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Theoretical Philosophy » What Would a Thomistic Account of Vagueness Be? » 4/30/2017 8:50 am

truthseeker
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The phenomenon of vagueness can be exhibited by the sorites paradox. Consider the following argument:

(1) A million grains of sand is a heap.
(2) A heap minus one grain is still a heap.
Therefore,
(C) one grain of sand is a heap.

(C) contradicts the obvious truth that one grain of sand is not a heap. To avoid (C) one must deny the validity of the argument, or deny (1) or (2). (1) is obvious. Furthermore the argument seems valid by the principle of mathematical induction.

Can we deny (2)? If (2) is false then there has to be some exact number of grains which define a heap. But it would seem "heap" is a vague predicate, or concept: it cannot be defined exactly.

Seemingly true principles and propositions imply a contradiction. Accordingly we have a paradox. And similar paradoxes can be developed for many other vague predicates, such as "bald," "rich," "red," and so on.

Vagueness raises interesting philosophical questions. Is there a resolution to the sorites paradox? How should we reason with vague terms or concepts? Is vagueness just a defect of our language or thought, or is there vagueness in reality itself?

The notion of vagueness is also relevant to some political issues. Consider arguments over abortion hinging on where the cutoff is between a cluster of cells and a person, and the transgender advocate's slogan that gender exists on a spectrum.

I hope I have made it tolerably clear what I mean by "vagueness" and you have a sense of some philosophical issues raised by it. This preface having been given, I pose two questions: 

What would a Thomistic account of vagueness be?
How would a Thomist resolve the sorites paradox?


 

Chit-Chat » Corpora Worth Studying? » 1/06/2017 4:35 am

truthseeker
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Thank you for your reply Jeremy. I am most interested in wisdom teaching/gnosis.

Chit-Chat » Corpora Worth Studying? » 1/05/2017 2:06 pm

truthseeker
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In the past, certain cultures set aside collections of texts they deemed significant. Examples of such collections are religious corpora, such as the Bible and Vedas; corpora of philosophers, such as those of Plato and Aristotle; and corpora of great authors, such as those of Homer and Shakespeare. 

What corpora do you think are worth studying? I am particularly interested in lesser-known corpora, like the Avesta or the Chinese classics.

Theoretical Philosophy » Aquinas' Definition of Being » 7/22/2015 10:12 am

truthseeker
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First of all, I want to clarify that I used the word 'predicable' to mean what would be called 'property' by many contemporary philosophers. I wanted to avoid 'property' because that term has a different meaning in Scholastic philosophy. Perhaps I should've used the word 'accident?'

Anyway, I agree that not every predicate expresses a property (i.e. a predicable). If we assume certain predicates express properties we get a contradiction (e.g. 'is believed by the Greeks to be identical to Hesperus'–– tell me if I need to explain that). But why should we assume that 'exists' doesen't express the property of existence? Furthermore, if there's no property of existence, then what is existence?

John West wrote:

...I should expand by saying that properties are grounded in a substance and can be actualized (are actual or potencies) in virtue of a specific essence or form tied up with the matter of the substance.

When you say 'essence or form' is the 'or' the 'or' of synonymy or the 'or' of disjunction? That is, is essence the same as form? I was assuming a form was a property, which would imply that a substance could have many forms. But you seem to speak rather of a substance having a single form with different aspects.

Theoretical Philosophy » Aquinas' Definition of Being » 7/19/2015 3:34 pm

truthseeker
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I was assuming that 'form' is a synonym for 'predicable.' Are forms and predicables not the same? If not, what is the difference between the two?

Theoretical Philosophy » Aquinas' Definition of Being » 7/16/2015 3:18 pm

truthseeker
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Would it be correct to say that being is the form that an existing thing has, as greenness is the form that a green thing has?

Theoretical Philosophy » Seeking Clarification of Feser's Philosophy » 7/16/2015 3:04 pm

truthseeker
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Timocrates wrote:

I'm hoping I'm making sense here 

You are making sense. I need some time to study what's been written here and in other threads. 

Theoretical Philosophy » Seeking Clarification of Feser's Philosophy » 7/12/2015 3:34 pm

truthseeker
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The following post does not fully take into account the exchange between ArmandoAlvarez and Timocrates that occurred since my last post. Important as the concepts in that exchange are, my concern right now is just with Parmenides' and Zeno's arguments and why they lead us to the act/potency distinction.

First of all, I'd like to retract one of my earlier statements. I have been understanding Being in this discussion as the sum of everything that is, at any time. I concede, Timocrates, that what I said earlier about the possibility of a scenario in which beings change but Being does not was illogical. For if beings change, Being is composed of a certain state of affairs at one time but not another, and thus Being has different features at different times, and therefore changes since the definition of 'change' is 'the having of different features at different times.'

I do not believe, however, there is any contradiction in Being changing in this manner. Furtheremore, it can be the case that Being changes and everything is changed by something else. For Being could be changed by the changing of one of its constitutents. You seem to concede as much in this exchange with ArmandoAlvarez:

ArmandoAlvarez wrote:

 Components of the animal cause changes to other components of the animal," why couldn't we also say that about "being"? (i.e. some entities that constitute part of "being" in general cause changes to other entities.)





Timocrates wrote:

Once we grant plurality to being... change then becomes logically possible.





The changing of one of Being's constitutents would be caused by the changing of another of Being's constituents. E.g., in the scenario of the man with the stick pushing the stone, when the stone changes its location from not being in front of the hole at one time to being in front of the hole at another time, the stone changes because the man pushes the stone with the stick during the int

Theoretical Philosophy » Seeking Clarification of Feser's Philosophy » 7/11/2015 11:54 am

truthseeker
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John West wrote:

Okay. I take being-in-act (actuality) as a self-evident feature of reality.

I agree.

John West wrote:

With that in mind, I think your question can be reduced to the question, “Is there a way any one thing can become that it isn't already without ceasing to exist because of a change in identity?” If there is, then that thing has potencies.
I'll stop here for now. I

I don't think your last statement is necessarily true. But if you want to stop here for now, I'll wait until our discussion restarts to discuss the matter further.
 

Theoretical Philosophy » Seeking Clarification of Feser's Philosophy » 7/11/2015 11:48 am

truthseeker
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Timocrates wrote:

truthseeker wrote:

Let me state to be what I take to be an argument equivalent to the rendtion of Parmenides's argument DanielCC presented in the thread to which you linked:

1. Everything that changes is changed by something else.
2. Being and only Being exists.
C. Therefore, nothing changes.

This argument is valid. One can avoid the conclusion by accepting one of the following:

~1. Something that changes is changed by itself.
~2. Something other than Being exists.

One can refute the above rendition of Parmenides without invoking potency.

But that just raises the problem again. How can Being - 'the All' - "change itself"? This would seem to imply its imparting to itself something that it lacked. But being lacks nothing and the only thing other to being is nothing/nothingness. Being would thus, in any change, become
- even more being or
- less being or
- no being
In any change. Therefore being would remain unchangeable.

I concede that in the scenario of my response to Parmenides' argument, the sum of every being, i.e. Being, would remain unchangeable. But I have no objection to Being remaining unchangeable. What matters is that Being remaining unchangeable be compatible with something changing. And Being remaining unchanngeable is compatible with something changing in my scenario.

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