"Moorean criticisms don't work on any form of Idealism outside of Berekely for the obvious fact that it misses the point that the hand isn't a mere thought, but require both intutions and concepts. Hence Kant never speaks of experience as being mere mental content. "

Why can't I make a modus tollens refutation of that if I accept PNC in the way I described? You are assuming Kant's theory of knowledge and experience, which is at odds with my view of PNC, that's the whole point. To me it is self-evident that the principle of non-contradiction by itself is suficient to give me knowledge about objects; it is an insight into being as such. If Kant's views imply this is false, I can apply a modus tollens.

Well I don't know why it "doesn't work", since I don't see how there can be a response that won't already require TI. I will remain as a realist, yes, but I don't think it's ignoring Kant; to me it's just applying a modus tollens and I don't see why one wouldn't be allowed to do that.