John West, what are your thoughts on Digital Physics?

By the way, I did read the paper. I was wondering if "I have hands" could still be true under SH.

John West, whether or not there is a fleshy base, couldn't "hands" be analyzed as accidental forms adhering on computer information and code? Like how medieval people knew "I have hands" but not that "hands are made of atoms." Also, if SH is true, how could we know if the base reality is "fleshy"?

I have come up with a better simulation hypothesis. It is a version of Bostrom's argument, which can be found here: https://www.simulation-argument.com/ His argument assumes that simulants could be conscious and rational, which I of course deny. But the argument can be reconstructed as to include "neural simulations" (brains in vats and the like), which obviously would be conscious and rational. Even after this is done, though, I believe the SA still would not work, because H3 of Bostrom's trilemma is self-defeating. 

But I believe the argument can be made to use the Self-Indication Assumption. The SIA says that one should reason as if one is a random selection among all possible observers. For example, imagine this scenario: A coin is flipped. If it lands on heads,10 observers are created; if tails, 1000 observers are created. The created observers do not know how the coin landed. If they reason according to the SIA and bet on tails, 99% of observers will guess correctly. Here is a more comprehensive defense of SIA: https://arxiv.org/pdf/gr-qc/0009081 

It is obvious how this relates to SA. BIVs could be created in far greater number than real people. If H1 predicts 100 billion humans, H2 predicts 1 trillion, and H3 predicts 2 trillion, there are 3.1 trillion observers. The SIA would then say there is approximately a chance of 2/3 that H3 is correct, because it contains approx. 2/3 of all possible observers. How do I refute this?

Hello, my name is Cosmyk, and this is my first post.

One thing that I find very disturbing is the Simulation Hypothesis (SH). The SH is basically the idea that I am either a brain in a vat, or a simulated person (a "sim") who is being fed sensory data from some kind of artificially-generated simulation. In my opinion, the two best arguments for the SH are Nick Bostrom's Simulation argument and the argument from Digital Physics, made by Edward Fredkin, Brian Whitworth, and others. To find Bostrom's argument, Google "are you living in a computer simulation" and click on the first result. To find Whitworth's argument, Google "the physical world as virtual reality" and click on the first result. To find Fredkin's website, Google "Edward Fredkin" and click on the second result.

I don't believe that the arguments from Digital Physics hold much force. Digital Physics is a minority position. Current scientific evidence does not give any reason to favor it among other theories, since DP is only one interpretation among many superior ones.

Bostrom's argument, by itself, can be avoided if once accepts dualism. Humans have an immaterial nature, while sims are purely material, so no human is a sim. But I believe his argument can be reformulated to include "neural simulations", which are "brain-in-vat" scenarios, like in the movie The Matrix. Given the rise in popularity of video games, it is not unreasonable to think that in the future, many "matrices" will be created. If 50% of humans are plugged into such matrices, and we cannot tell whether or not we are in one,  the probability of us being in such a matrix is 50%. 

Digital Physics also supports the argument. Let's say one accepts that brains-in-vats (BIVs) outnumber humans, but for whatever reason still believes that one is real. In that case, one is believing an unlikelihood, namely that one was "born out of the matrix". If 50% of people are BIVs, then, if one accepts a realist theory, one should multiply one's creden