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| Theoretical Philosophy » William Lane Craig and Kevin Scharp | Is There Evidence for God? » 5/15/2016 7:42 pm |
- JayDee
- Replies: 337
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Thanks Kevin for your willingness to engage in conversation with us all. I still have a few more questions regarding the Fine-Tuning Argument so would be great to get your thoughts. Perhaps it would be better to branch off threads to more specific arguments, since this thread is a bit of a jumble of multiple conversations about different things.
| Theoretical Philosophy » William Lane Craig and Kevin Scharp | Is There Evidence for God? » 5/04/2016 7:07 pm |
- JayDee
- Replies: 337
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Kevin, regarding the FTA and Divine Psychology objection; if one could show that;
a) the three options (really) are only Design, Chance, and Necessity
b) Chance and Necessity are extremely low probability
Then as you mentioned earlier, if the probabilities sum to 1, i.e. p(D + C + N) = 1; wouldn't that allow the proponent of the FTA to claim that design - despite our not initially knowing what the probability was because of the divine psychology objection - is automatically the most probable? because p(D) = 1 - ( an extremely low number ).
Perhaps then the controversial point would become whether or not they are the only three options, and/or whether or not the probability of Chance and Necessity are extremely low.
But I suspect that possibly someone like Dr. Craig might be tempted to use the sum of probabilities in support of the idea that just showing C and N to be very low in probability, this might serve to increase the probability of D.
What are your thoughts?
| Theoretical Philosophy » William Lane Craig and Kevin Scharp | Is There Evidence for God? » 5/04/2016 3:09 am |
- JayDee
- Replies: 337
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DanielCC wrote:Point III coupled with Kevin's earlier remark on the Fine Tuning Argument to the effect that 'it would have to be the case that God WOULD create the universe.' is more interesting. Are you saying that God must have a reason to actualise exactly this world (here I'm using the possible world sense) over any other - in which case we have modal collapse problems anyway - and that us theists need to show you what that reason is*? Or are you going for a weaker claim as in God must have a reason to create this kind of universe (used in the non-possible world sense) and that us theists should show you what that reason is*?
* In both cases why should not it be sufficient to claim that there is a reason even if we don't have access to it?
On what basis can one claim that if God were to exist, that God would have a reason to finely tune a universe for life, and the probability of God deciding to do this would be greater than the probability of the fine tuning occurring by some other means?
You go on to say that for all we know God could have equally good reason not to fine tune a universe. Indeed God might not have any reason to create anything at all (perhaps a perfect being would have no desire to create anything), making the probability less than the other options. So what makes God having a reason not to fine tune the universe any less improbable than the fine tuning occurring by chance?
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