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Theoretical Philosophy » Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation? » Today 11:27 pm

surroundx
Replies: 45

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FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

Hmm, is it correct thus to say "in which"? And not "composed by"? Because in a world with only one single quark, said quark can't move; unless we allow space to be in too.

Technically you can't say "composed by/of" because the world wouldn't be composed, it would be simple (viz. a single existent "in" it).

Space simply is the absence of material objects. So said quark can move if it is the efficient cause of it's own locomotion.

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

Secondly, I'm not sure if we can go on "in a world in which only a single quark exist". It's not rightly conceivable (per Anscombe).

I haven't read anything by Anscombe on Hume's conceivability argument, I've only heard second-hand remarks, so you'll have to elaborate.

Theoretical Philosophy » Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation? » Today 10:56 pm

bmiller
Replies: 45

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surroundx wrote:

Space=nothingness. 

surroundx wrote:

Take the sentence "space is empty". Space is the subject and empty is the predicate. Thus I have made a qualification.

But then the first quote qualifies space just as much as the second since space is the subject and nothingness is the predicate.
"Space is nothingness"
"Space is empty"
Are grammatically the same.

And as Frenchy points out, in a world in which there is only a quark and nothing else, how could it be said to move?
 

Theoretical Philosophy » Five Proofs Critique: The Aristotelian Proof » Today 9:58 pm

Miguel
Replies: 1

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You never responded to my objections tho.

Anyway, do you have the Metaphysics of Sabzavari? Please share his argument for the distinction between Essence and Existence; there are never enough arguments for contingency, in my view

Theoretical Philosophy » Objections to AT view of forms » Today 8:22 pm

Drovot
Replies: 2

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FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

Hi,

My two cents. ^^'

Drovot wrote:

However, why can't the reductionist just claim that in the material world there are fluctuations of particles that resemble each other?

What does he means by "resemble"? They have a similar shape, a similar... form?

Drovot wrote:

If they lump together and eventually structure a pig, or a human, we could explain this lumping together of particles by following backwards its deterministic path. We don't need to adhere to some notion of form in order to explain why matter is brought together into certain patterns.

So, if they have the form of a pig, they're a pig?

Have a look at https://sdcojai.wordpress.com/do-natural-things-have-forms/. ;)

Thank you for the reply. I'll give that a read. This also brings up another question. Why suppose that the pig has some quiddity to it, some substantial form? What if the pig is fundamentally an arrangement of quarks? I mean even if we say the quarks exist virtually, that still means the quarks exist, albeit in a limited manner.

And we don't need to fall back on a metaphysical principle like form to explain the quark limitation. We can explain it via chemical bonding.

Theoretical Philosophy » Objections to AT view of forms » Today 8:06 pm

Hi,

My two cents. ^^'

Drovot wrote:

However, why can't the reductionist just claim that in the material world there are fluctuations of particles that resemble each other?

What does he means by "resemble"? They have a similar shape, a similar... form?

Drovot wrote:

If they lump together and eventually structure a pig, or a human, we could explain this lumping together of particles by following backwards its deterministic path. We don't need to adhere to some notion of form in order to explain why matter is brought together into certain patterns.

So, if they have the form of a pig, they're a pig?

Have a look at https://sdcojai.wordpress.com/do-natural-things-have-forms/. ;)

Theoretical Philosophy » Objections to AT view of forms » Today 6:33 pm

Drovot
Replies: 2

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Hi, I am a struggling Catholic. I've recently become familiar with the Scholastic tradition through Feser and Oderberg.

I suspect what I'm about to say will seem silly or at best a representation of my own failure to engage with the hylemorphic system on a more metaphysical level. Nonetheless, these objections have been in my mind for awhile and I'm interested in seeing whether or not someone can poke substantial holes in them.

So from what I understand there are few significant reasons why the scholastic believes in the physical instantiation of forms. First there is the view that forms help to explain the seemingly universal patterns found in physical beings. There are tulips and then there is the universal and abstract form of the tulip which resides in our minds. However, why can't the reductionist just claim that in the material world there are fluctuations of particles that resemble each other? Like when you drop a rock into a pond the water molecules will predictably ripple out, each ripple resembling the last insofar as it is a similar fluctuation of molecules.

There's also the argument that form helps to explain why some particles unify in a particular manner and exhibit a unified behavior. But, again, isn't it theoretically possible that we could trace the motions of chemical, molecular, and atomic and subatomic particles from a primordial ooze and watch as they eventually coalesce into, say, DNA, bacterial organisms, simple life forms, fish, etc. And the movements and coalescing of these particles is due simply to natural forces. If they lump together and eventually structure a pig, or a human, we could explain this lumping together of particles by following backwards its deterministic path. We don't need to adhere to some notion of form in order to explain why matter is brought together into certain patterns.

Theoretical Philosophy » Five Proofs Critique: The Aristotelian Proof » Today 4:30 pm

DanielCC
Replies: 1

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Here is the next installment in my ongoing series of articles critiquing Ed Feser's Five Proofs. This entry focuses on the Aristotelian Proof, which I am not so sanguine about as I am about the PSR argument. As before I would ask you kindly to post any substantial questions to the blog combox (double posting is fine), as we want to get it up onto Google hits.

Five Proofs Critique: The Aristotelian Proof

Religion » Catholicism » Today 10:30 am

Greg
Replies: 14

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Brian wrote:

Could someone either elaborate on, or point to a source that elaborates on the different types of mass? I take it that all masses have at their "core" Communion, or I suppose it is more accurately called the Eucharist. But are there are a bunch of different types?

Briefly, there are various rites. Each type of mass is the mass. It is celebration of the sacrament of the Eucharist, the making-present of the sacrifice on Calvary. But the different rites have different forms.

In Roman Catholicism, priests are permitted to celebrate both the Old Rite (the "Traditional Latin Mass,"  or the "Tridentine Mass") and the New Rite (the Novus Ordo). (Pope Benedict's 2008 motu proprio Summorum Pontificum gave permission to priests to celebrate either mass. That is, the local bishop could not prevent you from celebrating the Latin Mass.) But there are also various other rites which are still part of the Catholic Church... Ukrainian Rite, Byzantine Rite, Eastern Rite etc. Those  have their own masses as well. In many respects, their liturgy bears a greater resemblance to Orthodox liturgy than to Roman Catholic liturgy; and in many respects, their liturgy bears a greater resemblance to the Old Rite than to the Novus Ordo.

I would still say that each of these is structured the same, though. You still have a Liturgy of the Word (during which the priest approaches the altar and which culminates in the reading of the Gospel) and a Liturgy of the Eucharist (which begins with the Offertory and culminates in the reception of the Eucharist). (There are some exceptions. The Good Friday service is not a mass, because the sacrament is not consecrated. And there are Ash Wednesday services which are not masses also, though it can also be part of a mass.)

I would say, indeed, that Catholicism is very liturgical. The liturgy is extremely important, the Eucharist being the source and summit of Christian life. Accordingly, masses ce

Chit-Chat » What do you think about priestly celibacy? » Today 10:09 am

Greg
Replies: 2

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Yes I think it should continue. A priest's parish is the family of which he is the father. It is good for his attention to be undivided toward that family. When you have children, your life is tied up in ways that you cannot entirely anticipate for two decades.

Theoretical Philosophy » Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation? » Today 9:41 am

surroundx wrote:

In a possible world in which only a single quark exists, then only a single quark exists. There are no necessary prior conditions for it's existence (viz. no ontic need for space).

Hmm, is it correct thus to say "in which"? And not "composed by"? Because in a world with only one single quark, said quark can't move; unless we allow space to be in too.

Secondly, I'm not sure if we can go on "in a world in which only a single quark exist". It's not rightly conceivable (per Anscombe).

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