Jeremy Taylor, 

Perhaps it is just because I have little interest in analytical philosophy of religion, even theistic. It seems to have no bearing to the great thinkers and spiritual traditions of mankind.

I take your point. I don't know what religious tradition you are coming from, but for me, I have a spiritual duty to evangelize to this group of lost souls. They might have completely missed the point, but I still have to engage with their arguments. That said,  it really isn't much of a chore for me, it is always a lot of fun. 

I'd be much more interested in seeing Christians seriously engage with Indian or Islamic thought ​(I have it in mind to try and present some Madhyanika arguments against substance if I have time).

I would love to see that. I have been wanting to get into Indian philosophy, but haven't gotten around to it yet. 
 

First of all regarding Logical problem of evil, well its difficult to really establish that ,it has been ever since Free-will theodicies or defenses became a thing ..but in recent years many philosophers have criticized this free-will response to it,and some have tried to formulate other better versions too, I am not sure about their success though, suffice to say Logical POE is far from dead. 

I don't know... I think it still dead, but the body is still twitching. I haven't encountered any arguments like the one you described above, but I have encountered some papers that try and revive the Logical PoE. They weren't very good... The free-will defense isn't even necessary. I think Plantinga's paper just showed that the Emporer has no clothes. The logical incompatibility argument has a ludicrous burden of proof. I don't need the free will defense to think that the logical PoE fails. 

About Argument 3... the most intimidating and touching aspect of J.L Schellenberg's formulation of the argument is that there probably are people who had no such experience ever and through no fault of their own(in other words non-culpable disbelief) and that, the argument goes is incompatible with perfectly loving God. 

Yes, Schellenberg's formulation is indeed the best. And I am one such person who hasn't had an encounter with God that a naturalist couldn't reasonably doubt. But I had a long correspondence with a cousin of mine concerning Schellenberg's DH argument, and I was never satisfied with Schellenberg's thoughts about when the inference is valid. He argues that for any time t that a person is non-resistantly in a state of non-belief, God should make himself known to them. But why any time? Perhaps a person's maturity is such that, if God was to make himself known to them at some time t1, they would be less willing to pursue closeness with him then if God were to make himself known at some later time [i]t2

What I would briefly ask you here is which account is that you ultimately want to defend?

I take it the two accounts you are referring to are my general account of meaning and my specific account of meaning (just for the sake of clarity). I am happy to defend both, just so long as it's clear that they succeed or fail on their own merits. Obviously, the general account does most of the work for addressing Megill and Linford's paper, so it will be the most important so far as that goes. 

Like I said above there seem to be other problems with your views too which I point out. If you address them I think your counter-argument might succeed.

O.K. I will try and address them below  

[T]he problem is that it seems very hard to contemplate the content of  this relationship..
Maybe I should try to be more clear on this question ..for example ..what makes ordinary personal relationships meaning full is their content like our friendship with our colleagues is meaningful because I enjoy their company,they talk to me about all the interesting topics,they pay for food bills ..etc ,or ones relationship with their spouse is meaningful because of ..well all the goods that come from marriage ...and Like my correspondence with you is meaningful because we are discussing a very interesting topic...Its these goods in context of relationships that make it more or less meaningful or which really define these relationships (you might find some of it more meaningful than the rest

Hmm… this is complicated. I am having trouble getting my mind around it. I think I am with you on this point. Relationships must have content to be relationships, and the nature of the content greatly effects the meaning, but I just want to clarify some things. First, that it is not just the positive content that adds to meaning. If my relationship with my sister involved me dropping everything I am doing to drive three ho

Wow, there were some really good responses there, particularly concerning argument three. I think argument three is the toughest argument by far. In fact, I am going to mull it over a bit more. For this post, I want to focus on removing some of the confusion concerning the account of meaning I put forward. It is probably best to make sure we are clear on that before we move on to anything else. 

Wait, This is a little confusing, weren't you of the view that meaning of life was having union with God?

No. My view is that our ultimate purpose is union with God, but I thought I was very careful to separate ultimate purpose from meaning. I understand the confusion, though. I effectively developed a bunch of jargon, defined each once, then started using it as if that was all the explaining it took. Allow me another attempt to clarify. Below I lay out key terms, then outline my general account of meaning (which is the abstract framework that I think a full account of meaning will follow), and then finish with what I have said concerning my specific account of meaning (which is the particulars that fit into the abstract framework). I hope this helps. 

Key Terms

Meaning: A life lived for a certain purpose.

Purpose:  An end for which one acts

Value: The condition of being desirable

Ultimate Purpose:  The purpose for which God made us, one proper to our essence and which we can find ultimate fulfillment in.

Notice that all of these definitions are unchanged since I put them forward in my first post. 

QED's General Account of Meaning

Alright, first let's get this straight, I don't think meaning in life is only possible in a world with God. If you take a close look at the key terms above you can probably see that. After all, meaning as far as I am concerned is just living one's life for some purpose, and we can live for purposes even if God didn't exist. I said as much in a few of my posts. For example:

[i]I think a meaningfu

Okay, I will share my thoughts of the remaining arguments. 

Argument Three: 

Argument three is pretty good. Since it argues against strictly theistic meanings of life, ie. that meaning in life is only possible in a world with God, and my position is a more inclusive theistic theory, ie. that meaning might be possible without God, but God still adds something rich to our account of meaning, I am content to ignore it. That said, there is something that I think the argument misses. Also, I think the argument could possibly be modified to attack my position, so I will comment on those both below. 

First, what I think the argument misses. The authors begin their argument with this inference: Suppose that God is necessary for our lives to have meaning.  But then, the meaning of life must arise through some sort of relation, whatever it might be, that we stand in with respect to God; for if no such relation between us and God is needed for life to have meaning[i], then our lives could have [/i]meaning independently of God. This is where I think the go wrong because there is a type of strictly theistic theory of meaning that does not hold that meaning must be a relation between us and God. It is all theories that think meaning depends on something (y), where y is not God, but y is something that can only exist in a world in which God exists. For example, suppose someone believed, like me, that meaning is found in living for a purpose that is objectively valuable, but also believed that things can only be objectively valuable in a world with God. This hypothetical person would not be convinced by argument three, and rightly. However, it is possible that it is this sort of move that Megill and Linford tried to pre-emptively avoid with their distinction between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility. I am still hazy on those concepts.

Now for how I the argument might be mod