| Theoretical Philosophy » The mind-body problem: what is your solution? » 3/23/2018 4:38 pm |
- SR
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I am an idealist, which I define as the claim that there is nothing outside of consciousness. My main reason for being an idealist is that
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- all materialisms (physicalisms) have the intractable problem of how mentality can be caused by non-mentality (the so-called "hard problem of consciousness"). (Property dualism does not have a reason why the underlying substance with physical and mental properties should be considered physical.)
- substance dualism has the intractable problem of how the two substances interact.
- while idealism has problems, they are tractable.
By "intractable problem" I mean that no one, in the centuries in which these ontologies have been around, has the slightest idea of how the problem can be addressed, much less solved. All conjecture, speculation, or what have you is stopped at the outset. Idealism's main problem is why there appear to be things outside of consciousness, like rocks. This problem can be addressed, for example, by noting that a rock in a dream is clearly within consciousness, and conjecturing that the physical world is simply a shared dream with much more restrictive rules than our private dreams. I am not saying this is the solution, just that it could be, and at least shows that the problem is addressable.
I would say that hylemorphic dualism is two steps away from being idealism. The first step is to recognize that everything is in God's consciousness, and is kept in being 24/7 by God. Because of the doctrine of Divine Simplicity, God's sustaining power is identical to God as Pure Act which is identical to God's Thinking, and so every thing can be understood to be an idea of God. The second step is to replace the concept of prime matter with this power of God's thinking. That is, replace 'hyle' with God as Pure Act. This, to be sure, upends the actualizing role in the act/potency distinction for physical entities. Under this scheme, God, as the formless power of Thinking, actualizes form (thoughts) by thinking
| Theoretical Philosophy » The Existential Argument » 2/18/2018 2:26 pm |
- SR
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aftermathemat wrote:In other words, if ~PSR, then the universe could easily stop existing in the next 5 seconds for no reason. And what's worse is the fact that we have to take that possibility seriously because that is what ~PSR entails.
But if the PSR is true, and if one concludes from that that the ultimate reason for the universe's existence is that it is God's Will, then couldn't it also be God's Will that the universe will cease to exist five seconds from now?
| Theoretical Philosophy » Three Distinctions Among Kinds of Philosopher » 2/02/2018 6:00 pm |
- SR
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Well, I am a revisionist hedgehog, which I think also implies being a philosopher's philosopher, though I'm not sure about that. Does classical theism have any pull with non-philosophers?
My reason for being revisionist, by the way, is that I would argue that we should not trust common sense on the grounds of Original Sin, though I prefer to take the Vedanta view of it, and call it Maya. We must be deluded, since, if God is ubiquitous, then the reality of God should be obvious, but it isn't.
I'm not sure why I am a hedgehog. Maybe it is just easier for an amateur philosopher like myself.
Another distinction: tough vs tender-minded. From www.oxfordreference.com:Distinction drawn by James, who found it illuminating to classify philosophers into one of these two camps (Pragmatism, Ch. 1). The tender-minded are: rationalistic (going by ‘principles’), intellectualistic, idealistic, optimistic, religious, free-willist, monistic, and dogmatical. The tough-minded are: empiricist (going by ‘facts’), sensationalistic, materialistic, pessimistic, irreligious, fatalistic, pluralistic, and sceptical. Like Nietzsche, James believed that even intellectual and rational constructions, such as philosophical systems purport to be, are expressions of individual temperament.
| Theoretical Philosophy » Is prime matter necessary for change and limitation? » 2/02/2018 5:02 pm |
- SR
- Replies: 8
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RomanJoe wrote:
So what is exactly being actualized in this scenario though? With prime matter at least there is a potential substratum which needs to be determined by a prior actual cause.
Form is being actualized. This is not to say that there are non-actualized forms hanging around waiting to be actualized. (While AT says that there is no prime matter existing outside of form, in my scenario, there are no forms that are not actualized. We can, nevertheless, make a logical distinction between a form and its actualization.) However, not all forms are physically actualized. They can also be actualized as thoughts in our minds or in divine minds, and ultimately they are all thoughts in the mind of God.
With human artifacts this can be understood as someone having in mind a thing to be fashioned -- that's a form actualized as thought -- followed by drawing sketches -- form actualized as drawings -- followed by construction of the thing -- form as physically actualized. In each step, use is made of existing actualized forms -- simple concepts for thoughts, ink and paper for sketches, wood or whatever for the physical thing, and use is made of the form of the previous step. So the finished object contains the original thought-form.
For natural objects, I would say a similar process is carried out by divine mind or minds. In the first place, I consider the form of, say, a plant, to consist of its entire life cycle, so a seed is just a part of the whole form, as is the full-grown plant. So what I am suggesting is that this life-cycle form exists outside of physical reality, and then gets particularized with this non-physical form being physically elaborated by filling it out with existing molecular forms, with the energy required to make this happen being God as Energy. So it is forms "all the way down" being channeled by existing forms, propelled by Energy.But in this case how is it that they can be actualized in different places and different times? W
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| Theoretical Philosophy » Is prime matter necessary for change and limitation? » 1/26/2018 1:12 am |
- SR
- Replies: 8
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RomanJoe wrote:
What you say is interesting. I'm wondering, what do you make of Feser idea that prime matter HAS to exist if there is to be any change at all? Feser discusses this in Scholastic Metaphysics. He argues that since form is merely an actualizing principle, there has to be some determinable unactualized material which it can actualize. I guess one could argue that maybe we're treading too close to violating ex nihilo nihil fit if we don't have prime matter and merely see form as solely capable of taking on new forms without the aid of a purely potential substratum.
The reason prime matter is thought to be needed for change is that, being formless, it allows "room", so to speak, for form/matter composites to alter, and to come and go. But Pure Act is also formless (though the name given to that formlessness is usually 'simplicity'). Being formless, it too provides that room, while at the same time providing the energy for the change, which prime matter cannot provide. Feser's argument presupposes that it is the form of an actual being that actualizes the next actualized being in a causal sequence. I would say instead that the form only channels the Energy which is Pure Act that results in the actualized effect. So ex nihilo nihil fit still holds, in that new actualized things come from actualized things. It is just a question of what provides the actualizing power.
Another thing prime matter is said to provide is individuality. Two things with identical forms (perhaps, two electrons) are individualized by that form being composed with distinct bits of prime matter. (At least, this is how I understand it). But that same function can be provided by Pure Act -- the two things with identical form being separately actualized, in different places or different times.
| Theoretical Philosophy » Is prime matter necessary for change and limitation? » 1/24/2018 12:10 am |
- SR
- Replies: 8
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RomanJoe,
I think we can do what you suggest by expanding form to include the "form" of final causation. But first, one can dispense with prime matter by considering a form, considered in isolation from the thing of which it is the form, as entirely potential. A thing, then, is the actualization of this potential through the action of Pure Act, i.e., God as the sustainer of all things in existence. And so, a thing is a composite of form and God's actualizing power. Since (because of Divine Simplicity) God's actualizing power is the same as God's intellect, one can consider all things as ideas in the mind of God. This includes the ideas we would call final causes. Change is accounted for by the actualization of these final causes, for example, that a seed's form includes its propensity for becoming a plant, with Pure Act providing the ultimate efficient cause for its sprouting.
This also removes the difference between physical and non-physical things. A physical thing has a form which is, so to speak, "bulked out" with molecular constituents, while a non-physical thing isn't. One consequence is that material causes, like final causes, can be seen as embedded in the formal cause, so reducing the number of causes to two, formal and efficient.
As I see it, this is a simpler ontology than hylomorphism, without losing any explanatory power.
| Theoretical Philosophy » Objections to AT view of forms » 1/23/2018 11:57 pm |
- SR
- Replies: 44
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RomanJoe wrote:SR wrote:
I happen to agree with you that prime matter can be dispensed with. But not form.
I'm curious why you think this. Do you posit just some sort of secondary matter instead? Do you think potency does not need some substratum and can be attributed to a thing's form? The reason why I'm asking these questions is because I've been struggling with understanding prime matter. From what I can grasp, it's posited as a substratum that acts as the seat of potentiality in all material beings--it's a correlative basic material that form actualizes. I still don't understand why we can't just appeal to some sort of secondary matter or attribute potentials for new existences to the form of a substance.
Perhaps I could open this up into a separate thread if it begins to deviate from the OP too much.I will respond in your "Is prime matter necessary for change and limitation?" thread.
| Theoretical Philosophy » Objections to AT view of forms » 1/22/2018 6:48 pm |
- SR
- Replies: 44
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Drovot wrote:SR wrote:
I'm not an expert on AT, but my understanding of 'form' according to AT is that it includes all that distinguishes one class of entity from another.It is not just its physical components that distinguish a pig from, say, a rock. Another distinction is that it can sense its environment, while a rock can't, so that sensory capability is part of its form. A clearer example might be what AT considers the form of a human being. It includes reason and will, since that is what distinguishes human beings from other animals, not to mention rocks.
But why should we take the macroscopic features of reality as the prima facie form of the pig? This is one of my issues with AT form, it treats the macroscopic features as the fundamental features of a things--
It appears that for you the word 'form' simply means macroscopic appearance. But as I said that is not what AT means by 'form'. According to AT, the ability to reason is an essential part of a human's form, and that has nothing to do with macroscopic appearance.
...but when I take a microscope to the pig, when I dissect it, when I theorize about its inner structure, I learn that there is a complex world of matter mechanically moving. I don't find any form,
Well, yes you are finding form, as FrenchySkepticalCatholic says, you're just using the words 'structure' and 'arrangement' instead. A mathematical object has form (in the AT usage of the word) but has no macroscopic appearance at all, and there are those who say that all there is to know about a quark is its mathematical form.
I don't need to appeal to form to explain the unity and behavior of the pig. Theoretically I could explain the pig as a pig by tracing the individual motions of each particle of matter in accordance with physical laws.
This is a highly contentious statement. Only physicalists believe that animal behavior is theoretically explainable by reduction to microphysical motions. For exam
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| Theoretical Philosophy » Objections to AT view of forms » 1/21/2018 7:59 pm |
- SR
- Replies: 44
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Drovot wrote:
When you take a pig, though, there are multiple different levels of analysis you can conduct with regards to its material constitution. Muscle, blood, bone, chemicals, cells, molecules, atoms, quarks, etc. I don't see how the pig isn't reducible to these base levels.
I'm not an expert on AT, but my understanding of 'form' according to AT is that it includes all that distinguishes one class of entity from another.It is not just its physical components that distinguish a pig from, say, a rock. Another distinction is that it can sense its environment, while a rock can't, so that sensory capability is part of its form. A clearer example might be what AT considers the form of a human being. It includes reason and will, since that is what distinguishes human beings from other animals, not to mention rocks.
If anything, science has shown that the notion of homogeneous structures called forms are non existent. Things are more complex than just being one thing.
Forms can be very complex, and can include many levels. I am "just one thing", and my form is part physical, part animal, and part rational.
A pig, at its fundamental level, is the movement of a subatomic storm, no?
No. At its fundamental level a pig is alive, can sense, follow instincts, feel pain, and so forth. The subatomic storm is only the fundamental level of its mineral aspect.
There wouldn't be substantial change on this view, only the movements of subatomic secondary matter. I just am really having a hard time seeing how putting forth principles like form and an ever-elusive prime matter are relevant given our current understanding of material constitution.
I happen to agree with you that prime matter can be dispensed with. But not form.
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| Theoretical Philosophy » Objections to AT view of forms » 1/21/2018 3:05 pm |
- SR
- Replies: 44
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Drovot,
It is only the purely physical aspects of a pig that may be reducible to the properties of quarks and electrons. But that may not be the case when it comes to plants, and is almost certainly not the case when it comes to sentient animals. The form of a pig includes these vegetative and animal characteristics, for example, a pig's instincts, its ability to sense, feel hunger and act on it. None of that is reducible to the forms of physical particles. Of course, a physicalist believes they are reducible, but that's just wishful thinking on their part.