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1/25/2018 12:26 pm  #1


A demonstrative argument for PSR from PNC

This is an argument I came up with a few days ago. I am not completely sure if it's valid or sound, but it seems interesting to me, and very different from standard attempts to derive PSR from PNC.

As it stands, it works better if we use a basic distinction between essence and existence, though it may not be necessary. I use it for convenience. I'll just present it informally in different steps.

1) There is a sense in which everything that exists *must* exist, in order to allow for the tautology that "the existent being exists". This means that any being, as long as it exists at t, *must* exist at t and therefore cannot fail to exist at t.

2) For a contingent being X, this means that X could in principle fail to exist and need not exist, so we may say that X has a "potential to not exist" (although, more appropriately, it would just be that X's potency to exist needs to be constantly actualized). But as long as X exists at t, its potency to not exist cannot be actualized at t. If it could be actualized at t, it means X could both exist and fail to exist at t, which is a contradiction. So X's non-existence must be precluded.

3) For a contingent being X that doesn't have existence as part of its essence (and therefore no inherent tendency to exist), it is only possible for its non-existence to be precluded if there is a cause, an explanation, that effectively is responsible for X's existence at t and therefore precludes X's non-existence at t.

NOTE: None of this implies any sort of necessitarianism; the contingent being "needs" to exist only at t when it is already an existent being, as a result of a cause; it needn't exist before t and neither does it need to exist after t; we could also say that God could have chosen to create a different universe and that different universe would only need to exist posterior (ontologically) to God's creation, at t, so there is no real necessitarianism.

4) So, to recap, a contingent being that exists at t, and therefore cannot not-exist at t, is able to instantiate this state of affairs/have this tautology being really true of itself, only because there is a cause of X at t which therefore precludes X from not-existint at t.

5)A brute thing or fact, however, by definition cannot have a cause. A brute thing Y that exists at t also *must* exist at t, logically, however, how is it able to ensure that it cannot not-exist at t? A contingent being is able to have its non-existence precluded at t because of a cause/explanation of its existence at t. But a brute thing cannot have a cause or any explanation for its existence at t.

6) If there is nothing to preclude the non-existence of a being at t, then it is possible for that being to not-exist at t. Notice how this does not presuppose PSR or PC in any way; I am not treating "nothing" as some sort of strange cause or explanation, or depending strictly on intelligibility instead of non-contradiction; I am just stating the fact that if there isn't anything at all to preclude the non-existence of a being at t, then it is possible for that being to not-exist at t. It cannot be said that, as a matter of brute fact, that being could still have its non-existence precluded if there isn't anything that precludes its non-existence. That would be a real contradiction. So if there isn't anything at all that precludes the non-existence of something at t, that something can fail to exist at t.

7) But recall how the brute thing existing at t doesn't have any cause or explanation for why it exists instead of not existing. It doesn't have anything (like a cause) to preclude its non-existence at t. So, by 6, this would mean that a brute thing existing at t could fail to exist at t. But that's a contradiction!

8) Is there any other option available? Well, one could say that the brute thing Y existing at t has its non-existence precluded by the mere predication of its existence at t. So, Y's existence at t, combined with PNC, ensures that Y cannot exist, retaining coherence.

9) However, what would that even mean of Y? The mere fact that it exists at t would be sufficient to ensure that it doesn't possibly fail to exist at t, without the aid of any external cause whatsoever. That could only be possible, however, if Y were a necessary being. A necessary being existing at t cannot not-exist at t simply because it exists -- it has an inherent tendency to exist, its own essence is existence, all by itself it is able to keep existing.

10) But a brute fact/thing cannot be a necessary being, or that would mean that this brute fact/thing exists because of what it is; there would be an explanation for the existence of the brute thing, to be found in its nature and its inherent tendency to exist. So a brute fact/thing can't be necessary and must be contingent.

11) The brute thing cannot have its non-existence at t precluded simply by the fact that it exists, for that would mean that it has an inherent tendency to remain in existence, that its own nature tends to exist -- which would make it a necessary being, not a brute thing/fact.

12) It also cannot be said that the brute thing has its non-existence precluded at t simply because of PNC, because what has its non-existence precluded because of PNC would be a necessary being, which a brute fact can't be.

13) So a brute fact/thing doesn't have anything at t that precludes its non-existence at t, when it exists.

14) So it is possible for the brute thing to both exist and not-exist at t, which is a contradiction.

15) Therefore brute facts/things are impossible. QED.


What do you guys think? The latter steps would be the most controversial ones, I assume. As of now, I think it works. But I'm not completely sure either; I may be a little biased since it's my argument.

Any comments?

Last edited by Miguel (1/25/2018 12:29 pm)

 

1/25/2018 12:59 pm  #2


Re: A demonstrative argument for PSR from PNC

Quote: "If it could be actualized at t, it means X could both exist and fail to exist at t, which is a contradiction. So X's non-existence must be precluded."


I think this is where someone could object by saying that it actually IS possible for X to both exist and fail to exist at t, but it's just not possible for it to happen  at the same time and for both to be the case.


X exists at t, but it need not necessarily exist at t and could fail to exist at t. If that were to happen, X would not exist. Of course, per supposition that X exists at t, X actually exists and cannot fail to exist per supposition. But it's possible for X not to exist at t or at least to stop existing, because one is not saying X both is and is not existing  at the same time.


One is saying that X could both exist and not exist at t as distinct options for X at t, but not at the same time. So basically X could either exist or not exist at t, but not both.

Last edited by aftermathemat (1/25/2018 1:01 pm)

 

1/25/2018 1:03 pm  #3


Re: A demonstrative argument for PSR from PNC

Basically, my argument is that the tautological fact that "if X exists at t, X cannot not-exist at t" must correspond to ontology in some way; but ontologically it cannot be the case that a contingent being's non-existence at t is precluded simply by the fact that it exists at t, otherwise we would be treating the contingent being as if it were necessary, as if its existence at t were sufficient for it to have its non-existence precluded. But nevertheless the tautology must still hold true; for contingent beings this is possible because there is a sufficient reason for their existence external to themselves, so there is a sufficient reason why their non-existence is precluded at t.

But a brute fact cannot have a sufficient reason for its existence at t, and therefore can have nothing to preclude its non-existence at t (contra the tautology) except the sheer fact that it exists, but this would mean this brute fact is necessary and its existence is sufficient to rule out the possibility of it not-existing.

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1/25/2018 1:05 pm  #4


Re: A demonstrative argument for PSR from PNC

aftermathemat wrote:

Quote: "If it could be actualized at t, it means X could both exist and fail to exist at t, which is a contradiction. So X's non-existence must be precluded."


I think this is where someone could object by saying that it actually IS possible for X to both exist and fail to exist at t, but it's just not possible for it to happen  at the same time and for both to be the case.


X exists at t, but it need not necessarily exist at t and could fail to exist at t. If that were to happen, X would not exist. Of course, per supposition that X exists at t, X actually exists and cannot fail to exist per supposition. But it's possible for X not to exist at t or at least to stop existing, because one is not saying X both is and is not existing  at the same time.


One is saying that X could both exist and not exist at t as distinct options for X at t, but not at the same time. So basically X could either exist or not exist at t, but not both.

 
If it's distinct options for X but *not at the same time*, as you say, then it's not at t. That's the problem. If X exists at t, then it CANNOT be really possible for X to not-exist at t. If its potency for non-existence were actualized, so to speak, then it would no longer be t0 (say) but t1. So as a matter of fact, if X exists at t then x cannot fail to exist at t.

Last edited by Miguel (1/25/2018 1:06 pm)

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1/25/2018 1:19 pm  #5


Re: A demonstrative argument for PSR from PNC

Miguel wrote:

But a brute fact cannot have a sufficient reason for its existence at t, and therefore can have nothing to preclude its non-existence at t (contra the tautology) except the sheer fact that it exists, but this would mean this brute fact is necessary and its existence is sufficient to rule out the possibility of it not-existing.

This reminds me of Scott Sullivan and Lagrange's argument from the Principle of Idenitity which asks what distinguishes an existing thing from nothing, pointing out how it could only be distinguished from nothing by itself or another, and then how if a fact were to be distinguished from nothing by itself would make it necessary because it would need nothing outside of itself in order to exist.

Therefore, a thing that exists is distinguished from nothing by another. That another is existence, because everything about it would need to exist in order for it to even be distinguished in the first place.


It's a very good argument that appeals to ontological grounding and ends up with the atheist having to say that an existing thing isn't actually distinguished from nothing, or is distinguished from nothing by nothing, which are both absurd.


Such reasoning could easily be used against brute facts by pointing out how it is logically impossible for them to be truly uncaused ontologically, because this would entail that nothing distinguishes brute facts from nothing, which entails that they don't actually exist.
 

 

1/25/2018 1:22 pm  #6


Re: A demonstrative argument for PSR from PNC

Miguel wrote:

If it's distinct options for X but *not at the same time*, as you say, then it's not at t. That's the problem. If X exists at t, then it CANNOT be really possible for X to not-exist at t. If its potency for non-existence were actualized, so to speak, then it would no longer be t0 (say) but t1. So as a matter of fact, if X exists at t then x cannot fail to exist at t.

Yes, that is correct, if what you are saying is that, if X exists at t by supposition  , then it must necessarily exist at t per supposition.

I agree with you there, but I think someone could still object by saying that it is possible for X not to exist at t, which means that  either X exists at t or does not, but only these 2 options can hold,and only one of them at the same time.

Or maybe that's not even an objection but simply a restatement of your point, Oh well.

Last edited by aftermathemat (1/25/2018 1:23 pm)

 

1/25/2018 1:33 pm  #7


Re: A demonstrative argument for PSR from PNC

The only other objectionable premsies that could perhaps need some further defending would be 9, 11 and 12. After that, you're home free. And the argument....goes through.

 

3/01/2018 12:21 am  #8


Re: A demonstrative argument for PSR from PNC

Underrated argument tbh

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