Classical Theism, Philosophy, and Religion Forum

You are not logged in. Would you like to login or register?

Theoretical Philosophy » Theism and Tribalism » 5/12/2018 5:21 am

I'm glad to hear some Christian apologists are engaging more thoughtfully with Islam. I do recall Kreeft doing this too.

​I had in mind more the lesser miracles of Jesus, which are sometimes stressed as important proofs for Christianity. Perhaps it has been done, I would hardy claim expertise, but I think that a lot more argument needs to be given than is sometimes the case at least to show why proving Jesus' historical miracles (this is related to the emphasis put on historicity by some Christian apologists, which itself needs more explanation, from what I've seen) would be such important evidence.

Theoretical Philosophy » Theism and Tribalism » 5/11/2018 9:15 pm

119 wrote:

[
Add the trinity to the list. Which of the cosmo arguments take us there? To use these arguments in Christian apologetics and then to mention (almost as an addendum, as if in passing) that G-d is a "special unity" that consists of three parts, each of which has the sufficient requirements to be G-d, is either charlatanry of world-historic proportions ... or rank tribalism.

There's a (subconscious) disjunctive syllogism bewitching us and it's all because of tribalism: either some flavor of Christianity is true OR nihilism. The arguments for Judaism (or Theism unaffiliated, or Hinduism) are simply ignored. Since we're harping about WLC

"When you look at the Messianic prophecies in the Old Testament, they give virtually no clue that Messiah isn’t going to be this triumphant warrior king that was expected. This is what was supposed to happen."

And it didn't. Game over. Case closed. We need to rise above our ingrained tendencies to identify with the religion of our tribe.

​I certainly agree that Christian apologists often don't give enough consideration of other religions, and seem to too easily reach the position that Christianity is the best explanation. For example, huge weight is often put on historical miracles, without proper explanation why this is so important (and dismissal of miracles in other faiths). Caricatures of other faiths are still distressingly common (Buddhism is nihilistic, Islam is portrays God as simply bloodthirsty and lacking all mercy, and so on.).

Chit-Chat » What is wrong with people? » 5/11/2018 9:10 am

Trump says all sorts of things, but he also speaks out of his rear-end. Interesting you are willing to take him at his word on this. The rally was chaotic. It had non-far right people attending, or originally intending to and pulling out. It makes much more sense to see Trump as trying to clumsily refer to these than that he is a closest Neo-Nazi sympathiser.

Your point about Hitler was silly. If you can't see the difference between an anti-Semite  allegedly overlooking the Jewishness of his doctor, and someone welcoming a Jewish person into his family and being very pro-Israel, then you are seriously lost.

You were talking about Trump colluding with Russia, not simply Russia's attempts at interference. I can only think the fallacy here is committed knowingly and deliberately. Given the silliness of this thread, and its similarities to AKG's rants, and the fact this is supposed to be a philosophy forum, I'm going to lock it. If you wish to put forward more considered case against Trump, you may start a new thread, but these rants are no more welcome here than at Feser's.

Chit-Chat » What is wrong with people? » 5/10/2018 8:26 pm

I consider it unproven everyone who was there engaged in that chant. It was chaotic and there was far from one centre of events. Anyway, it's not relevant because you are assuming Trump actually acquainted himself with all that went on and had that specifically in mind when he made his remarks. Trump makes clumsy ill-informed

The Hitler example is not just question begging and peurile but not a good analogy, given that Trump is very pro-Israel and we're talking about him welcoming a Jewish person into his family. I grant you Trump is a very inconsistent person, but even he is unlikely to be able to square this within himself with viewing Neo-Nazis favourably.

The FBI based much of its investigation on a Clinton campaign document, which ironically made use of lots of Russian, sometimes Kremlin-associated, sources. And neither the FBI nor Meuller seem to have any serious evidence of collusion. To talk of collusion, therefore, as if it were anything but very speculative, is certainly conspiratorial.

Don't you understand that such unhinged rants as those you seem intent on, actually do more harm than good to anti-Trumpers? I don't like Trump, but there's nothing that gets me feeling mildly sympathetic towards Trumpism like reading it's unhinged opponents.

Chit-Chat » What is wrong with people? » 5/10/2018 6:53 pm

Your first three response paragraphs are just more question begging. Not everyone who was there and, especially, not everyone who was originally going to go was a white nationalist (who, incidentally, if we being sticklers for accuracy, aren't all Neo-Nazis). Trump, in his clumsy way, seems to have been referring to some of these people. This is a much more plausible interpretation than that Trump, a man with a Jewish son-in-law and who is very pro-Israel, was calling Neo-Nazis and white nationalists fine people.

Your final paragraph is just conspiratorial nonsense. Streuth! There's nothing like the ravings of fanatical anti-Trumpers to make even Trump and his hardcore supporters comparatively good. And let no one doubt anymore, that the left can be just as conspiratorial and silly as the right. Come on, there's lots of valid things to criticise Trump over, like the fact he's a compulsive liar with little decorum or loyalty. But we can safely discount the idea he was the one behind the grassy knoll, or whatever conspiracy #resistance come up with next.

Theoretical Philosophy » Contemporary reasons for rejecting final causality » 5/10/2018 6:38 pm

In very basic terms I think the objections to final causes remain the same. They are that final causes are unnecessary to understand causality and contrary to parsimony, and that they ill-fit a naturalistic understanding of the world. Most of the different objections, in different times and places, are variations on these.

Chit-Chat » What is wrong with people? » 5/10/2018 12:12 am

I can't stand Trump, but you'd help your case if you didn't commit blatant fallacies, like switching the term protestors for Neo-Nazis. The events in Charlottesville are murky, but it was originally going to be a broader  based event, and not one populated only by white supremacists. It goes without saying, if you turn up at a protest and there is a large, obviously racialist (or black block/anti-fa/radical leftist) component, you should leave. And that seems to be what happened. Other protesters either didn't turn up or left. But things were chaotic. It seems much more plausible that Trump was talking about non-white supremacists. Trump is many things, but I see no reason to think he is a white supremacist. The man is an idiot, not a Nazi.

Fanatical Trump supporters are bad, but so are hysterical Trump haters. There's so much to actually criticise him on - like his selection of the reprehensible Bolton or the fact he makes even Hillary seem honest and sincere - but many left-liberals seem to need to make silly or paranoid criticisms instead.

Theoretical Philosophy » Divine Hiddeness » 4/28/2018 11:40 pm

I think there is ambiguity here. The usual atheist objections aim to show God isn't omnibenevolent (if he's omnipotent) in the sense he doesn't live up to a standard of objective goodness, not that he isn't omnibenevolent because there isn't objective goodness. The PoE, for example, loses whatever sting it has if there is no objective good, so the atheist using it must grant there is such for the sake of argument at least.

Theoretical Philosophy » Hylemorphic dualism and the interaction problem » 4/27/2018 12:03 am

Joe,

I suppose it depends on what one means by elusive. There are always questions about causation, even between material things. The mechanical explanations for material-material causation that seem in the background of this objection don't actually provide a full explanation for why a particular material thing causes a particular material effect - they aren't full, philosophical accounts of causation. This is why the Humean puzzles can be raised, and why the Thomist account of causation doesn't usurp scientific accounts. I don't think the case of immaterial-material causation would be any different, except here there can't, by the nature of the case, be the kind of physical-mechanical-scientific account that is part the explanation of a material-material causal process. What I don't see, though, is why this would be some sort of objection to immaterial-material causation. 

​As for the location of the mind, I think that would require a particular understanding or immaterial substance before it would become a significant issue for the dualist. Also, it is disputable whether the mental is always restricted to a certain locale of material correlatives, and whether one can excert psychophysical influence on other living organisms (or inanimate objects). There is reasonably good evidence that the restriction is far from complete, and that such influence can be exerted.

Theoretical Philosophy » Hylemorphic dualism and the interaction problem » 4/26/2018 10:18 pm

Unless, perhaps like Descartes and some Cartesian dualists, we assume all causation in the material world must be physical causation, the entire interaction problem seems wildly inflated. It seems hard why two distinct, different kinds of substances shouldn't interact. Perhaps those who put forward this objection are labouring under the assumption that immaterial-material causation is problematic because we can't give some mechanics-like description of what goes on the causal process - all we can say is immaterial substance X causes such and such an effect in material substance Y (or vice versa). But this seems a mistaken assumption because, one, it is hard to see why immaterial-material causation should have to behave like material-material causation, and, two, even in the latter case, the mechanical description itself doesn't actually explain why any particular material cause has a particular material effect (in any particular situation). 

​In short, I don't think there is an interaction problem for hylomorphic dualism in just the same way there isn't one for (most) substance dualism. At least critics need to give a lot better reasons for thinking so than the usual gesturing about how different substances can enter into a causal relationship.

Board footera

 

Powered by Boardhost. Create a Free Forum