StardustyPsyche wrote:

The First Way is false as an argument for the necessity of a hierarchical first changer acting in the present moment because another changer in the present moment is not necessary to account for observed uniform linear motion.

Stardusty, on the above, I'd like to see you develop your case against causal series ordered per se by going deeper on two fronts.

First, specify the role of temporality as rigorously as possible. We all know that in A-T explanations, when one body moves another body, there is usually contact, so the action and passion occur simultaneously (cf. e.g. Phys. 242a60-62). But in a causal series ordered per se, Feser says at numerous places that the causal events need not occur instantaneously, although the members must exist at the same time. See Five Proofs pp. 61-63. Example: " ... 'simultaneous' does not entail 'instantaneous'. The single event in which a cause generates its effect can take place over the course of seconds, minutes, even hours or much longer. (Think of a potter molding a vase, a cube of sugar dissolving in water, or a heater warming a room.)" As I remember, you have said that such explanations are wrong because they operate only on the macro level. I may just be slow on the uptake, but I'm not sure you have done justice to Feser's concessions about "not necessarily instantaneous." 

BTW I don't remember your answering the question, doesn't the music stop when the flute player stops playing the flute?

Second, I have not seen anyone really deal with what Aquinas makes the organizing principle of a per se series: "intention." In Aquinas' discussions of causal hierarchies ordered per se, he makes it clear that the intentio of the first cause, to execute which it uses all the subordinate causes as instruments, is what binds (so to speak) the series into a order. There was some discussion of this point over on the blog, and I don't think it reached a satisfactory conclusion. If we leave "mind" aside and just deal with intention as a principle by which an effect reaches an end, can you work intention into your analysis? What's important in a per se series is not that all the causal events occur instantaneously, but that the subordinate causes play only an instrumental role in achieving the end for which the first cause is operating through the series. A series over which the first cause's intentio does not extend is not a series ordered per se, only per accidens, as when one guy lights a candle and later on, a second guy lights a second candle from it.

@Jeremy Taylor"That you chose to stay there is almost certainly the mark of a troll."
--That you would think you have any clue as to my motivations for how and where I post is almost certainly the mark of a person with a vastly over inflated sense of his capacity for internet psychoanalysis, prone to make assumptions based on his own prejudices.

But then, perhaps that is typical of those who cry "troll".

" I ask others to tone down denunciations of SP,"
--I could not care less about the idiotic names others call me, such as troll, except that I do feel a bit of pity for those who call me names.

ficino"simultaneous' does not entail 'instantaneous'. The single event in which a cause generates its effect can take place over the course of seconds, minutes, even hours or much longer. (Think of a potter molding a vase, a cube of sugar dissolving in water, or a heater warming a room.)"
--To speak of a non-instantaneous simultaneity is a self contradiction in any serious causal analysis.

The First Way is supposed to be an argument for a hierarchical first mover in the present moment.  If you allow for the time it takes for a cube of sugar dissolving in water or a heater warming a room the next step is to do a regression analysis of those processes. This is a temporal regression analysis, not a hierarchical regression analysis.

Elsewhere Feser allows that the first member of the analysis can be shown to be arbitrary, say starting with dripping a cube of sugar into a cup of water.  He doesn't seem to realize this totally invalidates the First Way as an argument for the necessity of a hierarchical first mover in the present moment.  What caused the cube to drop into the water?  The hand, which was caused by the muscle,...heart...air in the lung...air outside the lung...plants that made the oxygen...rain that fell...clouds...water cycle...Earth formation...big bang...unknown.

The First Way is based on the notion that the natural place for an object is at rest.  To account for observed uniform linear motion a rigid body series of movers is imagined that terminates in a first mover.

By allowing for time delay the regression analysis is no longer hierarchical, rather temporal..  The existence or non-existence of objects becomes irrelevant.  The material of all objects persists in existence, and once a causal influence has been imparted it's continued existence as a recognizable object is irrelevant to the continuation of the causal series.

So the hand drops the cube in the water.  The person can die, or live, it doesn't matter, the cube will continue to dissolve.  Suppose half the cube is dissolved and then the cup breaks.  That has no effect on the fact that half the sugar is in the water. 

These notions of existent entities and essential series become completely irrelevant once time delay is allowed for, if one is attempting to demonstrate a hierarchical  first mover in the present moment.

"BTW I don't remember your answering the question, doesn't the music stop when the flute player stops playing the flute?"
--I did answer, and then I told you I answered, and I sent you the reference as to where to find the answer.  That was a long time ago.

First a person does something, then they do something else.  How does that in any way argue for a hierarchical first mover acting in the present moment?

"If we leave "mind" aside and just deal with intention as a principle by which an effect reaches an end, can you work intention into your analysis?"
--In what sense do ordinary objects have intention?  Maybe you are alluding to the Fifth Way or a teleological argument.  That is an anthropomorphization of ordinary objects, that they somehow intend to do things or work toward and end or work toward what is best.  This is a sort of subconscious begging the question, first projecting human qualities onto ordinary objects, then imagining there must be a superhuman being that imparted these qualities into such objects.  The simple answer is that objects do not have intention and do not work toward an end, people only imagine such.

"the subordinate causes play only an instrumental role"
--Everything is an instrument between its antecedent and its consequent.
 

StardustyPsyche wrote:

 

The First Way is supposed to be an argument for a hierarchical first mover in the present moment.  If you allow for the time it takes for a cube of sugar dissolving in water or a heater warming a room the next step is to do a regression analysis of those processes. This is a temporal regression analysis, not a hierarchical regression analysis.

But how do we know that the First Way is supposed to require that all the events in the chain occur instantaneously? Aquinas himself gives as his first example of "motion" the case where fire heats wood: "just as the actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is hot in potency, to be hot actually (actu), and through this it moves and alters it." Certainly it takes a while for the wood to become hot - the primary bodies are jumping around over some time period. 

The First Way is based on the notion that the natural place for an object is at rest.  To account for observed uniform linear motion a rigid body series of movers is imagined that terminates in a first mover.

By allowing for time delay the regression analysis is no longer hierarchical, rather temporal. ... [snip]
These notions of existent entities and essential series become completely irrelevant once time delay is allowed for, if one is attempting to demonstrate a hierarchical  first mover in the present moment.

I get this, but as I said before, so far I'm not convinced that your argument is directed at the A-T-Feser argument the way that argument is formulated. What makes a per se series hierarchical, acc to Aquinas, is intentio not simultaneity. [ETA: there might be a passage somewhere in the corpus Thomisticum where a causal series ordered per se is not governed by the intentio of the first member. I haven't come across such a passage, but I will post it if I do.]

"BTW I don't remember your answering the question, doesn't the music stop when the flute player stops playing the flute?"
--I did answer, and then I told you I answered, and I sent you the reference as to where to find the answer.  That was a long time ago.

Yes it was a long time ago. I don't remember where you answered. I am sorry I missed it/and or forgot the reference. Maybe now that your thread has moved over here, you'd want to supply the answer again...? 

"If we leave "mind" aside and just deal with intention as a principle by which an effect reaches an end, can you work intention into your analysis?"
--In what sense do ordinary objects have intention?  Maybe you are alluding to the Fifth Way or a teleological argument.  That is an anthropomorphization of ordinary objects, that they somehow intend to do things or work toward and end or work toward what is best.  This is a sort of subconscious begging the question, first projecting human qualities onto ordinary objects, then imagining there must be a superhuman being that imparted these qualities into such objects.  The simple answer is that objects do not have intention and do not work toward an end, people only imagine such.

This is a point on which I was accused of being a sock puppet with a bee in its bonnet about intention, lol. I can't argue for Aquinas' view of intentio in the case of non-rational, esp. inanimate objects. He holds it, though, and it's a feature of his rationale for a per se series. If you want to attack the notion of a per se series by attacking intentio, that will be an interesting argument to get from you. I think the defenders of Aquinas will ask for argument beyond assertion.

 

"the subordinate causes play only an instrumental role"
--Everything is an instrument between its antecedent and its consequent.
 

Aquinas is using "instrumentaliter" in a technical sense which excludes intention from the subordinate members of the series and attributes it only to the first, governing member. So he will deny that the causality exercised by the first member upon any subordinate member is "instrumental" unless the first member is itself an "instrument" in a superior hierarchical series. 

I guess I'm basically suggesting, either dig more deeply into the A-T background of the notions you are attacking, so that it's clear you're attacking those and not other ones, or develop a more robust argument that blows A-T metaphysics, not physics, out of the water altogether.  You've made points that I think are worthwhile (I know most followers of Aquinas deny this), e.g. to challenge a per se series on the grounds that at the micro level, there are no instantaneous causal series. Still, your points so far have been dismissed as not relevant to what Aquinas and Feser actually argue.  

Last edited by ficino (11/26/2017 9:50 am)

@ficino
"But how do we know that the First Way is supposed to require that all the events in the chain occur instantaneously?"
--Because Aquinas allowed for a past eternal universe.  If causation is temporal then a causal regress analysis is temporal.  On a past eternal universe there is no need for a first mover, since in that case the universe has always existed and everything in it has always been moving.

On the notion that motion of an object must be accounted for by "another" moving it the assertion of a hierarchical first mover in the present moment makes sense.  But that concept of motion in fact is not manifest and evident to the senses when one looks more carefully than the ancients did.

"your points so far have been dismissed as not relevant to what Aquinas and Feser actually argue.  "
--That is mostly what A-T proponents do, and Feser creates a particularly toxic culture that is a reflection of his own personality.  They will call you a sock puppet, troll, claim irrelevance, allude to some paper out there someplace that supposedly addresses the point, call names, and eventually delete.  Actually engaging on the merits is cause to be scolded by the leader.

I posted some fairly long posts back at #7 and #8.  I have posted similar arguments many times in many places on various blogs and never has anybody refuted my arguments beyond a few scattered comments.

The fact is my arguments go directly to the very core of what A-T argues for.  Having dismantled that core all the rest of the edifice of A-T becomes irrelevant.

The First Way is asserted to demonstrate the necessity of a hierarchical first mover acting in the present moment to account for the motion that is manifest and evident to our senses.  In #7 I disprove that claim.

The Second Way is asserted to demonstrate the necessity of a hierarchical first mover acting in the present moment to account for the existential inertia that is manifest and evident to our senses.  In #8 I disprove that claim.

With the First and Second ways disproved A-T is in shambles, and I really don't need to address the minutia of the whole A-T edifice.