Posted by Drovot  1/20/2018 6:33 pm | #1 |
Hi, I am a struggling Catholic. I've recently become familiar with the Scholastic tradition through Feser and Oderberg.
I suspect what I'm about to say will seem silly or at best a representation of my own failure to engage with the hylemorphic system on a more metaphysical level. Nonetheless, these objections have been in my mind for awhile and I'm interested in seeing whether or not someone can poke substantial holes in them.
So from what I understand there are few significant reasons why the scholastic believes in the physical instantiation of forms. First there is the view that forms help to explain the seemingly universal patterns found in physical beings. There are tulips and then there is the universal and abstract form of the tulip which resides in our minds. However, why can't the reductionist just claim that in the material world there are fluctuations of particles that resemble each other? Like when you drop a rock into a pond the water molecules will predictably ripple out, each ripple resembling the last insofar as it is a similar fluctuation of molecules.
There's also the argument that form helps to explain why some particles unify in a particular manner and exhibit a unified behavior. But, again, isn't it theoretically possible that we could trace the motions of chemical, molecular, and atomic and subatomic particles from a primordial ooze and watch as they eventually coalesce into, say, DNA, bacterial organisms, simple life forms, fish, etc. And the movements and coalescing of these particles is due simply to natural forces. If they lump together and eventually structure a pig, or a human, we could explain this lumping together of particles by following backwards its deterministic path. We don't need to adhere to some notion of form in order to explain why matter is brought together into certain patterns.
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Posted by FrenchySkepticalCatholic 1/20/2018 8:06 pm | #2 |
Hi,
My two cents. ^^'
Drovot wrote:
However, why can't the reductionist just claim that in the material world there are fluctuations of particles that resemble each other?
What does he means by "resemble"? They have a similar shape, a similar... form?
If they lump together and eventually structure a pig, or a human, we could explain this lumping together of particles by following backwards its deterministic path. We don't need to adhere to some notion of form in order to explain why matter is brought together into certain patterns.
So, if they have the form of a pig, they're a pig?
Have a look at https://sdcojai.wordpress.com/do-natural-things-have-forms/. ;)
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Posted by Drovot 1/20/2018 8:22 pm | #3 |
Hi,
My two cents. ^^'
However, why can't the reductionist just claim that in the material world there are fluctuations of particles that resemble each other?
What does he means by "resemble"? They have a similar shape, a similar... form?
If they lump together and eventually structure a pig, or a human, we could explain this lumping together of particles by following backwards its deterministic path. We don't need to adhere to some notion of form in order to explain why matter is brought together into certain patterns.
So, if they have the form of a pig, they're a pig?
Have a look at https://sdcojai.wordpress.com/do-natural-things-have-forms/. ;)
Thank you for the reply. I'll give that a read. This also brings up another question. Why suppose that the pig has some quiddity to it, some substantial form? What if the pig is fundamentally an arrangement of quarks? I mean even if we say the quarks exist virtually, that still means the quarks exist, albeit in a limited manner.
And we don't need to fall back on a metaphysical principle like form to explain the quark limitation. We can explain it via chemical bonding.
Last edited by Drovot (1/20/2018 8:24 pm)
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Posted by FrenchySkepticalCatholic 1/21/2018 8:42 am | #4 |
Why suppose that the pig has some quiddity to it, some substantial form? What if the pig is fundamentally an arrangement of quarks? I mean even if we say the quarks exist virtually, that still means the quarks exist, albeit in a limited manner.
I'd say here that if you can explain the pig without reference to the pig, it works. So yeah, saying that the "pig is fundamentally an arrangement of quarks" works.
... But... 
... how would you differentiate that arrangement of quarks from me, which is, in that view, another arrangement of quark without referring to me and to the pig ? Once you say "a pig is nothing but a pigwise arrangement of quarks", then we're inserting the form of a pig back into business !
And we don't need to fall back on a metaphysical principle like form to explain the quark limitation. We can explain it via chemical bonding.
Color me confused. What does it mean? Or, more precisely, what do you mean?
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Posted by Drovot 1/21/2018 10:37 am | #5 |
I'd say here that if you can explain the pig without reference to the pig, it works. So yeah, saying that the "pig is fundamentally an arrangement of quarks" works.
... But...
... how would you differentiate that arrangement of quarks from me, which is, in that view, another arrangement of quark without referring to me and to the pig ? Once you say "a pig is nothing but a pigwise arrangement of quarks", then we're inserting the form of a pig back into business !
Color me confused. What does it mean? Or, more precisely, what do you mean?
We can differentiate between the two arrangements of quarks because one is a completely different swarm of quarks. One has coalesced in such and such a way as to result in a swarm that is limited to behaving in a particular manner, what we would call pig-like. But I don't see why we need to insert principles like form and matter to explain why it operates in a distinct way, or why these quarks are limited and behave in the way they do. We can appeal to the individual parts of the pig, looking at its physiology, it's chemical makeup, and ultimately it's microscopic, molecular, atomic, and subatomic structures. At no point do I need to appeal to a form. Its unity is a result of a collision of particles that has drifted throughout the cosmos since its very inception. They just happen to, at this point in time, fluctuate into a specific structure we call a pig. And, given the constant movement of matter, they will drift apart someday.
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Posted by FrenchySkepticalCatholic 1/21/2018 11:03 am | #6 |
Again, I'm not at ease with the AT vocabulary, so perhaps I'm arguing wrong, but... well, here's my cents again. 
We can appeal to the individual parts of the pig, looking at its physiology, it's chemical makeup, and ultimately it's microscopic, molecular, atomic, and subatomic structures.
At no point do I need to appeal to a form.
So, we can appeal to a form but we don't need to appeal to a form? I think you're confused as to what a form is.
Its unity is a result of a collision of particles that has drifted throughout the cosmos since its very inception.
Well, is its unity contained in the "collision of particles"? Is it written in the specific quarks of atoms that "if you move us together we'll form a pig"?
They just happen to, at this point in time, fluctuate into a specific structure we call a pig. And, given the constant movement of matter, they will drift apart someday.
Again, you mention structure. I don't know what is the difference between a form and a structure in your vocabulary. Besides, when will a pig stop being a pig ? When is that drifting considered to be sufficient? Could this drifting be predicted? Is it just random? Can a pig stop being a pig just because? Without reason?
One has coalesced in such and such a way as to result in a swarm that is limited to behaving in a particular manner, what we would call pig-like
Is the behavior of the quarks you call pig-like reducible to the quarks? Can we observe a pig like behavior by just watching the quarks, or is it just something happening at a "higher level"?
Again, I'm not well versed in AT. Though I'm - as my name happens to be - good to ask questions until I understand the problem. I hope it helps...
Last edited by FrenchySkepticalCatholic (1/21/2018 11:05 am)
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Posted by SR 1/21/2018 3:05 pm | #7 |
Drovot,
It is only the purely physical aspects of a pig that may be reducible to the properties of quarks and electrons. But that may not be the case when it comes to plants, and is almost certainly not the case when it comes to sentient animals. The form of a pig includes these vegetative and animal characteristics, for example, a pig's instincts, its ability to sense, feel hunger and act on it. None of that is reducible to the forms of physical particles. Of course, a physicalist believes they are reducible, but that's just wishful thinking on their part.
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Posted by RomanJoe 1/21/2018 4:47 pm | #8 |
Drovot you also seem to think that because something is constituted by smaller parts and those parts in turn constituted by others, that all substances are reducible to their fundamental parts. I don't see how this follows though. We can only understand the way these parts operate by reference to the whole, the form.
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Posted by Drovot 1/21/2018 7:07 pm | #9 |
When you take a pig, though, there are multiple different levels of analysis you can conduct with regards to its material constitution. Muscle, blood, bone, chemicals, cells, molecules, atoms, quarks, etc. I don't see how the pig isn't reducible to these base levels. If anything, science has shown that the notion of homogeneous structures called forms are non existent. Things are more complex than just being one thing. A pig, at its fundamental level, is the movement of a subatomic storm, no? There wouldn't be substantial change on this view, only the movements of subatomic secondary matter. I just am really having a hard time seeing how putting forth principles like form and an ever-elusive prime matter are relevant given our current understanding of material constitution.
Last edited by Drovot (1/21/2018 7:20 pm)
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Posted by SR 1/21/2018 7:59 pm | #10 |
When you take a pig, though, there are multiple different levels of analysis you can conduct with regards to its material constitution. Muscle, blood, bone, chemicals, cells, molecules, atoms, quarks, etc. I don't see how the pig isn't reducible to these base levels.
I'm not an expert on AT, but my understanding of 'form' according to AT is that it includes all that distinguishes one class of entity from another.It is not just its physical components that distinguish a pig from, say, a rock. Another distinction is that it can sense its environment, while a rock can't, so that sensory capability is part of its form. A clearer example might be what AT considers the form of a human being. It includes reason and will, since that is what distinguishes human beings from other animals, not to mention rocks.
If anything, science has shown that the notion of homogeneous structures called forms are non existent. Things are more complex than just being one thing.
Forms can be very complex, and can include many levels. I am "just one thing", and my form is part physical, part animal, and part rational.
A pig, at its fundamental level, is the movement of a subatomic storm, no?
No. At its fundamental level a pig is alive, can sense, follow instincts, feel pain, and so forth. The subatomic storm is only the fundamental level of its mineral aspect.
There wouldn't be substantial change on this view, only the movements of subatomic secondary matter. I just am really having a hard time seeing how putting forth principles like form and an ever-elusive prime matter are relevant given our current understanding of material constitution.
I happen to agree with you that prime matter can be dispensed with. But not form.
