RomanJoe wrote:

I'm in a similar boat. Often I find fideism to be a healthy default position for a skeptic insofar as it can preserve your sanity, and in my experience, stave off nihilistic thoughts. What do you think, among human beings regularly considered morally valuable, is a condition for their moral value?

I'm re-reading [url=https://www.amazon.com/Latome-singe-cannibale-théologique-origines-ebook/dp/B01BMDSFR8/]L'atome, le singe et le cannibale[/url] from Jean-Michel Maldamé. There's a whole chapter on morality, and why, as humans, we have things to do concerning morality, where animals don't.

RomanJoe wrote:

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:

For me, at conception. Why? Prudence. Since I don't know, I believe that it should be respected at least from the earliest stages of its existence.

So do you view abortion more as negligence than murder, considering that you're not sure whether or not the embryo or fetus is morally valuable but--prudence demands--we treat it as such to avoid the possibility of infringing upon a human being's right to life?

I still view it as murder, but out of pure fideism, from the teachings of the Church - as I still haven't found the time to fully study the question.

Reading Dawkins. Honestly. If you take him seriously, along his scientisticatheisticantitheistic pen pals, they're the best apologists FOR theism (after Rosenberg, I think).

In what way is this different from "the fact you believe God exists is not a proof that God exists"? Or "we naturally evolved to believe in God, therefore our belief in God is not necessarily warranted by our evolution"?
In other words, is there something new here, beside conflating epistemic and subject of belief?

In your text, replace "belief in God" by "belief in X", where X is anything. The argument doesn't change.

It's basically the EEAN reworded for a naturalistic stance.

Paraschis wrote:

What are people's thoughts on here about the newly emergent field of CSR? Many philosophers working in CSR have crafted novel religion-debunking arguments based on the field's findings, according to which CSR has shown that religious beliefs, being formed and sustained by evolutionary-adapted cognitive biases, for instance, are not epistemically justifiable.

For a most recent and high-quality volume on the subject which could also be useful as an introduction to the research and the debates over it, I would suggest Advances in Religion, Cognitive Science and Experimental Philosophy (2016). For the more religiously uncommitted amongst us, I would recommend A Natural History of Natural Theology: The Congnitive Science of Theology and Philosophy of Religion (2015), which deals with arguments relevant to classical theism, such as the cosmological argument(s). 

I don't see how you can make the assertion that "religious beliefs, being formed and sustained by evolutionary-adapted cognitive biases" to say that they are "not epistemically justifiable" to end with "novel religion-debunking arguments". What's new from that? I've given the books you quoted a read, but from what I found, nothing presented there is a "religion-debunking argument".