Posted by surroundx  1/05/2018 11:18 am | #1 |
A-T metaphysicians reject the claim that the universe simply popped into existence ex nihilo without an efficient cause, at least in part because there would be nothing actual to actualise the potential for existence of whatever began existing.
As an atheist, it puzzles me that A-T metaphysicians (and others) do not talk about what we might call geographical potential. Forgive the anthropomorphisms, but if God were deciding what to create surely God would also have to decide where to create it. Thus if God does create (whether ex materia or ex nihilo), two kinds of potential are actualised (at least), not just one. Existence and geographical location.
Therefore, I would have thought that those who invoke the PSR to reject the absolute beginning of the universe in absentia efficient causation, such as in the context of Leibnizian-type CA's, their arguments would include pointing out the burden of such a position as including two brute facts: what exists and where.
Any thoughts?
Last edited by surroundx (1/05/2018 11:52 am)
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Posted by DanielCC 1/05/2018 12:00 pm | #2 |
Have you read Leibniz corrospondence with Samual Clarke? Both questions come up there.
As to the contrastive question of why God actualises this world as opposed to another world this leads to problem of the best possible world (if God has a reason to actualise one world in favour of all others then only that world can get actualised, in which case that world is necessary and every seemingly contingent contained with in it is necessary too).
Keep in mind though that many Cosmological arguments appeal to a weaker form of the PSR though.
Re geographical location, that presumes an absolutist account of space. Leibniz used such a query vis that there would be no PSR for God creating the universe here as opposed to there, as an objection against the Newtonian account of absolute space (bit of a cheap shot).
Unlile the other this question is ill-founded in as much as creato ex nihilo whether this be taken in a temporal or atemporal sense is taken to cover all existing entries. An absolute space (which is surely a being as it has spatial properties) which can exist apart from an prior to God’s causal activity (would it be a necessary being) cannot just be assumed.
1. Either spatiality is a property of objects or of the cosmos taken as a whole (the space-time block of Eternalist 4-Dimensionalism) in which case spatial properties come into existence with their possessers.
2. Space itself is a being which has properties, in which case it either comes into existence or is necessary (forward the PSR).
Last edited by DanielCC (1/05/2018 12:19 pm)
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Posted by surroundx 1/05/2018 9:03 pm | #3 |
DanielCC wrote:
Have you read Leibniz corrospondence with Samual Clarke? Both questions come up there.
As to the contrastive question of why God actualises this world as opposed to another world this leads to problem of the best possible world (if God has a reason to actualise one world in favour of all others then only that world can get actualised, in which case that world is necessary and every seemingly contingent contained with in it is necessary too).
Keep in mind though that many Cosmological arguments appeal to a weaker form of the PSR though.
I never raised this question/problem, as I was merely pointing out that what God creates involves the actualisation of an existential potential. The first kind of potential, the second being geographical potential.
Re geographical location, that presumes an absolutist account of space. Leibniz used such a query vis that there would be no PSR for God creating the universe here as opposed to there, as an objection against the Newtonian account of absolute space (bit of a cheap shot).
Unlile the other this question is ill-founded in as much as creato ex nihilo whether this be taken in a temporal or atemporal sense is taken to cover all existing entries. An absolute space (which is surely a being as it has spatial properties) which can exist apart from an prior to God’s causal activity (would it be a necessary being) cannot just be assumed.
1. Either spatiality is a property of objects or of the cosmos taken as a whole (the space-time block of Eternalist 4-Dimensionalism) in which case spatial properties come into existence with their possessers.
2. Space itself is a being which has properties, in which case it either comes into existence or is necessary (forward the PSR).
3. Space itself does not exist. It is the unique negation of existence (viz. identity of indiscernibles). Spatial properties are merely one side of the material/physicalist coin. Material objects lack Omnipresence (viz. the distinction between material and immaterial objects), and hence are said to be "spatially finite". To put it technically (viz. my language), they can only occupy a finite number of ontic loci at a given instant. You can move from this room to the next, and that is a real change. A change of occupation of a set of ontic loci.
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Posted by Timocrates 1/06/2018 11:08 am | #4 |
3. Space itself does not exist. It is the unique negation of existence (viz. identity of indiscernibles). Spatial properties are merely one side of the material/physicalist coin. Material objects lack Omnipresence (viz. the distinction between material and immaterial objects), and hence are said to be "spatially finite". To put it technically (viz. my language), they can only occupy a finite number of ontic loci at a given instant. You can move from this room to the next, and that is a real change. A change of occupation of a set of ontic loci.
But if space does not exist, then how could place exist in it? There is not place in nothing and nothing (or the non-existent) is not a place.
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Posted by surroundx 1/06/2018 11:26 am | #5 |
3. Space itself does not exist. It is the unique negation of existence (viz. identity of indiscernibles). Spatial properties are merely one side of the material/physicalist coin. Material objects lack Omnipresence (viz. the distinction between material and immaterial objects), and hence are said to be "spatially finite". To put it technically (viz. my language), they can only occupy a finite number of ontic loci at a given instant. You can move from this room to the next, and that is a real change. A change of occupation of a set of ontic loci.
But if space does not exist, then how could place exist in it? There is not place in nothing and nothing (or the non-existent) is not a place.
I was able to sit down at my chair just before because nothing was already occupying it. Places are negative realities, like coldness being the absence of heat.
If space exists, is it material or immaterial? Does space require space to exist? If not, why is it exceptional?
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Posted by Timocrates 1/06/2018 1:37 pm | #6 |
3. Space itself does not exist. It is the unique negation of existence (viz. identity of indiscernibles). Spatial properties are merely one side of the material/physicalist coin. Material objects lack Omnipresence (viz. the distinction between material and immaterial objects), and hence are said to be "spatially finite". To put it technically (viz. my language), they can only occupy a finite number of ontic loci at a given instant. You can move from this room to the next, and that is a real change. A change of occupation of a set of ontic loci.
But if space does not exist, then how could place exist in it? There is not place in nothing and nothing (or the non-existent) is not a place.
I was able to sit down at my chair just before because nothing was already occupying it. Places are negative realities, like coldness being the absence of heat.
But you are not a negative reality: the different parts of you are in different places relative to each other, do you agree? A spinning ball could occupy the same place overall but each of its parts or sections would be moving from place to place. And I think it's rather bizarre to imagine that there is negative place: a negative place would be no place; a "negative reality" is just the negation of reality itself: to transition from the real to the unreal is no different than transitioning from the existent to the non-existent. But surely there was something real and actual you were moving into when you sat down at your chair.
Now nothing - a place included - can be said to exist while it is in potentiality but only in actuality.
Further, an immediate paradox follows upon your theory. Let us say we were at the end of the universe and space. According to your idea, we could launch a projectile beyond the limits of the edge of existent space because there is nothing impossible about something moving into a non-existent place; however, this could not happen for the following reason: as the projectile departed beyond space and continued outward, there would be no space or place between the projectile itself and the edge of the universe to separate it from the universe: i.e. there would literally be nothing between the body of the projectile and the body of universal space separating them. To assume there could be would be just to expand space (i.e. to make unnocupied place to be actually existent - a "postivie reality" - even though it is unnoccupied) to include the projectile within the universe; but on your hypothesis this possibility is precluded because there would be no actually existing places (no "positive realities") between the projectile and the universe. Therefore there would literally be no distance or space between them either.
Last edited by Timocrates (1/06/2018 3:30 pm)
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Posted by DanielCC 1/06/2018 2:11 pm | #7 |
Thomist talk about potentials doesn't really help as here.
3. Space itself does not exist. It is the unique negation of existence (viz. identity of indiscernibles). Spatial properties are merely one side of the material/physicalist coin. Material objects lack Omnipresence (viz. the distinction between material and immaterial objects), and hence are said to be "spatially finite". To put it technically (viz. my language), they can only occupy a finite number of ontic loci at a given instant. You can move from this room to the next, and that is a real change. A change of occupation of a set of ontic loci.
Omnipresence means to exist at all spatial locations. Immaterial objects cannot be said to be omnipresent because they lack spatial properties or properties relating to space (this means that, like 'Infinite', 'Omnipresent' is a nonsensical theological honorific)
Could you clarify the second sentence? I am not sure what you mean by appealing to the identity of indiscernibles. Are you claiming that if two entities occupied the same spatial location they would be identical?
Likewise what do you with the claim that space is the negation of existence? Surely not the claim that for any x that exists x has a spatial location? What reason could one give a prior to accept a criterion of existence that rules out abstract objects, epiphenomnal property and sense date amonst other things?
Another point: the claim that two material objects cannot be co-present at the same spatial location seems like a question to be solved by physics rather than appeal to metaphysical concerns, at least unless we have some strong reason to think that this metaphysical account is the only coherent one. Most philosophers take the laws of nature to be contingent (Thomists do not) and there are various theories in theoretical physics which suggest the universe could have had a different spatial structure were its origin conditions different (likewise that if multiverse cosmology be true then there will exist other universes with different spatial structures).
If space exists, is it material or immaterial? Does space require space to exist? If not, why is it exceptional?
How do you define material?
Last edited by DanielCC (1/06/2018 2:17 pm)
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Posted by Timocrates 1/06/2018 2:28 pm | #8 |
Another point: the claim that two material objects cannot be co-present at the same spatial location seems like a question to be solved by physics rather than appeal to metaphysical concerns
My problem with this is that if two material objects (bodies) could be co-present in and at the same time and place, it could follow that contrary qualities could also be simultaneously co-present at the same time in the same place: i.e. something could be actually both hot and cold, heavy and light, having mass and not having mass at the same time. This -if not impossible- is certainly meaningless and grounds for radical skepticism about even science itself.
Last edited by Timocrates (1/06/2018 2:29 pm)
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Posted by DanielCC 1/06/2018 2:58 pm | #9 |
Another point: the claim that two material objects cannot be co-present at the same spatial location seems like a question to be solved by physics rather than appeal to metaphysical concerns
My problem with this is that if two material objects (bodies) could be co-present in and at the same time and place, it could follow that contrary qualities could also be simultaneously co-present at the same time in the same place: i.e. something could be actually both hot and cold, heavy and light, having mass and not having mass at the same time. This -if not impossible- is certainly meaningless and grounds for radical skepticism about even science itself.
You’re taking material in a naive sense. The material objects in question are more likely to be sub-atomic particles which behave very differently from the ‘medium sized dry goods’ that are the material objects we encounter in everyday life.
That two material entities possess incompatible properties occupy the same space doesn’t mean that there is one entity possessing both incompatible properties. The latter is metaphysically impossible whilst the former is not (the only question it what empirical and theoretical reasons do we have for thinking it to be the case).
Last edited by DanielCC (1/06/2018 3:00 pm)
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Posted by Timocrates 1/06/2018 3:52 pm | #10 |
That two material entities possess incompatible properties occupy the same space doesn’t mean that there is one entity possessing both incompatible properties. The latter is metaphysically impossible whilst the former is not (the only question it what empirical and theoretical reasons do we have for thinking it to be the case).
Thank you. I granted the existence of two material entities; however, what I have issue with is the simultaneous presence of incompatible properties, particularly in the empirical domain. I mean could the self-same temperature sample be both hot and cold, detecting a presence of high and low (or virtually no) thermal energy? If it could, and we admit this, then physics is certainly in trouble or at least at a virtual dead end, I think.
Last edited by Timocrates (1/06/2018 3:53 pm)
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