Posted by aftermathemat 1/27/2018 8:03 am | #1 |
If logical possibilities are grounded in something actual, and they are since logic is that which limits what is possible and impossible, then what should we make of brute fact possibilities?
The argument from logical possibility (Pruss et al) for the existence of God doesn't need PSR in order to go through, but it also claims that the logical actuality that grounds all logical possibilities has the power to causally actualise them as well. But brute facts are an exception to this since they by definition cannot be actualised by anything, so how do we explain the logical grounding of brute facts, if we accept their possibility for sake of argument?
And furthermore, can we make an argument for God from the grounding of any logical possibilities, even brute ones, if we know that all possibilities are grounded somewhere, at the very least the very law of non-contradiction? If so, then this would be one of the rare arguments that is completely independent from the PSR and can prove God even if we allow for the sake of argument that the existence of things is for no reason.
Last edited by aftermathemat (1/27/2018 8:05 am)
Posted by surroundx 1/30/2018 6:17 am | #2 |
aftermathemat wrote:
If logical possibilities are grounded in something actual, and they are since logic is that which limits what is possible and impossible, then what should we make of brute fact possibilities?
Are you talking about broad logical possibility?
Why think that logic is what limits what is (im)possible? Why not essence?
Posted by aftermathemat 1/30/2018 8:37 am | #3 |
surroundx wrote:
Are you talking about broad logical possibility?
Why think that logic is what limits what is (im)possible? Why not essence?
Well, essences are logically possible, aren't they? Trinagularity is the essence and nature of triangles, but triangularity is also a logical condition that describes what a certain situation must be like and what must entail if a certain thing is a certain way. This means that essences are themselves subject to logic, especially the principle of identity and non-contradiction.
Also, it makes sense to ask if a certain thing is logically possible, but it makes no sense to ask if the laws of logic are logically possible, in the same way in which it makes sense to ask what illuminates a certain object, and no sense to ask what illuminates light.
Posted by surroundx 1/30/2018 9:10 am | #4 |
aftermathemat wrote:
Well, essences are logically possible, aren't they? Trinagularity is the essence and nature of triangles, but triangularity is also a logical condition that describes what a certain situation must be like and what must entail if a certain thing is a certain way. This means that essences are themselves subject to logic, especially the principle of identity and non-contradiction.
I don't subscribe to the essence-existence distinction, but I assumed that you do.
How is triangularity a logical condition? If x does not have three sides then x cannot be an instantiation of the essence of triangularity. Whatever x really is, it is essentially different from triangularity. Not because it fails the principle of identity, but because it's very nature is such that it is really the instantiation of some non-triangularity essence. Any talk about which essence is instantiated in E is epistemic.
As to essences being subject to logic, are there any illogical essences?
Why not merely say that p is metaphysically possible if (but not iff) it's essence and existence are not incompatible? The incompatibility being metaphysical, not logical. If I try to stuff a watermelon into a glass cup while preserving the fruits structure, I will fail. Not because of any logical constraint, but because of a deeper incompatibility. Any logical problem you can cite viz. the watermelon example will be predicated upon the natures/essences of the material objects involved. Logic is merely an attempted codification of how things can be.
Posted by aftermathemat 1/30/2018 9:39 am | #5 |
surroundx wrote:
I don't subscribe to the essence-existence distinction, but I assumed that you do.
I myself do indeed subscribe to the existence-essence distinction, but the argument I was using is independent of that.
surroundx wrote:
How is triangularity a logical condition? If x does not have three sides then x cannot be an instantiation of the essence of triangularity. Whatever x really is, it is essentially different from triangularity. Not because it fails the principle of identity, but because it's very nature is such that it is really the instantiation of some non-triangularity essence.
Well, having 3 sides is a logical condition for trinagularity to be instantiated. After all, it is a logical possibility, and other essences can in this way be viewed as different logical possibilities differing from each other in virtue of their identity.
surroundx wrote:
As to essences being subject to logic, are there any illogical essences?
Square circles would presumably be such an illogical essence, though that particular essence doesn't even subsist qua eternal idea due to it's inherently contradictory nature.
surroundx wrote:
If I try to stuff a watermelon into a glass cup while preserving the fruits structure, I will fail. Not because of any logical constraint, but because of a deeper incompatibility. Any logical problem you can cite viz. the watermelon example will be predicated upon the natures/essences of the material objects involved. Logic is merely an attempted codification of how things can be.
I guess logical possibility is deeper than physical/metaphysical possibility. Logic is not merely an attempt at codification, in the same way that the laws of physics are not a mere codification. If logic were grounded by eternal essences, then the laws of physics would also be grounded in eternal essences as well, especially when it comes to the behvariour of instantiated particulars. Thus, the laws of logic actually describe an essential reality similar to how the laws of physics describe the behaviour of those essential realities. The only difference is that logic also describes existence and instantiation, which is linked closely to God.
Posted by Miguel 1/30/2018 11:34 am | #6 |
How can one even talk of a "deeper compatibility" without also having some strong reference in logical consistency, for instance the idea of a contradiction?
Posted by aftermathemat 1/30/2018 12:34 pm | #7 |
Miguel wrote:
How can one even talk of a "deeper compatibility" without also having some strong reference in logical consistency, for instance the idea of a contradiction?
Miguel, considering that logical consistency is what makes any compatibility possible, do you think that a logical possibility argument could be made for God's existence that includes brute facts as a logical possibility? That is, it could be granted for the sake of argument that PSR is false and brute facts are not only possible but actual, and the existence of any logical possibility, whether it be a brute fact possibility or an explicable possibility, would prove the existence of God?
My intuition here says it could be, but we may have to sacrifice causal efficacy as a description of God in this since the ultimate grounding of logical possibility (which is God) cannot directly actualise brute facts as this would contradict the very notion of a brute fact.
What do you think?
Last edited by aftermathemat (1/30/2018 12:34 pm)