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8/07/2015 3:12 pm  #1


Direct "full" realism versus direct "abridged" realism

I have no problem with the notion that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world. What I find problematic is the notion that what resides in the mind after we become aware of an entity is not an abridged representation of the essence, or of the form, of the entity, but its very form, as explained by Prof. Feser in this article:

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/03/fodor-and-aquinas-on-extended-mind.html

"For on the Aristotelian-Thomistic account of knowledge, when the intellect comes to understand some object, what this essentially involves is the form that makes the object what it is coming to reside in the intellect itself. It isn’t that a “representation,” understood as a kind of internal object or particular, comes to exist in the mind and in some way mirrors or correlates with the (utterly distinct) thing outside the mind; it is that one and the same thing, the object’s form or essence, exists simultaneously in the intellect and in the object known by the intellect. They are formally identical and thus not utterly distinct."

To show the problem, I propose the following dialog between God and a Thomist:

God: So you claim that the very form, in a hylomorphic sense of course, of the camel resides in your intellect? Well, I will make a camel according to that form. Let's start with DNA. Give Me the aminoacid sequence.

Thomist: I can't, Lord. I know the camel at a macroscopic level only.

God: OK, then give Me the essence at the macroscopic level and I'll figure out the DNA. Let's start with the number and shape of the camel's teeth.

Thomist: Lord, I don't know the camel at such level of detail.

God: Then how can you possibly claim that the very form of the camel has come to reside in your intellect?

---

Both the traditional Thomistic and the representationalist positions have been proposed as Thomasian, i.e. of St. Thomas himself.

For the traditional Thomistic position, besides Prof. Feser:

John O'Callaghan 2003. "Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a More Perfect Form of Existence".

Review: http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23608-thomist-realism-and-the-linguistic-turn-toward-a-more-perfect-form-of-existence/

Elena Baltuta 2013. "Aquinas on Intellectual Cognition: The Case of Intelligible Species", in Philosophia, Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, September 2013, Volume 41, Issue 3, pp 589-602.

http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11406-013-9481-y

For a representationalist interpretation of Thomasian thought:

Robert Pasnau 1997 thesis "Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages".

Robert Pasnau 2002. “What is Cognition? A Reply to Some Critics”, in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 76 (2002) 483-90.

Both available at: http://spot.colorado.edu/~pasnau/inprint/

Claude Panaccio 2001. "Aquinas on intellectual representation", in Dominik Perler ed. "Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality". Brill. 185--201 (2001).

Sandro D'Onofrio 2008 thesis "Aquinas as representationalist: The ontology of the species intelligibilis".

http://books.google.com/books?id=KrzsCPBuKygC

Last edited by Johannes (8/07/2015 3:39 pm)

 

8/07/2015 4:43 pm  #2


Re: Direct "full" realism versus direct "abridged" realism

Johannes wrote:

God: So you claim that the very form, in a hylomorphic sense of course, of the camel resides in your intellect? Well, I will make a camel according to that form. Let's start with DNA. Give Me the aminoacid sequence.

There is an issue here - most, if not all of us don't know the essence of a camel, instead we know at best the essence of an animal substance complete with certain accidents e.g. furry, tooth-bearing, ill-tempered - at best we might know certain properties (taken in the scholastic sense of 'proper accidents') which relate to one of the higher genus under which the camel falls.

Let us instead pursue the same scenario with Man defined as Rational Animal: here we do have the essential characteristic and thus can truly say our minds are informed by the form 'Man'. Does it follow that from said essence we should be able to read off some feature of the human DNA sequence? No, because the fact that rational animals are compose this way is only contingent – If Oderberg’s thesis that any rational animal is ‘metaphysically human’ is correct, then it follows that God could presumably create a rational animal with entirely different biological features.
 
Let’s ignore even that option though, suppose we don’t raise the question of other rational animals. I still wouldn’t say that knowing the essence of man would entail we must know all the details of some biological feature e.g. DNA. What it does entail is that we must know what Rationality (and Animality) is, what it means to reason, and not whatever mechanisms in the material world maybe correlated with this process.
 

Last edited by DanielCC (8/07/2015 4:45 pm)

 

8/07/2015 6:13 pm  #3


Re: Direct "full" realism versus direct "abridged" realism

DanielCC wrote:

There is an issue here - most, if not all of us don't know the essence of a camel, instead we know at best the essence of an animal substance complete with certain accidents e.g. furry, tooth-bearing, ill-tempered - at best we might know certain properties (taken in the scholastic sense of 'proper accidents') which relate to one of the higher genus under which the camel falls.

The point is: what does a Thomist mean when he says that "the form of the known entity resides in the knower's intellect"? Because if the very form resides in the intellect, God should be able to build such an entity from that form.

DanielCC wrote:

Let us instead pursue the same scenario with Man defined as Rational Animal: here we do have the essential characteristic and thus can truly say our minds are informed by the form 'Man'. Does it follow that from said essence we should be able to read off some feature of the human DNA sequence? No, because the fact that rational animals are compose this way is only contingent – If Oderberg’s thesis that any rational animal is ‘metaphysically human’ is correct, then it follows that God could presumably create a rational animal with entirely different biological features.

IMV, man as species is, at the same time:
- for biology: species Homo Sapiens, under biological genus Homo, family Hominidae, etc.
- for metaphysics: a species under metaphysical genus "rational animal", defined as a rational animal (animal informed by a spiritual rational soul) of the biological species Homo Sapiens.

Thus, IMV our minds are informed by the abstraction "rational animal", which is a metaphysical genus and not a species, and by an abridged representation of the Homo Sapiens biological species.

Whether God can "create a rational animal with entirely different biological features" depends on 1) what is meant by "entirely different" and 2) whether we are including the hypothesis of another universe with different physical properties. Because it is quite probable that, given this universe with its periodic table of chemical elements, a complex enough neural network can only be built in carbon based lifeforms which, for having that complexity, must be obligate aerobes, so that if by "entirely different biological features" we mean "not based on carbon and not depending on oxygen", the answer to the question of "whether God can create such a rational animal using only natural secondary causes for the underlying biology", i.e. without resorting to supernatural activity to sustain the physical life of such animal, would be "not in this universe". 

With this long caveat, yes, it is clear that God can create a rational animal with entirely different biological features. But that is not the point under discussion.

DanielCC wrote:

Let’s ignore even that option though, suppose we don’t raise the question of other rational animals. I still wouldn’t say that knowing the essence of man would entail we must know all the details of some biological feature e.g. DNA. What it does entail is that we must know what Rationality (and Animality) is, what it means to reason, and not whatever mechanisms in the material world maybe correlated with this process.

I insist, what you then know is the common feature of metaphysical genus "rational animal".

Back to the beginning, it all depends on what a Thomist means when he states that "the form of the known entity resides in the knower's intellect". To me, that is true only if the known entity can be built from the information present in the knower's intellect. Which implies that, for most complex entities, their form resides only in the divine Intellect.
 

Last edited by Johannes (8/07/2015 6:14 pm)

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8/07/2015 6:36 pm  #4


Re: Direct "full" realism versus direct "abridged" realism

Problems with Form are akin (though mind this being merely an analogy) to the functionalist problematic in that, for instance, man has multiple realizations (as addition does for functionalism).


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8/07/2015 8:14 pm  #5


Re: Direct "full" realism versus direct "abridged" realism

Johannes, I think DanielCC's reply is along the right lines. A substance has a substantial form, of course, but it also has numerous accidental (sub)forms; you seem to be conflating the two. Similarly, a substance has an essence, but it also has numerous essential properties that flow from that essence but with which that essence is not to be identified; you seem to be conflating those as well.

It doesn't seem to follow from our intellect's having received a form even in its "unabridged" entirety that we can simply read off at will everything entailed by that form, let alone everything accidentally associated with it . Even in having in my intellect the form of something as simple as a triangle, I'm surely not aware of every single property entailed by triangularity. (Still less need I be aware of all the accidents of a specific instantiation of triangularity. If I'm color-blind, I may not even know what color it is.) But there doesn't for that reason seem to be anything problematic about my intellect's having received the form in the first place.

Finally, even if it were the case that having the form of X in one's intellect meant that one could simply rattle off all the facts about X at will, it still wouldn't follow that Ed (or Aristotle or Aquinas) was wrong to hold that "when the intellect comes to understand some object, what this essentially involves is the form that makes the object what it is coming to reside in the intellect itself" (emphasis mine). At most we might conclude that an intellect that couldn't rattle off such facts hadn't come to understand X (at least fully, and perhaps at all).

Last edited by Scott (8/07/2015 8:44 pm)

 

8/07/2015 11:41 pm  #6


Re: Direct "full" realism versus direct "abridged" realism

Scott wrote:

A substance has a substantial form, of course, but it also has numerous accidental (sub)forms; you seem to be conflating the two. Similarly, a substance has an essence, but it also has numerous essential properties that flow from that essence but with which that essence is not to be identified; you seem to be conflating those as well.

This seems a very convenient approach, whereby you, a bedouin, and the world's foremost expert on camels all know the substantial form/essence of a camel but just differ in the knowledge of the camel´s accidental (sub)forms/essential properties. So the Thomist in my fictional dialog can get away by replying: "Lord, the number and shape of the camel's teeth are not part of the camel's substantial form/essence but one of its accidental (sub)forms/essential properties. I know the camel's substantial form/essence, not its accidental (sub)forms/essential properties." If this is the case, then what is in the camel's substantial form and what is in its accidental (sub)forms? What is part of its essence and what is part of its essential properties?

It seems to me that the structures of the camel's digestive system and of its skeleton are both part of its substantial form, not accidental subforms.

Scott wrote:

But there doesn't for that reason seem to be anything problematic about my intellect's having received the form in the first place.

Of course, by stripping the form down enough you can always claim that your intellect has received the form.

Scott wrote:

Finally, even if it were the case that having the form of X in one's intellect meant that one could simply rattle off all the facts about X at will, it still wouldn't follow that Ed (or Aristotle or Aquinas) was wrong to hold that "when the intellect comes to understand some object, what this essentially involves is the form that makes the object what it is coming to reside in the intellect itself" (emphasis mine). At most we might conclude that an intellect that couldn't rattle off such facts hadn't come to understand X (at least fully, and perhaps at all).

We must distinguish between having the information to make X and knowing all the consequences of that information. You may know exactly what a triangle is, so that a triangle can be made from the form in your intellect, and at the same time not know explicitely all the properties of the triangle. You may know all the technical data of a car, so that the car can be built from the form in your intellect, and at the same time not know the maximum speed that said car can reach. Lastly, in order to build a living organism you must know its genetic code, but you do not need to know the range of ambient temperatures under which the organism can survive. The properties of a triangle such as the relations between its sides and angles, the maximum speed of a car, and the acceptable ambient temperature range for an organism are all consequences of the essence of the respective entity, not part of that essence. Maybe the right term for those consequences is "essential properties", but lacking academic training in philosophy, I defer the terminology to the experts.

Bottom line: the issue lies in the definition of what is in the form of an entity X. You can define the form stripped enough of all specifics so that you can say that it resides in your intellect when you just have a minimum knowledge of X. Or you can define the form full enough so that you can say that it resides in your intellect only when X can be made from what you know about it.

Which ends the discussion, because definitions are not to be argued about, but to be decided by authority or consensus. If the consensus in the Thomistic school is that an entity's substantial form is defined in the first way I described above, then that's it.

To note, the forms that really matter in metaphysics, namely angelic essences and human souls, are simple enough that they can be fully described: spiritual forms endowed with intellect and free will. Therefore the issue under discussion does not really matter in metaphysics.

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