminium have the potential to spark regardless of whether the microwave has been invented? It appears if a set of objects gain a potentiality depending on what we can invent to interact with it, then potentiality is not rooted in the object itself (rather, it is a function of their nature and everything they can interact with). Or, does every physical object have every logically possible potentiality? Yet you appear to reject this resolution to the objection.

Here again the objection is set out in a very confusing manner, you first question , 

You say potentiality is "rooted in a thing's nature" (11), but is it not rather rooted in our own minds?

 
Then you end up saying that

potentiality is not rooted in the object itself (rather, it is a function of their nature and everything they can interact with)

These two claims don't really connect. are they supposed to be two different claims? Two different objections?  

About the First I would address it with your other objections pertaining to mind-dependence of such principles, as such claim is not substantiated here. 

As for the second, I am not sure how is that an objection to the principle rather than being just a question about ontology of Potentialities. More precisely , I think you might be misunderstanding the point Feser is trying to make. He is trying to point out that "Potentialities" in A-T sense is picked out in de re sense not de dicto sense. That means is that talk of "Potentialities" are about "capabilities" of actually existing object not about talk of what happens in some "possible" world involving that object. So here Feser would agree with you that Object is capable of gaining and losing potentialities and that some state of affairs are actualized Jointly by different objects. This does not conflict with them being rooted in things nature as they actually exist as he says , though natures might put constraints on what kind of Potentialities can an object gain or lose.  Here the distinction between essential and accidental properties and some other principles is important but hopefully I've made my point. You or anyone else who have the book with them might want to confirm this as I don't have it right now , don't remember the mentioned page exactly.

FZM wrote:

(Or, in fact, some kinds of scientific explanation may be no more than what the A-T chap is doing or providing, so, equally, why choose some kind of 'scientific' language to describe it over an A-T one?)

Maybe it is a matter of what work one's description serves. If one is trying to make empirically testable predictions and eventually to learn more about the world, won't scientific language serve the purpose better than A-T language?

I don't have the background to evaluate a lot of what James Ladyman writes here, but he rejects a priori metaphysics as practiced, for example, by the late Jonathan Lowe (whose work I believe Feser regards highly), who mostly did conceptual analysis. Ladyman also goes on to cast doubt on "naturalistic metaphysics," i.e. metaphysics that attempts to work from the conclusions of the several sciences. Ladyman says that after the demise of logical positivism, many analytic philosophers came to think that scientific realism must be grounded in metaphysics. People like Lowe said that metaphysics provides the very framework within which sciences are conceived, since metaphysics deals with universal concepts like identity, necessity, causation, space and time. Ladyman brings what seem to me as a layman to be fairly strong objections to this view that metaphysics rules science, so to speak. 

http://www.bristol.ac.uk/metaphysicsofscience/associatememberspublications/S1358246107000197a.pdf

 

Last edited by ficino (11/03/2017 9:48 am)

Jeremy Taylor wrote:

ficino wrote:

Maybe it is a matter of what work one's description serves. If one is trying to make empirically testable predictions and eventually to learn more about the world, won't scientific language serve the purpose better than A-T language?

Again, it depends just what you want to learn about the world. Metaphysics helps us to learn about the world, at a different level to science. It rather begs the question to make empirical testability the standard of judgement of a discipline.

I don't have the background to evaluate a lot of what James Ladyman writes here, but he rejects a priori metaphysics as practiced, for example, by the late Jonathan Lowe (whose work I believe Feser regards highly), who mostly did conceptual analysis. Ladyman also goes on to cast doubt on "naturalistic metaphysics," i.e. metaphysics that attempts to work from the conclusions of the several sciences. Ladyman says that after the demise of logical positivism, many analytic philosophers came to think that scientific realism must be grounded in metaphysics. People like Lowe said that metaphysics provides the very framework within which sciences are conceived, since metaphysics deals with universal concepts like identity, necessity, causation, space and time. Ladyman brings what seem to me as a layman to be fairly strong objections to this view that metaphysics rules science, so to speak. 

http://www.bristol.ac.uk/metaphysicsofscience/associatememberspublications/S1358246107000197a.pdf

 

It would be best if you summarise a document like this.

This evening I'll try to summarize what I can. Much of the central part of Ladyman's paper is beyond me because he goes into the work of various physicists.

As to your first, Jeremy, I wrote an "if - then" sentence, so I was not claiming that empirical testibility is the standard of judgment of every discipline. I do see people say that science cannot do what it does unless its principles are delivered by metaphysics, or words to that effect. Aristotle, of course, says things along this line. If someone questions that stance, is that person thereby a proponent of "scientism"? I suppose it depends on how that person handles questions that normally are considered in the province of metaphysics. Ladyman seems to opt for a tentative, epistemically cautious approach to them but to want to eschew building metaphysical structures. 

More later.