John West wrote:

Last one: I've been at it for two days and I'm about to wind down with something nonphilosophical (Yukio Mishima's Runaway Horses, I think). I'm posting mainly to help clarify the discussion (if not for you gentlemen then for others reading you):

Calhoun wrote:

Also that does seem like somewhat odd definition of contingent, I think contingency is essentially a modal notion, it doesn't have some essential connection to explanations. Its just something that could not have existed, some state of affairs that could otherwise have not obtained. If something doesn't have any sort of explanation , it doesn't seem to necessarily follow that its thereby necessary as it still might not have existed. At least this is how I grasp the concept of contingency.

It's worth distinguishing modal contingency from dependent contingency. x is modally contingent if and only if x is possibly nonexistent if existent and possibly existent if nonexistent; x is dependently contingent if and only if there is some y such that (i) x is not identical to y; (ii) necessarily, if x exists, then y exists; (iii) y is in some sense the ground or source of x's existence. (The definition of modal contingency can also be put in possible worlds jargon: x is modally contingent if and only if x exists in some possible worlds but not others.) You're obviously right that it's unorthodox to call dependently contingent beings “contingent beings” without further qualification, but Monkey stipulates that is what he's doing at the start of his post so I don't really see a problem.

Right, got it. 
Well like I said I thought contingency is essentially a modal notion. It seems its better to just call dependent contingency, dependency. That would still get the whole point of the argument across I think.

Noble_monkey wrote:

Since the totality of contingent beings is contingent then it must have an external explanation. 

This is a very controversial claim. Problem is that it seems totality of contingent beings(if there is one , this might also be controversial just like "conjunction of all contingently true propositions" is) is not itself some further contingent being or a being at all. Its a heap and that could have merely internal explanation.
 

Argyement looks pretty strong, I guess critic will try to either endorse some radical modal sceptism ( rejecting modal premises) or reject S5.

From what I gather, Its actually quite difficult to say what kind of metaphysics science presupposes by looking at various scientific theories. Means from simply science its very difficult to get true ontology of the world, Although science does successfully discard certain class of views. I have seen philosophers argue that different aspects of science in fact entail contradictory metaphysical views or atleast leave too much open metaphysical questions. Some philosophers of science basically then try to eliminate the subject entirely from our ontology based on there being open questions on it for example Objects or Substances are eliminated by Ontic Structural realists because of the same considerations, from what I understand.

In a recent book which I haven't read but from its abstract the author Anjan Chakravartty argues that "In crucial respects, ontology is in the eye of the beholder: it is informed by underlying commitments with implications for the limits of inquiry, which inevitably vary across rational inquirers. As a result, the proper scope of ontology is subject to a striking form of voluntary choice, yielding a new and transformative conception of scientific ontology"

So maybe then to certain extent metaphysical presupposition of Science are decided by inquirers themselves.

You might want to check out this book.

https://www.amazon.com/Scientific-Ontology-Integrating-Naturalized-Epistemology/dp/0190651458

Also I would recommend "Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized" By James Ladyman and others, I think this is the most sophisticated defense of scientism and naturalism, I don't know if its successful and It seem Ontic-Structural realism is the most viable alternative to A-T philosophy at least more than what appears to be versions of atomism, although its not much engaged with by ATist yet. Its also uploaded online by some atheist blogger I think, try google

Greg wrote:

Calhoun wrote:

Good points, but still responses to POE might not essentially depend on Utiltitarianism but some of them seem to take notion of "greater good" along the same lines.

Partly I think theists responding to POE take on some of the assumptions involved in the problem itself. There are good reasons to do that, as it is best to reject as little as possible of the argument one is disputing. But it seems to me that some replies to POE presuppose utilitarianism because POE does. That is, POE claims that even if some goods are only possible because evil is possible (i.e., goods associated with free choice or salvation), the evil in the world seems to outweigh the good, or else that as much good could be produced without the evil. But that is a pretty utilitarian way of setting up the problem.

Correct, most versions do seem to do that, Just to make a note here though there are some which seem to be based on deontological premises , what some philosophers of religion call commonsense POE and as I understand , which basically takes evidence on non-inferential basis, based on a seeming. I think Trent Dougherty has argued that justification of premise that there is gratuitous evil can be based on Phenomenal conservatism. 

IF this is correct then these are some ways to setup non Utilitarian POE I think.