surroundx wrote:

Space, and here I'm not just talking about "empty space" (which is a qualified negation), is a universal negation: nothingness. And thus has no extension and no limits. There is nothing to stop you from actual locomotion in a fixed direction forever. There is no finite upper limit to the quantity of extension that may be instantiated at a given instant. For any finite number of existing objects, another object could always begin to exist and thus take up more previously empty space.

Are you saying that *space* = nothingness?  And there are different version on nothingness?  Some versions qualified and some unqualified?

Sorry, having a hard time following your theory.  Is there something I should read to get a background?

surroundx wrote:

Do you think that an actual infinite is metaphysically possible?

I can't answer you unless I understand what what you think *nothing* and *infinite* mean.

surroundx wrote:

If there are no things and no space between them, then one cannot insert a third existing cube between them. However, space is not a thing, but rather the negation of things, and so there being nothing between two cubes does not entail that they are conjoined.

I think we are in agreement that space is different than a materially existing object and is also different than nothing.  But I disagree that if there is nothing between 2 objects that they not are conjoined.  Because what determines that there is a single material object is a boundary.  If there is nothing between 2 objects, there is no boundary between them, and so they must be considered a single object. 

surroundx wrote:

Absolutely size matters. However, the size of the gap is determined through negation. Imagine that space is singularly horizontal and totals 10, and each of two cubes take up 1 space each. Then 8 spaces are unoccupied, either in virtue of the unactualised potential for a further 8 cubes to exist, or in virtue of the actualised potential for 2 cubes to exist (10-8=2 is the same as 10-2=8). The potential distance between the two cubes ranges from a maximum of 8 to a minimum of 0. The actual distance is determined by locomotion.

But I think you are using the act/potency distinction ambiguously.
For you mention in one place there actually are 10 units of which 2 are actually occupied, implying that the sense of what is actual is 10 possible spaces.  So both spaces and things occupying them exist independently of each other.

But then it seems you shift focus exclusively to objects alone.
Almost like that you consider material objects as a default condition and the lack of objects as a privation of material objects but not quite, because this particular "privation" has at least some positive qualities.  Is this correct?

surroundx wrote:

bmiller wrote:

I don't think parsimony alone should determine the plausibility of an argument.
There are other factors to consider such as the argument's explanatory power.

But of course a person will believe what he wants to believe.

Isn't explanatory power just the PoP in disguise? Explaining two facts with one entity is better than explaining two facts with two entities. Since it results in a smaller ontological expansion.

I don't believe what I want to believe. I simply strive not to have a bloated ontology.

No I don't think parsimony is about explanatory power.  It just means that arguments should dispense with things that are meaningless additions to the argument.   As Greg mentioned the fact that an argument has more or fewer steps by itself does not mean it is true.

What I meant by belief is that we have an intellect and and a will.  The intellect functions to determine what is rational, but the will determines what we believe to be true.  Basically we can fall to confirmation bias.

What would you call the absence of any qualities whatsoever?

@surroundx,

surroundx wrote:

bmiller wrote:

But then it seems the argument is actually about ontology in the first place.
Theists maintain that God is essential for things to exist.  Atheists maintain that God is not essential for things to exist.  The arguments contradict each other so Fred could not rationally hold that both are true.  Parsimony would only tighten up each argument to be more concise. 

H2 is God, but H1 doesn't have to be atheism. It could be another god hypothesis. Say a unitarian god. It's just an example anyway. H2 could be something entirely different (viz. non-theistic). The point is that if H1 is simpler, and H2 non-essential, and yet the person already accepts H2 on other grounds but not H1, then choosing H1 would involve an expansion to their ontology.

OK.  May I ask if what you are getting at is: 
1) Brute facts the simplest explanation for anything
2) Parsimony dictates that we should accept the the simplest explanation
3) Therefore we should accept that existence is a brute fact.

Is this the gist of your inquiry?