ClassicalLiberal.Theist wrote:

ForumUser wrote:

I've been reading Ed Feser's Aquinas and after finishing with his discussion of Aquinas' First Way, and midway into the Second Way, it appears to me he neglected to answer the objection that a per se causal series can terminate with a natural thing. The rock's motion depends on the stick which depends on the hand, muscles, electrical stimuli, brain neurons, atoms, quarks. Is a quark made of anything? Perhaps not. Apparently not? Why doesn't the buck stop there, as far as this 'unmoved mover' argument is concerned? Why must you instead necessarily arrive at God, Creator of the Universe, for any per se causal event (or observation of some motion, i.e. potential becoming actualized)?
 

Per se causal series, can not even in principle, terminate in a natural thing. They must terminate in necessity and all natural things are contigent. Thus, they don't fit the bill. Attempting to end a per se causal series of contigent things, with a contigent thing (which would be all natural things, even if they're small), is incoherent. I could give you a more in-depth response, if you wish.

You'll definitely need to elaborate for me, because it is not self-evident that all matter and energy is contingent.

I also do not see how the fact that a collection of quarks was positioned at (x,y,z) instead of (x', y', z') prior to someone moving a stone with a stick implies God's existence. To phrase my problem another way, it is not clear to me why God's existence must be the brute fact rather than the universe's existence (i.e. the set of all matter and energy).

The only thing he says is that if it has potency, then that potency must be actualized and hence it isn't the terminus of a per se series. I do not see how that applies to quarks as the fundamental constituents of matter. It appears to me that their only potency is being in one place rather than another -- namely, their current location rather than a different one, and this potency has no bearing on the fact that they were triggered by present stimuli (according to naturalism) to collectively form a neuron firing to move a limb to move a stick to move a rock. So the idea that the terminus of a per se series must be 'pure actuality' and hence be God seems simply false.

Or, if one must explain why the quarks are being held together by the nuclear forces to form atoms, then it seems to me we are equally justified to say that this recurring observation (which we refer to as the strong force and weak force) "just exists" as a brute fact, rather than say that "God exists to cause the strong force and weak force to exist" as a brute fact. I mean, I do not see any justification for declaring God to be the brute fact rather than the apparent laws of nature as the brute fact. In other words, we can say "It is in the universe's nature to exist" more easily than we can say "It is in God's nature to exist, and God holds the universe in existence". (The former accounts for our suffering; the latter does not, and hence holds greater explanatory power. That is, if we regard 'God' as the god of Abraham, rather than merely an indifferent clockmaker-type deistic god.)

I think I can see the understanding that metaphysics "underlies" physical science, and I used to agree with this assertion without thinking much about it when I was first introduced to the ideas. But now I do not know what RomanJoe means by saying 'an explanation of change as such': It seems he's merely given a particular definition to the word 'change'; Jeremy Taylor, why is an argument 'needed' to show how change is possible? What do you even mean by the phrase, 'how change is possible'? 'how X is possible' I think means, "what causes can make X into a reality", i.e. "what can cause X". (for example, X = ice to melt) By insisting that 'change' itself be a /situation/ rather than a verb, I think you are effectively 'begging the question' by assuming from the beginning the Aquinas-definition of 'change'. If, rather, 'change' is simply a verb meaning X goes to Y, then "How is change possible?" is a meaningless question, an improper combination of words: The listener must respond by seeking clarification, "How which change is possible?" If you intend to ask about all things that change, then the answer is trite: "Each effect appears to have its own cause."

I would like to try to focus attention directly on my problem that this metaphysics Feser presents is not necessarily 'real', but rather a model we've created:

Suppose a man surveys a river near a forest, and declares that there's potential to build a bridge over the river, that the river "has the potential to be bridged". At this point, all we know clearly exists is the man, the river, and the forest. The "potential" the man sees in the system is his own idea about what is possible in the future. He does not see this 'potential' the same way that he sees 'the river'. It does not exist in the same way. It does not clearly exist at all. What appears to exist, rather, is that his interaction with the river and forest triggered his neurons to synapse in certain ways. My concern is that Feser and others (any ar

I am trying to read through Ed Feser's Aquinas, but I am hitting numerous obstacles on each page. I think I should get answers to these questions before proceeding with this book. As for my background, I have a Bachelor of Science in Physics, a Master of Medical Physics, and am pursuing a PhD in the Biomedical Sciences. I've read through the Bible, Catechism of the Catholic Church, Quran, and many Christian apologetics (Kreeft, Kreeft & Tacelli, CS Lewis, Michael Waldstein, papal documents, etc) and watched numerous YouTube debates.

I originally wrote these comments, objections, and questions originally posed to Dr. Feser while reading (referencing page numbers); I think you can understand without reference to the book, however.

"Act and potency"

1. Comment: You claim redness is an aspect of the ball's being (p. 10), but rather color is a function of the radiation bouncing off of it. I can make sense of your argument if I think instead of the frequencies of radiation it absorbs: That (as we currently understand) /is/ an aspect of its being.

2. Objection (p 10): Why believe this metaphysical model [about actualization and potentiality, and change being the actualization of potential rather than the breaking of atomic bonds; rather than leftover pizza absorbing radiation from the microwave, "the microwave actualizes the pizza's warmth"?] instead of our modern physical models? In other words, "How can change occur?" seems like a meaningless question, and to give it meaning, one must invent or presuppose this system of "metaphysics". Instead of saying "Change occurs when potency is reduced to act," one can instead be satisfied with, "Change occurs when atoms interact": Why do we need this metaphysics at all?

3. Objection: You say potentiality is "rooted in a thing's nature" (11), but is it not rather rooted in our own minds? Does aluminium have the potential to spark regardless of whether the microwave has been invented? It appears if a set of objects gain a