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Practical Philosophy » Empathy and Morality » 8/14/2015 2:42 pm |
Alexander wrote:
Perhaps I misunderstand, because I foresee an obvious query: what the hypothetical teacher seems to be doing is considering the morality of an action (in this case, accepting a gift from a student). If we are forbidden to consider whether the action is moral, how do we know we are doing the action because it is moral? After all, the act might be immoral. If we don't stop to consider, how would we know?
Firstly, that would come awfully close to relativism. Secondly, in objective morality, we know it's wrong to receive gifts for doing your job. Period. So that's the only moral action in this case. We know which actions are moral and which are not.
Practical Philosophy » Contraception and health care » 8/08/2015 3:27 am |
'Health care' in this case is just progressive doublespeak, I'd say you're overcomplicating it. Just as they call abortion 'choice' instead of murder, they call contraception 'health care'.
Practical Philosophy » A Counterexample to Natural Law Theory from Pruss » 8/05/2015 3:23 am |
Practical Philosophy » Empathy and Morality » 8/05/2015 3:19 am |
I've always liked Kant's stance that a moral action is only moral when it is done without any rationalizations, emotions, etc. So when you start to think oh should I accept this gift from a student, I've worked hard, but the rules forbid it, etc., your decision will not be a moral one according to Kant. So moral actions should be done only because they are moral, nothing more, not because of empathy or something else.
Theoretical Philosophy » A Modal Disproof of God » 8/04/2015 5:33 am |
DanielCC wrote:
But the argument does not require the existence of beings with free will (the rabbit example for instance) so even if the appeal to free will does work in the case of humans there’s still more work to be done.
It doesn't require it, but the existence of being with free will trumps it since it is not only a possible, but an actual world. I don't think it's plausible to say that if a world of evil rabbits exists and that trumps God's omnipresence and omnibenevolence that it also trumps them when it comes to creatures with free will, as I've shown.
So one thing is clear, the conclusion of that argument cannot be generalized to all possible worlds because it is not possible that God cannot exercise his omnipotence and omnibenevolence in one possible world, but can in another. Since from the observable world we can observe and conclude we have free will and that God can exercise his omnipotence and omnibenevolence in this world, we see that gratuitous evil is possible, thus the argument number 3 and 4 are simply not true thus the argument number 6 isn't true.
I'll stop spamming now.
Theoretical Philosophy » A Modal Disproof of God » 8/04/2015 4:32 am |
DanielCC wrote:
The argument is that God's 'presence' in all possible worlds should render evil worlds impossible and they do not, prima facia, appear to be so.
I'm no expert, but the whole argument just stands on shaky ground. For example
''Gratuitous Evil is incompatible with the first and last Divine Attribute referenced above''
Firstly I don't think this is true. Even in completely evil world, the inhabitants of that evil were chose to be evil out of their own free will, I simply do not see how does that trump omnipotence and omniscience. I always like to refer to Paradise Lost in these matters, God speaking to Christ:
''Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell. Not free, what proof could they have given sincere of true allegiance, constant Faith or Love, where onely what they needs must do, appeard, not what they would? What praise could they receive? What pleasure I from such obedience paid? They trespass, Authors to themselves in all, both what they judge and what they choose; for so I formd them free, and free they must remain''
We can define evil as something that is contrary to God and God's will. Thus, God did not create evil, God merely gave us a choice, a freedom to do something that is contrary to God's laws. - thus, God did not create evil, unless one supposes that God giving us freedom constitutes the creation of evil. The guy who put together that argument in the original post completely distances evil from this and see it just as something distinct from the other laws of the universe.
Now, if we agree that evil is necessary because it is basically an extension of free will, how can we say that an extension of free will trumps God's omnipotence and omnibenevolence? It simply does not and this is where the argument falls apart for me, because it basically states ''God presence in all worlds renders free will (or a direct result of free will) impossible''. And I think we agree that free will exists, thus the argument just falls apart
Chit-Chat » Putting Internet Atheist in their place » 8/04/2015 4:02 am |
I remember talking to one atheist on an internet forum and he said he actually graduated philosophy from Berkeley. I just talked about basic stuff about actuality and potency, that the origin of the first matter couldn't have been another matter, that time didn't start itself, etc. His initial response was ''oh, you're one of those Aquinas guys, pfff I spit on metaphyiscs'' (I only read a 100 pages from a 1912 textbook on Ontology btw). Then he proceede to tell me that the material origin of the universe is perfectly viable because our universe MAY have been started by another universe. I was just dumbfounded by that comment because he was perfectly satisfied with ''our universe was started by another universe'' and he did not seem to understand my point that even in that universe matter is matter and that matter cannot come into existance from the state of zero potentiality (that's how I explain what nothingness is to people), so my initial arguments apply even to that universe because they apply to all matter.
In any case, I don't understand these people.
Theoretical Philosophy » A Modal Disproof of God » 8/03/2015 4:17 pm |
I was always kind of confused with the skeptics' obsession with the ''problem'' of evil. I argue that evil is necessary for free will, period. In my mind, that cuts off all the whining about evil.
As for the omnibenevolence, it may have bee dr. Feser who said well God can't force you into His presence, you can be a great person all your life but if you're an atheist, you're not going to Heaven because you don't want to be with God. And again, God's omnibenevolence can't trump free will bestowed upon us by God. So if you choose to do evil, what can God's omnibenevolence do about that if you have free will to do so? I mean, God is bound by laws which God instituted, this is also why I reject the argument that gratuitous evil is somehow incompatible with God's omnipotence.
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