1 | Theoretical Philosophy » Kant and PSR » 3/14/2018 8:30 pm |
- Marty
- Replies: 42
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Again: That's missing the point. Your response is well-known historically and doesn't work. And honestly, I'm about done. You can hold that position, but all it will do is ignore Kant. If you want to ignore Kantianism for realism that's fine, but that's just ignoring these issues.
| Theoretical Philosophy » Kant and PSR » 3/14/2018 8:12 pm |
- Marty
- Replies: 42
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And I've already answered to you that we can know the noumenon exists, in the negative sense. When Kant mentions we can't know the noumenon, he means it in the positive sense. All the noumenon becomes is merely an epistemic limit - hence the appeal to dual-aspect views. But you seem to be dealing with ontological differences between phenomenon and noumenon, which I don't think is tenable.
| Theoretical Philosophy » Kant and PSR » 3/14/2018 8:10 pm |
- Marty
- Replies: 42
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Miguel wrote:Since Marty doesn't answer my question, I went ahead and did some research in case I was gettng Kant's positions confused. This is from the SEP:
Despite the fact that Kant devotes an entirely new section of the Critique to the branches of special metaphysics, his criticisms reiterate some of the claims already defended in both the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic. Indeed, two central teachings from these earlier portions of the Critique — the transcendental ideality of space and time, and the critical limitation of all application of the concepts of the understanding to “appearances” — already carry with them Kant's rejection of “ontology (metaphysica generalis).” Accordingly, in the Transcendental Analytic Kant argues against any attempt to acquire knowledge of “objects in general” through the formal concepts and principles of the understanding, taken by themselves alone. In this connection, Kant denies that the principles or rules of either general logic (e.g., the principle of contradiction), or those of his own “transcendental logic” (the pure concepts of the understanding) by themselves yield knowledge of objects. These claims follow from Kant's well-known “kind distinction” between the understanding and sensibility, together with the view that knowledge requires the cooperation of both faculties. This position, articulated throughout the Analytic, entails that independently of their application to intuitions, the concepts and principles of the understanding are mere forms of thought which cannot yield knowledge of objects.
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For if no intuition could be given corresponding to the concept, the concept would still be a thought, so far as its form is concerned, but would be without any object, and no knowledge of anything would be possible by means of it. So far as I could know, there would be nothing, and could be nothing, to which my thought could be applied. B147
We thus find one general comp
| Theoretical Philosophy » Kant and PSR » 3/14/2018 8:09 pm |
- Marty
- Replies: 42
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Miguel wrote:
So? Kant would be perfectly okay with the assertion that we can have knowledge about objects from first principles alone, such as PNC, with no need for experience? I thought it was part of his critique of metaphysics.
Anyway, after I repeat my question for the 7th or 8th time I hope I'll get an answer.The PNC is not an object.
| Theoretical Philosophy » Kant and PSR » 3/14/2018 7:09 pm |
- Marty
- Replies: 42
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Miguel wrote:UGADawg wrote:
Miguel, is there not a sense in which you're failing to distinguish between PNC and other truths w.r.t. the analytic / synthetic distinction?
Truths about spatio-temporal reality, or categorical relations e.g. substance / accident and cause / effect, are synthetic. Kant's whole project was concerned with showing how synthetic a priori knowledge of this sort was possible, in answer of which he argued that the the forms of sensibility and understanding must be the case w.r.t. the phenomena, which goes a long way in explaining why he thinks they cannot be predicated of the noumena.
But this says nothing of analytic truths, i.e. it seems to me Kant could happily accept that they apply everywhere and always, while noting this is irrelevant as it regards the more synthetic truths, of which PSR would be one example.
So I'm not seeing any contradiction.
Are you replying to my PSR argument or my PNC argument?
What I'm saying about PNC is because AFAIK Kant denies that the first principles of thought by themselves can give us knowledge about things; for us to know anything about an object it must be given in experience, thus he goes on to talk about the transcendental conditions of experience. But to me this is in contradiction with the fact that PNC gives us real knowledge about real objects even if we never experience them; PNC is a direct insight into being and its nature as such, and therefore PNC by itself gives us a knowledge of objects.
As I said, if Kant would be okay with what I said, then my objection would be blocked, but that's not something he can be okay with AFAIK.
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I was waiting for it.
| Theoretical Philosophy » Kant and PSR » 3/12/2018 5:15 pm |
- Marty
- Replies: 42
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Miguel wrote:Marty wrote:
It is true that there is a nounemon. As for something being "in" the noumenon I just don't know what that even would mean.
Sure, and it would have to be true that the noumenon is bound by the principle of non-contradiction, the noumenon must be logically coherent and subjected to PNC, and likewise that whatever could go on in the noumenon would have to be logically coherent and not contradictory in any way. We have to be able to affirm a true fact of the matter about the noumenon regarding the principle of non-contradiction.
None of this would be acceptable for a transcendental idealist to say, I'm aware. That's why I (and many) take transcendental idealism to be demonstrably false.You think Immanuel Kant wouldn't affirm that the noumenon exists, and that we can't apply its existence as oppose to its nonexistence?
Exactly where does Kant say this? That we can't apply the PNC in the sense that the noumenon is, as opposed to it not existing? I'm bewildered at your background in Kant.
| Theoretical Philosophy » Kant and PSR » 3/11/2018 10:12 pm |
- Marty
- Replies: 42
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It is true that there is a nounemon. As for something being "in" the noumenon I just don't know what that even would mean.
| Theoretical Philosophy » Kant and PSR » 3/11/2018 6:57 pm |
- Marty
- Replies: 42
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I mean, I don't see what the PNC has to do with anything, though.
| Theoretical Philosophy » Kant and PSR » 3/11/2018 11:56 am |
- Marty
- Replies: 42
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Miguel wrote:Marty wrote:Miguel wrote:
Can you affirm the following fact of the noumenon?
"No being can both be and not be in the same aspect at the same time"
If you can't give affirm this as a fact of the matter of what goes on in the noumenon (yes, this completely goes against Kant, that's the point), then transcendental idealism is false.
Can you rule out contradictions in the noumenon without saying anything positive about it?Considering there is no sense of time w.r.t to noumenon - if I were to even consider it in the positive sense which Kant rejects - then where's the contradiction that that something is both the same thing and not the same thing at the same time? Since time again isn't noumenal?
The "at the same time" in most formulations of PNC is not actually what we call time. In fact, you may drop it from the proposition if you will. It is enough that "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be"m just like God can't both be and not be (even though God is not in time; the "at the same time" is just a rejoinder commonly used for PNC). PNC is obviously not limited to time and never has been thought so, either by Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, or whoever. So we can drop all references to what seems like time and formulate it as I did. I ask again: after all, can you affirm that of the noumenon? Can you say that there aren't and can be no contradictions, no violations of PNC, in the noumenon? Can you say that without saying anything positive about it? Can you say it's true even in the noumenon that "it is impossible for a thing to be and not be"? If you can't, then transcendental idealism is false.That's fine. I wasn't the one who brought it up.
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I don't see how the latter follows at all without begging the question.
| Theoretical Philosophy » Kant and PSR » 3/06/2018 11:17 pm |
- Marty
- Replies: 42
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Miguel wrote:Marty wrote:UGADawg wrote:
Marty one worry I have is while this two-aspect view seems to avoid the straightforwardly contradictory aspects of the two-world view, it seems to leave the noumena so empty of any positive content that it's a wonder why they get posited at all. At this point, why even think it's real? Do Kant / Allison conclusively show that the two aspects don't completely overlap? Etc.
On the section of the problem of affection:
“In Wittgensteinian terms, Kant was not trying to say what is unsayable, but merely to define the boundaries of what can be said or asked. In order to do so, however, he had to introduce the “metalanguage” of transcendental philosophy. Thus, such expression as “things as they are in themselves,” “noumena,” the “transcendental object,” and their correlates are to be understood as technical terms within this metalanguage rather than referring to transcendentally real entities.” – Henry E. Allsion
So the entire projection of Kant's work is to prove how transcendental idealism just is tenable in this way, through this metalanguage, to apply to these limitations, to give the transcendental deduction, etc.
ust like a insect who doesn't apprehend the world in the way a human might apprehend it due to clear epistemic limits, a human has limits too, and I'm just not sure why is so controverisal to posit these things. We might think we're very clever, but I'm not sure how it would be in principle possible to know everything about the world. Perhaps even logically impossible?Miguel wrote:
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I have only briefly mentioned it, but (perhaps I am mistaken, but it's my impression) a true Kantian would have to reject the principle of non-contradiction applies in the noumenon; he would have to think of it merely as part of our rational experience and not as a true fabric of the world. So for the Kantian we