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| Theoretical Philosophy » What if the series of causes is the cause? » 4/10/2016 6:23 pm |
- lawrence89
- Replies: 7
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iwpoe wrote:I think that's a category mistake. A series of causes isn't the *sort of thing* that can be a mover.
Yes but... why?
DanielCC wrote:but that in no way explains why it should be the cause of itself (even Hume considered that absurd).
Yes but... why?
DanielCC wrote:Also: if the collection was the unmoved mover fulfills the role of unmoved mover then it is de facto a necessary being. Yet are not all its parts i.e. the movers that make up the series, contingent? If so then one can counter by saying that it's incoherent to have a necessary being composed solely of contingent parts.
But it could be answered that it is a composition fallacy. To deduce the contingency of the whole from the contingency of the components needs first that we prove that a necessary being can't ever be composed of contingent beings. But how can we quickly prove it?
DanielCC wrote:on pains of contradiction one cannot have an unchanged being ever part of which is changing.
Yes but... why?
DanielCC wrote:Re Fallacies of Composition, the critic i.e. the one arguing for the fallacy, still has to explain why the part-whole reasoning in question is fallacious. Until they give a reason to think that a totality of changing parts does not rule out a whole without change the field is yours.
No. The critic just notices that there is a chance in which the composition can be false, so he says that we can't logically conclude anything. The thomist must give reason to explain why the series can't be a mover.
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| Theoretical Philosophy » What if the series of causes is the cause? » 4/10/2016 5:20 am |
- lawrence89
- Replies: 7
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Recently I was talking with a friend about the first (and second) way, and he made me this objection. He recognized that it is right to look for a mover, and that the moved movers are not sufficient to move themeselves, if they are taken singularly. But he said that we can't exclude the case where the entire series of movers constitutes the real mover, as if its moving power was an emergent property that the single moved movers didn't have. I answered that the series is not a real entity, but just a human concept, so it's impossible that an idea causes something in reality. But I'm not entirely satisfied with my answer: how do we know that the series is not a real entity composed of other real entities? So how could I answer? I thought that I could also answer that if the series was the unmoved mover, then it would mean that the unmoved mover was composed of single moving parts, which is absurd. But how can we prove that it is absurd? Although it seems something obvious, it could be accused of being a composition fallacy to say that a series made by moved things can't be unmoved, as if I say that a house can't weigh more than 1 pound if it is composed of bricks that weigh 1 pound. So I suppose the only way to prevent this objection is to ground what is a composition in philosophy of nature, discussing that composed objects are contingent themeselves, and so they require a cause. But in this way, aquinas's ways become much longer. Do you see any quicker answer to this objection? Why can't the series be itself a cause?
| Theoretical Philosophy » Which is the series of movers in the first way? » 12/10/2015 2:41 pm |
- lawrence89
- Replies: 5
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I understand the argument and I find it valid. But I don't understand exactly what we are talking about. Can we identify the per se series we are following with some specific objects of the world? For example: the hand moved by the muscle, the muscle moved by electric stimulus etc... is this series the series we are following? I'm not sure. I know that we don't have to follow per accidens series, that are usually studied by sciences. But my question is: why are they per accidens? Because they are temporal?
| Theoretical Philosophy » Which is the series of movers in the first way? » 12/07/2015 7:05 am |
- lawrence89
- Replies: 5
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I understand everthing you say, but I don't see how it is related to the first (or even the second) way. I will try to study theese matters better... can you give me any advice about any book that goes deeply in theese matters? I'm not talking about a general rational theology text, but something more specific about the different kind of causal series etc...
Thanks
| Theoretical Philosophy » Which is the series of movers in the first way? » 12/05/2015 3:28 am |
- lawrence89
- Replies: 5
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What you say is very interesting, even if I still have some problems grasping everything.
Ok, simultaneity is not important for the series of movers. But it remains important for the first mover, otherwise our argument will identify God with the author of the big bang, and we know that the argument doesn't go back in time, but is valid also here and now. So, what I find hard to understand is how can the unmoved mover influence the causal series. In what way? Until today, I thought He did it just being the first of the series. But you are telling me that it is not necessarily right: the first mover influences the entire series, and not only it's first element. Feser's example is really good, when he says that also a circular series would require a first mover. But how would that mover act on that series? Can you give me an example to understand this concept?
| Theoretical Philosophy » Which is the series of movers in the first way? » 12/03/2015 2:45 pm |
- lawrence89
- Replies: 5
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Hi, I'm thinking about the series of movers in Aquinas's First way, and I have a question. In order for the argument to succeed, it's important to distinguish between "per accidens" causes and "per se" ones. I think it's important to underline that the beings in the series we are talking about are not different in time, but all happen a the same time. But I have problems to understand this concept. Aquinas gived the example of the hand, the stone etc. Other authors give other examples, but all of them don't persuade me. For example, Michael Augros in this great article ( ) distinguishes between these two series:
- My Brush : My Hand : My Brain : My will ...
- Me painting right now : My parents conceiving me : Their parents conceiving them ...
Augros rightly says that we are interested only in the first series, not in the second one (that is in time). Now, my problem is that I don't see much difference between the two. In fact, also in the first case we can find a slight delay between the change of the hand and the change of the brush etc. In other words, if we do a time lapse with a high-precision camera, we will see that the hand doesn't move all together, but some "atoms" start to move first, and then the move passes to other atoms, then to the base of the brush and finally to the tip of the brush. So, it seems that also this example is not good. But I can't find a good example of movers that are really acting all at the same time. And I'm sure that's a really important point in the First way. Can you help me?
| Theoretical Philosophy » Books about the soul » 9/22/2015 2:32 am |
- lawrence89
- Replies: 1
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Hi, I would like to start studying the topic of the soul and the hylemorphic dualism from a catholic perspective (does it follows the thomistic doctrine on these issues?). Can you give me any advice about some books I could read to start understanding the topic? I know Feser has talked about "In Defense of the Soul" by Ric Machuga... is it ok? Any other good introductory texts?
| Theoretical Philosophy » God and time » 9/03/2015 9:04 am |
- lawrence89
- Replies: 4
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Thanks for your answer. Probably I'm a bit confused. I was thinking that if God is Timelessness, then we had to be eternalists. But you say we could also be presentist. So I'm asking: given that God is Timelessness, doesn't it mean that He "sees" our past and future events together? And in that case, doesn't it mean that presentism is false?
| Theoretical Philosophy » God and time » 9/03/2015 5:42 am |
- lawrence89
- Replies: 4
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I'm reflecting on the relationship between God and time. I'm not sure if we have to consider the eternity of God as an infinite time or as the absence of time. I wonder if there is a dogmatic answer to these questions, or if the problem is still open. Does thomism have a precise answer? Should we use A-theory or B-theory of time?
I have found a lot of protestant work on these matters, using analytic philosophy (for example Edward Wierenga's book on God's attributes.) But are there some texts from a catholic perspective (classical theism)?
| Introductions » Hi everyone » 9/03/2015 3:26 am |
- lawrence89
- Replies: 2
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Hi,
I will briefly introduce myself before starting participating at the forum. I'm from Italy and I'm studying computer engineering. I'm very interested in rational theology, philosophy, apologetics and theology in general. I'm sure this forum will be a great resource for exchanging ideas.
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