seigneur wrote:

Why do I have to teach you how to conduct a discussion?

The topic is "I hate libertarianism", on the example of Ayn Rand's objectivism. The task for libertarians is to change the OP's mind or correct his opinions.

We got so far as to agree that Ayn Rand is "BS". But without Ayn Rand, what is libertarianism and who is libertarian? No explanation thus far, except that we should read Eric Mack's recent book.

I take Libertarianism alone as an economic policy. Thus libertarian Christians and other non-objectivists would argue that it is the economic system that promotes the greatest social flourishing given the average of human nature. Of course one could try to make the same point with Communism if one so wanted. 

Due_Kindheartedness wrote:

@DanielCC unfortunately that thread doesn't give a definition of what freedom is. Is it "the ability to pursue multiple options and not be punished for taking advantage of this ability" or is it "being unlimited"?

Neither and no one said it had to be either of those. Freedom is constituted, at least partially, by the principle of alternate possibilities.

Ouros wrote:

@DanielCC

Too strong in what sense? Libertarian free will I suppose?
I'm incline to think that libertarian free will should be able to give us contrastive explanation.

I concur. This is the route I would take.

Ouros wrote:

I got the impression that some atheist would say that axiological perfection would make the world worst, because it would mean imperfection stand alongside perfection. I would say that it isn't a brilliant answer, too. :-).

No, it's close to a contradiction in the strictly analytical sense - by definition the presence of axiological perfection is a good rather than a bad thing.

Ouros wrote:

@DanielCC

But your first proposition would lack some contrastive explanation isn't it? Why THIS world rather than another?
It would be some half-brute explanation. What would be better for the atheist/pantheist though: modal collapse or semi-brute fact?
Something very interesting anyway is be the axiological status of God: would a world without God be better or not? I know that some atheist say that they would like that God exist. (I think Michael Tooley is like that.) But what about the angry ones? Like the New Atheists?

Such a principle would indeed fail in the case of contrastive explanation (this is one objection against Rundle’s theory). Presumably Rundle or the Rundlesque Optimalist (who is at least in a better position in that he can give a partial reason why there must be contingent being) would try to argue that a PSR allowing for contrastive explaination would be too strong even for the the theist. The Optimalist could try to deflect by making some claim that an element of randomness is better in that it adds an additional something to be grateful for I.e. that this as opposed to an equally good but very different world is actual - not that this is a brilliant answer mind but I’m playing Devil’s Advocate.

Patrick Grimm and a few others, usually billed as anti-theists, have tried to argue it would be better if God did not exist. This is not an easily defensible position though given that most theists require axiological perfect as a hallmark of God (most default to the old idea of arguing that the concept of God is incoherent).

To me this is similar to the Gale-Pruss cosmological argument albeit with causation instead of the PSR.

My only reservation would be origins essentialism - if each beings has its causal origin of necessity (in all worlds in which is exists it is caused to exist by the same being) then it makes it easier for the critic to dig their heels in and claim that some contingent beings necessarily  have their existence as a brute fact.

If I recall correctly Pruss offers an even weaker version of this argument based on counter-parts to get round origins problems (the critic would be forced to take Bede Rundle approach and argue that necessarily there exists a contingent being in every possible world).